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Abstract
In established industry sectors, Reliability, Availability, Maintainability, and Safety
(RAMS) risk assessments are normally used to compare the risks associated with different
technologies on process units. Sanitation solutions are split into traditional wastewater treatment,
which is centralized treatment and can be classified as an established industry, and decentralized
treatment such as pit latrines and septic tank systems that are on much smaller scales. In addition,
they can be classified as non-conventional methods such as reinvented advanced decentralized
non-sewered sanitation solution techniques, which exist mainly in two forms as “Single-User
Reinvented Toilet (SURT)” systems or “Multiple-User Reinvented Toilet (MURT)” systems.
Advanced decentralized non-sewered sanitation systems include prefabricated advanced onsite
solutions, these types of sanitation technologies aim to meet global sanitation challenges such as
those stated in the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (UN SDG) and promoted by
the creation of the ISO 30500 standard for decentralized non-sewered sanitation systems, which
focuses on the general safety and performance requirements of such systems. Therefore, an
important step for meeting the global sanitation challenge is to assess existing technologies and
new emerging technologies to see if the gaps in the definition of sustainable sanitation as
determined by stakeholders are bridgeable with methodologies that go beyond just the provision
of sanitation. A logical methodical approach to sustainable sanitation includes the assessment of
reliability, availability, maintainability, and safety (RAMS). Taking into consideration these
aspects in a measurable way will help ensure that there is a robust mix of technologies, choice,
competition, and affordability of options for sanitation; all of which help ensure success however

xiv

it is defined. Additionally, standardization of approaches taken by different technology providers
in the achievement of global sanitation ambitions will ensure a level playing field in sanitation
design globally, which will enable decentralized systems to become more reliable, and more
efficient.
Thus, a focus on the qualitative determination of RAMS for SURTs and MURTs is
due. This paper aims to define the methodology and approach required in the determination and
qualification of the failure modes of decentralized sanitation systems based on RAMS analysis.
This approach will be based on a RAMS risk assessment framework informed by classifying the
stakeholder definition of failure.

xv

Chapter 1: Introduction
According to the World Health Organization (WHO), 32% of the global population (or
approximately 2.5 billion) struggle with unimproved sanitation systems. The health risks linked
to unimproved sanitation systems are said to cause 280,000 diarrhoeal deaths annually (Mihelcic
& Orner, 2018) and is a major factor in spreading other diseases in developing communities.
Therefore, there is a pressing need to introduce sanitation solutions that can treat human waste in
the context of wastewater treatment sanitation and perhaps even recycle domestic wastewater.
The development of what is now sanitation started as a necessity in the early 19th century
when industrialization, urbanization, and globalization played a huge part in the Cholera
epidemic that claimed half of the European population in that century. Now, in most developed
countries the sanitation solutions employed are centralized systems that collect and treat large
wastewater volumes for large residential communities, industrial and commercial areas.
However, as different stakeholders such as academia, philanthropists, entrepreneurs, government
bodies, non-government bodies, and so on, look at ways to help fulfill the United Nations global
sanitation aims, they are looking at alternative sanitation technologies, different from the types,
which already dominate the developed nations. In many cases, the development of sanitation in
developing nations in densely populated urban sectors involves transitioning to smaller
decentralized systems, which comprise of many units that may or may not be networked. The
existence of many more points significantly increases the probabilities of failure because many
more components or units can go wrong in these units with multiple smaller systems, and as such
a framework is needed to guide decision-makers through the elements of Reliability,
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Availability, Maintainability, and Safety (RAMS) which can help reduce failure events in these
systems. That these systems should be reliable, easy to maintain, and cost-effective, is a moot
point, but there needs to be a methodical process to achieve such aims if the process of RAMS in
sustainable sanitation is to be maintained long term. Additionally, the high levels of nutrients and
organic content in wastewater, means that technological options should aim to recover resources
from wastewater, thus providing additional benefits to the communities being served. Resource
recovery not only helps the community served but also helps in creating a sustainable planet,
where limited resources are managed to ensure planetary homeostasis. Therefore, a core aim of
the proposed RAMS methodology in sanitation is to look at sanitation from the user interface
and include resource recovery where possible.
The dissertation mainly addresses sanitation technologies involved in the achievement of
RAMS for sanitation and does not delve into the management programs required for effective
sanitation in homes and/or communities. Such management systems are expected to require
management entities, who ensure that RAMS failures are addressed in an efficient and timely
manner, and it is assumed that for the sanitation technologies discussed in this dissertation to be
successful that the management systems are applied as a baseline are robust and are efficient. To
ensure that the correct technologies are chosen which fit a functional requirement for sanitation
technology, which in this case is defined as a technology which is fit for purpose but not
necessarily the most basic forms of the technology; and which do not compromise safety or
hygiene levels, a risk-based approach should be taken to sanitation provision. This ensures that
different wastewater treatment approaches can be weighed against one another, and the correct
treatments deployed based on the requirements of the stakeholders, and not just the assumptions
of sanitation providers. Risk-based RAMS approaches can be used to provide that guidance. For
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example, an advanced decentralized sanitation system bound for the International Space Station
(ISS) would have to be compact, efficient, easy to diagnose and maintain and produce no
hazardous waste during flight, this would be a key stakeholder requirement for reliability,
maintainability, and safety because this assures the usability (i.e. availability) of the sanitation
system on board; however, an advanced decentralized sanitation solution system bound for a
rural settlement in a developing country wouldn’t have the same footprint constraints, though
the need to be easily maintainable, reliable and most importantly be able to treat the fecal matter
in such a way that there are no environmental discharges which may impact the community
adversely, remains high, though not as critical as when in a sealed environment such as a space
station. These two examples show that context, stakeholders’ definition of success/failure, and
fitness for service in context, are very important aspects of deployment of sanitation technology.
Systems that are designed with the ultimate stakeholders in mind, which in most cases are the
front-end interface users (though not strictly in all scenarios), are more likely to be successful
long term, and these core criteria form the basis of the RAMS framework assessment approach.
To coin a phrase “the customer is king”. The approach is designed to allow stakeholders to
determine what makes a system successful, whilst allowing experts and sanitation providers to
design sanitation approaches that fit those success criteria as long as they maintain and/or
improve RAMS. This also allows experts to use technology, to assess social norms to ensure that
those aspects that are significant to a particular group or culture are identified, prioritized, and
mitigated in the design of sanitation systems so that sanitation systems can be improved globally.
The methodology attempts to quantify failure, so whether it’s the failure of a flush system flow
which is easily quantifiable or the failure in the cleanliness of a toilet which is less easily
quantifiable, the approach is to determine which stakeholder is most affected and which RAMS
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aspects are most likely impacted, therefore creating a logical sequence of applying mitigations
which are targeted at the audience of interest or designed to improve the aspect of interest, as a
means to improve that failure, therefore improving the RAMS of the sanitation system overall.
In conclusion, it is expected that the success of a sanitation system will have strong
correlations with stakeholder definition of success/failure of the sanitation equipment, and
reliance on quantifiable factors such as reliability, availability, maintainability, and safety will
play a significant part in ensuring the high levels of system usefulness, which are needed to
ensure that the outcomes of better sanitation implementation remain sustainable in the long term.
1.1 Research Overview
RAMS encompasses machine reliability, availability, maintainability, microbial safety.
All aspects are considered to contribute to the overall sustainability of a sanitation system, and
there is a balance to be had in the way in which all aspects interact with each other. These factors
are researched by asking certain research questions.
1.1.1 Research Questions
The questions asked by the research are as follows:


Can we create a model that allows the RAMS behaviours of sanitation systems to be
assessed?



Can we create a consistent, practical, and reproducible framework that covers all
decentralized non-sewered sanitation systems as single or multiple users re-invent the
toilet systems? It is important to note that larger decentralized non-sewered sanitation
may require short sewer runs for conveyance, however non-sewered sanitation systems in
this dissertation refers to non-centralized non-sewered sanitation systems, which are on a
small scale serving normally less than 1000 users.
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Can we create a flexible method that can be used for volume or flow-based sanitation?

1.1.2 Research Hypothesis
If failure can be accurately defined for decentralized non-sewered sanitation systems using
stakeholder information and failure data as the source of initial quantification; then the success of
decentralized non-sewered sanitation systems can be guided by comparing the RAMS failure
information of different sanitation systems.
1.1.3 Research Objective
There is currently no RAMS framework for assessing sanitation technologies, therefore a
single framework to guide the development trajectory of new sanitation technologies is needed.
Thus, the objective of this research is to create such a tool that allows comparisons to be made
consistently and flexibly.
1.1.4 Proposed Solution
A new ISO standard (30500) has been developed specifically for non-sewered sanitation
systems by international experts. The experts represented a broad range of categories, that have
vested interests in the advancement of non-sewered decentralized sanitation systems (ISO
Central Secretariat, 2018), and were from sectors such as industry, government, academia, and
non-governmental organizations. The proposed solution is the creation of a RAMS framework
model, which incorporates information from the ISO 30500 standard for safety, and has at its
core the UN’s sustainable development goals for sanitation, in developing a model, which can be
applied flexibly and universally to decentralized sanitation systems to create fit for purpose
sanitation technologies. The framework is foreseen as a tool that will be used to determine the
most likely failure criteria for a range of decentralized sanitation systems, thus providing a
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predictive model for stakeholders to determine the best sanitation technologies to provide for
sanitation need for different scenarios.
In conclusion, a well-designed RAMS framework tool can help reduce expensive
unplanned operational outages, improve reliability by prioritizing failure reduction at design, and
improve overall human and environmental safety, whilst ensuring that the right products are
developed and installed for sanitation provision. In addition to these, the model can inform future
iterations of the ISO 30500 standard.
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Chapter 2. Background and Review
2.1 Introduction
This chapter introduces the concepts of reliability, availability, maintenance, and safety
(RAMS) in the context of sanitation. This chapter aims to be descriptive and show the logical
sequence in which the required risk estimations can be achieved in sanitation by adapting
concepts already employed in other engineering sectors, for sanitation RAMS analysis. It shows
what constitutes centralized and decentralized sanitation, the advantages and disadvantages of
each, and aspects that can be advanced to make the systems more successful. It describes options
for characterizing sanitation systems, which will help in the process of defining typical sanitation
systems for the framework methodology. This chapter also introduces the origins of RAMS, the
different types of sanitation systems that the RAMS framework may be applied to, and the
boundaries and scopes available in the characterization of decentralized sanitation systems. The
literature review delves into the history, types, and complexities of different sanitation
technologies, the benefits of hybridization, and the importance of RAMS analysis in determining
what types of sanitation strategies to pursue based on the receiving population and economies of
scale.
2.2 Descriptions of Typical Sanitation Systems
A description of typical sanitation systems follows. Generally, sanitation systems are
either centralized or decentralized. These are the extreme ends of sanitation provision and
predominantly based on population numbers served. Decentralized systems can serve single
households and centralized systems may serve many million users.
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2.2.1 Centralized Wastewater Treatment Systems
In most developed countries, the wastewater treatment technology employed is
centralized systems that collect and treat large wastewater volumes for large residential
communities, industrial and commercial areas. They usually comprise the use of “large pipes,
pumping systems, various access routes, constructions, equipment and treatment facilities, far
away from the wastewater generation source” (Zaharia, 2017; Särkilahti, et al., 2017). They are
typically characterized by large transfer infrastructure costs and large restoration costs
(Eggimann, et al., 2015). Centralized wastewater treatment systems are well-understood
technology because they have been used since the 19th century; therefore, it is unlikely that there
will be an imminent rush to change them for decentralized systems everywhere. Centralized
systems are thus currently embedded in developed nations. Even though decentralized systems
with high network connectivity are sometimes a more effective option. So, in Europe and North
America, there is little chance that decentralization will become the norm. However, for global
sanitation, especially in places without existing centralized systems in place, centralized systems
may no longer be the best solution for global sanitation (Abellán, 2017; Wilderer et al., 2000). It
is therefore fair to say that “the superiority of the centralized sanitation paradigm can no longer
be taken for granted and questions about the optimal degree of centralization need to be
addressed” (Eggimann, et al., 2015), when sanitation options are being considered. In developing
nations such as India and in sub-Saharan Africa, where sanitation options are keenly under
consideration due to focus from the World Health Organization (WHO) and other agencies
interested in promoting global sanitation, there is a case for examining all the successes and
failures of centralized systems, to see where other more flexible options which are more suited to
the specific needs of these locations (Tatjana, et al., 2020)
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2.2.2 Decentralized Sanitation Systems
Decentralized treatment is the collection of wastewaters from a single source or multiple
sources, with no sewer runs or short sewer runs, and a treatment location local to the collection
points. The standout differentiator between centralized and decentralized systems is that in
decentralized systems, wastewater is treated closer to the source without extensive sewer runs
and collection systems (Libralato, et al., 2012) “Decentralized systems include onsite units that
treat wastewater from individual homes or buildings as well as cluster systems that treat
wastewater from groups of two or more homes but typically less than one hundred homes”
(Wang, 2014). One of the main advantages of decentralized systems is that they are characterized
by absent or short sewer runs (Jung, et al., 2018, Capodaglio, 2017), so fewer opportunities for
blockages and leaks, but also they can be deployed very quickly and installed quickly; which
when considered for instances where there are ongoing public health epidemics due to
insufficient sanitation is a crucial advantage. “Decentralized wastewater management increases
reuse opportunities” (Lijó, et al., 2017), because the valuable resource in wastewater can be
concentrated up in small volumes and recovered more practically, using less energy for
concentration due to proximity of sources to concentration locations. Also, the recovered
resources can be reused close to the source of wastewater, meaning benefits are more likely to be
realized by the community who invested in the infrastructure in the first place. This proximity
control helps stakeholders avoid much of the infrastructure costs, that normally accompany
centralized systems (Jorsaraei, et al.; 2014, Jung et al., 2018). In addition, proximity allows the
users to have more say in the RAMS requirement of the sanitation system in their community or
located close to their homes, as they have more personal stakes in the success or failure of the
wastewater treatment systems. This creates an imperative for integrating flexibility in the
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approach used in integrating sanitation systems to the potential users, where “cost considerations,
treatment efficiency, and social values can be central themes” (Suriyachan, et al., 2012;
Massoud, et al., 2009). There is still a lot to be understood about the comparative costs of
centralized and decentralized systems (Eggimann, et al., 2015; Librality, et al., 2012), however,
the consensus is that a mix of the two main types of configurations i.e. centralized and
decentralized sanitation options, will be required to fulfill the United Nations sanitation target
globally.
Decentralized systems additionally can be traditional and advanced, characterized by
whether they require energy input for operation or not. Advanced systems require energy input
such as electrical, solar, hydro, etc. and traditional systems such as pit latrine are operational
without any additional energy input. Both advanced and traditional systems can be with or
without resource recovery. Advanced systems are also generally made up of operational parts,
which are more complex, so they can be systems comprising anaerobic reactors, aerobic reactors
with and without membranes, biogas reactors, constructed wetland, microbial fuel cells, etc.,
whilst traditional decentralized wastewater treatment systems are less technology-intensive at
their core. Traditional decentralized sanitation systems exist mainly to provide a service to
separate wastewater from humans by physical separation at source and very little treatment
thereafter, and where treatment is added it is via the deliberate creation of a sanitation service
chain.
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Figure 2.1: Centralized Wastewater Treatment Systems

11

Figure 2.2: Decentralized Sanitation Systems
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2.2.2.1 Advanced Decentralized Sanitation Treatment System
Advanced decentralized sanitation systems require energy input. Advanced systems can
range from physical separation with chemical treatment only or biological treatment systems
such as the University of South Florida NEWgenerator system, which is designed to be a solarpowered multiple user community-based system. Advanced decentralized sanitation systems can
also be single household systems such as the Cranfield University’s nanomembrane toilet, which
generates power by combusting the fecal waste that is deposited into the toilet or multihousehold systems, which can be used by a community or several households.
Advanced systems are typically advanced engineered treatment systems and may be
coupled with filtration mechanisms after the biological process to achieve solid/liquid separation.
Many advanced decentralized systems, also combine sanitation with resource recovery due to the
ability to recover valuable materials such as filter cake from the filtration step for soil enhancers,
heating briquettes, biogas generation, compost, etc., as well as treated water, which can be reused
for flushing, hand washing, laundry, etc. However, this can introduce an increase in complexity
that affects the inherent reliabilities of system components. Increased complexity influences the
RAMS of a system; it increases the numbers of components requiring maintenance to minimize
failure, meaning the costs associated with maintaining the reliability of the system increases.
Thus, for advanced systems complexities are an inherent factor for assessing RAMS success,
particularly where maintenance costs are involved. Operational maintenance strategies must be
implemented which increase the mean time before failure of components so that failure
occurrences and therefore costs of rectification and/or downtime are minimized.
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2.2.2.1.1 SURT and MURT – Advanced Decentralized Non-sewered Sanitation Systems
SURTs and MURTs are Single-User Reinvented Toilet (SURT) and Multiple-User
Reinvented Toilet (MURT) systems. SURTs are advanced single-user systems that serve one
household. This means they are generally installed within the single home and are designed to
treat the waste generated from a single unit, which is typically around a maximum of 10 users
per day, for example, a family. MURTs are advanced sanitation systems designed to treat
wastewater from a larger number of users and are typically installed as multiple household /
communal user systems. So, the wastewater treated will be combined wastewater flows from
different households, multiple user settings such as a school (many pupils and students from
different homes), apartment blocks (different apartment units’ wastewater flows combined in
short sewer runs), communities, community centers, malls, etc. MURTs are typically
characterized by multiple user interfaces i.e. multiple toilet bowls with waste/wastewater
conveyed a short distance to a decentralized but centrally located treatment location that is near
the user interface. The wastewater here is not transferred to a typical centralized sanitation
solutions facility under normal operating conditions, though this could be an option in the event
of decentralized treatment system failure. The number of users of a multiple user system can
vary and is dependent on the design and capability of the treatment system, however, users are
from different households, and more than 10 people typically use the systems. The criteria set for
the assessment of RAMS for this framework is up to 10 people for SURT and less than 100 for
each decentralized MURT. Examples of SURTs are the Sabine Schober toilet which “uses the
Terra Preta Sanitation technology, which treats pee and poo by mixing it with charcoal to
produce highly fertile soil for reforestation” (Inhabitant, 2015), the Loowatt Toilet, the Cranfield
NanoMembrane Toilet, the EAWAG Blue Autarky Toilet, the Toronto Toilet, the Sedron
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Firelight Toilet, the HTClean by Helbling and much more. These are described as Class 1 AND
Class 2 in the ISO 30500 standard, where class 1 and class 2 systems have one front-end
interface but can have physical treatment or include biological treatment as class 1 or 2
respectively. . Examples of MURTs are the USF NEWgenerator system, the Duke empower
sanitation system, the Eco-san toilet, the CLEAR system, etc. These are also described as class 3
because they have multiple front-end interfaces.
There is another type of decentralized sanitation system, which fits between a SURT or
MURT and a centralized system and confers a hybrid sanitation solution. Thus, they provide the
flexibility of a decentralized system but the scale (buffer capacity) benefits of a centralized
system. Systems such as this also cover scenarios where MURTS or SURTS are networked.
They are of modular construction, with different sections connected, so that they can work
interconnected or independently. Hybrid systems exemplify the scalability between the two
extremes of centralization and decentralization. However, for this research, they will be referred
to in background research only, and the focus will be systems that can either be SURTS or
MURTS independent of scalability. There will be some description of the characteristic of the
hybrid system and discussions of some of the benefits of hybrid systems in specific contexts,
compared with the two extremes of focus.
SURTs and MURTs can also be open-loop, semi closed-loop, and closed-loop sanitation
systems. Open-loop systems are systems that are connected to the municipal water supply system
or have a source of continuous water input that originates from outside the sanitation subsystem
boundary. Semi closed-loop systems are systems that are initially charged with water to set the
system up for steady-state operation, but once the system is charged the water source is separated
from the sanitation system boundary with no further input except to top up the charge from time
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to time. Closed-loop systems as the name suggest have no freshwater input before or after
starting up. The table below shows examples of each system (Gates Foundation, 2018).
Table 2.1: Types of Advanced Decentralized Sanitation Treatment System

SURT

Subsystem

Open-loop system

Back-end
only



Back-end
only

Closed-loop
system





Duke Reclaimer
system

Integrated
front-end and
back-end

MURT

Semi closed-loop
system (requires
initial water
charge)







University of South
Florida’s
NEWgenerator
Clear Recycling
Toilet
SCG Chemicals Co.,
Ltd, Zylone cube







Front-end
only



HTC Helbling
Toilet
EAWAG Blue
Diversion
Autarky



University of
Toronto,
Toronto Toilet
Cranfield
Nanomembrane
Toilet

Duke
University’s
Empower
Sanitation
Platform
Eco-San Toilet
University of
South Florida’s
NEWgenerator
Clear
Recycling
Toilet

ERAM Scientific
Solutions’ E-Toilet

2.2.4.1 System Boundaries of SURTs and MURTs
SURTs and MURTs contain subsystems that are adapted to several functions. The subsystems
are usually comprised:


Front-end: User interface



Middle: Conveyance, Transfer, Storage



Back-end: Treatment, Disposal/Resource Re-use
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It is important to note that sometimes transfer pipework is nonexistent in decentralized sanitation
systems such as in the Cranfield nanomembrane toilet; however, there will still be some form of
conveyancing process that takes wastewater between the subsystem stages. The Cranfield
nanomembrane system has an Archimedes screw conveyancing system for solid waste transfer
from the front-end to the middle and a heat enhanced aspiration system for liquid waste. The
system boundaries of different types of SURTs and MURTs based on the wetness (link to utility
water) of the system is shown as follows:

Figure 2.3: Conceptual Closed-loop Non-sewered Sanitation System for SURT
(The dotted line represents an optional feature)
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Figure 2.4: Conceptual Semi-Closed-loop Non-sewered Sanitation System for SURT
(The dotted line represents an optional feature)

Figure 2.5: Conceptual Open-loop Non-sewered Sanitation System for MURT
(The dotted line represents an optional feature)
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Figure 2.6: Conceptual Semi-Closed-loop Non-sewered Sanitation System for MURT
(The dotted line represents an optional feature)

Figure 2.7: Conceptual Closed-loop Non-sewered Sanitation System for MURT
(The dotted line represents an optional feature)
Note that open-loop SURTs are not shown in the pictorial representations of system
boundaries based on wetness, this is because a normal cistern flush system which is commonly
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seen in most homes connected to traditional sanitation systems in areas with water flush systems
is an open-loop SURT. For the systems depicted above the subsystems are divided as follows,
the first part of the subsystem is the front-end:


A - Front-end/User interface (toilet pedestal, squat pan, etc.)



Dx – Municipal water / Water top up line



D2 – Fresh / Treated water storage



D3 – Water conveyance to Front-end

The next part of the subsystem is the middle.


B1 - Raw untreated water conveyance



B2 – Buffer tank (Pre-treatment, buffer storage, and/or equalization)



B3 / Bx - Post equalization conveyance (including transfer by trucks) and Maintenance

The final part of the subsystem is the back-end


C – Treatment (Anaerobic biological: Membrane, digestion; thermal destruction,
electrochemical disinfection, adsorption, chemical dosing, etc.)



D1- Treated water recycle (urban re-use)



Cx - Safe discharge (Sewer, Surface water, groundwater, etc.)
Table 2.2: SURT and MURT Comparison Table

Characteristic
Locations
Setting

SURT
Private home (family)
Indoor

MURT
Multi-family, Schools, shopping malls, etc.
Outdoor/public

Table 2.3: SURT and MURT Design Comparison Table
Characteristic
Number of front-ends
(seat or squat)
Number of users/d

SURT
Single

MURT
Multiple

<10

10 - 1000

Expected lifespan

1-3 years

Up to 10 years



References
Number of front-ends (seat or squat)



Roefs et al., 2017
 Wang, 2014
(Gates Foundation, 2018)
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Table 2.3: (Continued)
Characteristic
SURT
MURT
Potential technologies –
Cranfield
Pit Latrine including
Nanomembrane
VIP
showing some of the
Toilet
USF NEWgenerator
existing options in service
(Bair, 2018)
or being tested around the Sabine Schober
Toilet
Duke Empower
world.
Loowat
Sanitation System
Helbling
(STeP Sanitation
EAWAG blue Technology Platform,
n.d.)
Autarky
Eco-San toilet (ANSI,
n.d.)

Non-RAMS constraints
and considerations

Size, aesthetics
Cost
Complexity
Ease of
cleaning
Speed of
emergency
response/lag
Odor

Reliability considerations

Footprint
Cost
Complexity
Cultural acceptance
Ease of cleaning
Networkability
External façade
Odor
Future population
growth
Durability, cleanliness,
etc.

Availability
considerations

Limited user
impact

Multiple user impact

Maintenance
considerations

Availability of Common spares
alternative
front-ends

Safety considerations

Hygiene
Overflow etc.

Multiple user impact
Disease transfer
Hygiene etc.

 References
 hybrid MD-RED (Mercer, et al., 2019)
 AnMBR / SBR (Lijó, et al., 2017)
 EAWAG Blue Autarky (EAWAG,
2018), (Larsen, et al., 2015)
 The Cranfield nanomembrane toilet
(Cranfield University, 2018)
 Pit Latrine including VIP
 Simple bucket toilet filled with wood
shavings (Weride magazine, n.d.)
 The Sabine Schober toilet (Inhabitant,
2015)
 The loowat (Loowatt, n.d.)
 Helbling HTClean (Sanitation, 2018)
 Roefs et al., 2017
 Gaulke, 2009
 Murphy, et al., 2009
 Archer, 2012
 vacuum-biogas system for around 400
inhabitants that has been built in
Lübeck, Germany modular for up to
10,000 people (Otterphol, 2002)






















Azarkhail et al., 2012
Eti et al.,2007
Saleh et al., 2006
Bassan et al., 2015
O’Connor & Kleyner, 2011
O’Connor & Kleyner, 2011
Pedroni, et al., 2017
Wan, et al., 2017
Marias, et al., 2013
Smoot, 2017
Meeks, 2012
Mara, 2003
Grant et al., 2012
Shi et al., 2016
Stevens et al., 2017
Gibney, et al., 2013, McDermott, et al.,
2009
Orymowska & Sobkowicz, 2017
Davies, et al., 2017
Water Research Australia, 2014
Bastirai, et al., 2018)
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Table 2.4: Front-end User Interface Examples
Typical decentralized sanitation system examples

Typical front-end



Ventilated Improved Pit Latrine

Squat: pan/hole
Water sealed pour-flush

Multiple user system interfaces for systems such as
NEWgenerator, Duke Empower Sanitation System

Multiple pedestals or toilet bowl systems

All in one single user system e.g., EAWAG Blue Autarky,
Cranfield nanomembrane toilet

Single pedestal/toilet bowl per unit

Table 2.5: Back-End Treatment Examples
Typical decentralized
sanitation system examples
Pit Latrine
Treatment systems for MURT
treatment i.e. systems such as
NEWgenerator, Duke Empower
Sanitation System, etc.
All in one single user system
e.g., EAWAG Blue Autarky,
Cranfield nanomembrane toilet

Typical Middle
Pit
NEWgenerator: Equalisation - Anaerobic membrane treatment- active
filtration – ozone disinfection
Duke Empower Sanitation System: Active filtration - electrochemical
disinfection – Anaerobic digestion
Cranfield Nanomembrane toilet: Sedimentation - transpiration –
nanofiltration – combustion
EAWAG Blue Autarky: Supercritical water oxidation - biological
membrane reactor - active filtration- electrolysis

Table 2.6: Back-End Recovery Examples
Typical decentralized
sanitation system examples
Pit Latrine
Recovery systems for MURT
treatment e.g. NEWgenerator,
Duke Empower Sanitation
System
All in one single user system
e.g., EAWAG Blue Autarky,
Cranfield nanomembrane toilet

Typical Back-End
Not applicable: requires pit emptying when full
NEWgenerator resource recovery: hydroponics water, clean water, biogas
Duke Empower Sanitation System resource recovery: clean water
Cranfield Nanomembrane toilet resource recovery: flush water
EAWAG Blue Autarky resource recovery: clean water

2.2.2.1.1.1 Scaling Schemes of SURTs and MURTs
Decentralized sanitation systems can also be defined by scale. The number of users
determines the scale. The smallest scale of a non-sewered decentralized sanitation system is a
system for a single user or just a couple of users, and example such as the Laveo closed-loop
flush toilet, which is a patented battery powered and cartridge-based closed-loop toilet system,
without back-end treatment. This can be used on camping trips, in a motor home, or other setting
where access to water is difficult and treatment is not essential for the scenario. This type of
22

treatment is not considered a decentralized non-sewered sanitation system because it does not
possess a treatment stage. Single user sanitation systems meaning single household or single
facility systems, combine treatment with the front-end. The Cranfield toilet or the HTC Helbling
toilet are examples of these. These cater generally for 1 to 10 people. These systems are nonsewered decentralized sanitation systems because they incorporate treatment with the front-end
system.
Decentralized non-sewered sanitation systems can be closed-loop systems such as the
Cranfield toilet or semi closed-loop systems such as the HTC Helbling toilet. Open-loop, semi
closed-loop, and closed-loop MURTs form the next stage of scale and cater to communities or
people numbering from 10 to 1000 users. Generally, the more open-loop the system the more
users it can cater to, simply because the requirement for water recycle and storage is a limiting
factor in the footprint of a MURT system. This means that MURT systems that are either able to
recycle most of their water or are fully open-loop systems that tie into municipal water, are likely
to cater to more users. Therefore systems such as the Eco-San toilet that is semi closed-loop
MURT but can recover 4-5 m3 of water per day (Gates Foundation, 2018) can cater for up to 800
users, whereas the EAWAG blue diversion autarky can recover up to 30 litres per day is said to
be available to 10+ users per day per stall. Systems such as the EAWAG autarky can be
networked to cater to more users, however, costs of maintenance to maintain reliable service, and
reduce common-mode failures will need to be considered. A semi closed-loop MURT such as
the NEWgenerator is scalable to cater for up to 1000 users. It has the option of tie into water
sources or to be fully on recycled water, giving the flexibility to be either a semi closed-loop or
an open-loop MURT, which creates full scalability from 10 – 1000 users dependent on the
scenario.
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Centralized wastewater treatment systems could be thought of as giant MURTs with
extended middle sections (sewer collection systems), which can cater to millions of users,
ultimately these systems have the same steps; front-end – in-home user interface, middle –
transfer pipes to centralized treatment, and back-end which is the treatment, discharge / recycle.
It is also important to note that the backend in the ISO 30500 standards does not separate into the
“middle” and “backend”, but for this research, the backend has been separated into the two
stages, making the sanitation system comprised of three sections.
Table 2.7: Decentralized Non-sewered Sanitation System Interpretations
ISO Interpretation
Front-end (Toilet System)

Research Interpretation
Front-end (Toilet/User Interface)
Middle 

Conveyance

Back-end (Treatment
Buffer / Equalization
Back-end (Treatment, safe discharge, and/or recycle)

Table 2.8: User Scale of Decentralized Non-sewered Sanitation Systems
Users
<10

Open-Loop/Dry-Loop
Open-loop or closed-loop SURT

Design
Single
household
systems

Examples
Cranfield
nanomembrane
Toilet, HTC
Helbling, Toronto
Toilet, etc.

Scheme
Decentralized

10 - 100

Open-loop or closed-loop SURT
or MURT

Networked
SURT
Small-scale
MURT

EAWAG Blue
autarky, USF
NEWgenerator,
ERAM scientific
solutions E-toilet
Duke empower
sanitation
platform, etc.

Decentralized

100 1000

Open-loop or closed-loop
MURT

Multiple
household
systems

Zylone cube, Ecosan Toilet, USF
NEWgenerator,
etc.

Decentralized/Hybrid
(ISO 30500)
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Table 2.8: (Continued)
1000 – 10,000

Open-loop MURT

>10,000

Open-loop MURT

Networked
sanitation
treatment
systems
(networked
systems require
conveyance e.g.
water, pumps,
etc.) or truck
transport
Large scale
sewered
systems

Networked
NEWgenerator,
networked
Zylone cube, etc.

Hybrid (ISO 31800
for community-scale
sanitation)

Centralized
sewered
sanitation
systems

Centralized

So, it is clear that there are several configurations of sanitation technologies across the
globe in terms of scale, in fact, “the types of water supply and sanitation technologies that have
developed in the UK and other industrialized countries are inappropriate for the 2.9 billion
people needing adequate water supplies and the 4.2 billion people needing adequate sanitation by
the end of 2025” (Mara, 2003; Wilderer et al., 2000). Technologies that are used in the
developed world are expensive, generally inflexible due to their centralized nature (Libralato, et
al., 2012; Wilderer et al., 2000), and large. They require infrastructure that is nearly impossible
to install in areas where they are not already present due to the scale required. However, “the
delivery of water and sanitation services together with the promotion of hygiene is central to
public health” (Ricard Giné-Garriga, 2013), and to ensure that new systems are adopted for long
term sanitation as required by the goal of the United Nations, even where large scale is not
possible, improvement technologies should as a minimum meet the basic needs of users, be of
sound technology and function properly (Wilderer et al., 2000), using options for individual,
cluster and networked decentralized wastewater treatment systems, which offer an alternative to
centralization is key.
Advanced decentralized non-sewered sanitation systems offer more control over the
pathogenic release, compared with the use of traditional sanitation systems in areas that do not
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currently have sanitation systems in situ, they also offer better source control. Largely because
the volumes collected in SURTs and MURTs are smaller than those collected in centralized
wastewater treatment systems. Centralization has an inherent inflexibility due to the larger scale
but does provide benefits for equalization and buffering. This inherent volume mixing control of
COD gives opportunities for economies of scale in centralized systems, because the larger
combined volumes confer larger dilution factors, making larger systems such as centralized
systems more economical for scenarios where there are users in the multiples of thousands and
millions, and where input quality and toxicity cannot be controlled. So “decentralized sourceseparated systems do not benefit from economies of scale as they generally serve fewer
population equivalents (PE) than the conventional centralized systems” (Roefs, et al., 2017) but
they do benefit from a smaller unit size which allows for closer matching to growing user
demand and they provide a “build-as-you-need” or “just-in-time” capacity that can be added
incrementally; therefore, the costs of idle capacity which are associated with centralized systems
which can often be oversized in the design stages, to allow for population expansion can be
saved (Wang, 2014). Thus, smaller systems can provide better cost savings in some contexts, and
it may seem easy to assume that, being of smaller size, and having the opportunity to be
modified more easily, separation of waste i.e. source separation, can close the gap in costs when
compared on a per capita basis with centralized sanitation options. It is also easy to assume that
source separation can reduce the size of SURTs and MURTs if separated streams are removed
from the treatment system efficiently, so that they are dealt with outside the core sanitation
system, however contrary to expectations, source separation in decentralized sanitation on its
own, does not show immediate RAMS or economic gains because it introduces more processing
stages within the lifecycle of sanitation loops. More processing stages lead to more components
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that inevitably leads to more opportunities for failure and higher maintenance costs. The
additional stages needed for the collection of separated streams and the recycling stages also add
layers of energy usage. So, rather than see the benefits of decentralization where source
separation is incorporated as a means to reduce costs and footprint, it should be seen as a
paradigm shift in sanitation where the re-use of material are integrated into more sustainable
ways of achieving sanitation (Thibodeau, et al., 2014). Mostly source separation focuses on the
separation of greywater from black water (Otterpohl, et al.,2003, Gros, et al.,2020), and there is a
benefit from greywater being processed separately, as it’ll require less energy for treatment than
if combined with a flow with more COD loading. However, the key point is not to assume that
source separation will automatically achieve the aims of improved economies of scale in
decentralized systems, particularly in MURTs. In contradiction again, source separation may still
hold the key to achieving better economies of scale in self-contained wastewater treatment
system such as SURTs, if useful materials with economic benefits can be produced from
separated waste streams e.g. struvite from separated urine, and sold by the producers in a
manufactured service chain aimed at resource recovery, but this is outside the scope of the
sanitation system boundaries itself. The ability to maintain efficient source separation and
minimize the need for dilution and treatment, in SURTS could simply mean a smaller system
that fits more comfortably into a household can be designed, and here smaller sizes can confer an
economic advantage from a marketing standpoint, as long as high RAMS levels are maintained.
The main benefit of source separation in both types of decentralized systems is to minimize
uncontrolled COD loading on the treatment stages and capture useful products, which can be of
benefit economically and environmentally if the appropriate service chains can be realized, but it
is not a given that source separation will create economic advantages for SURTs and MURTs
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over-centralization in terms of economies of scale, due to the number of additional intermediate
stages required for source separation in decentralization. If the maximum footprint is a key
stakeholder definition of failure for a decentralized sanitation system, however, source
separation, which relies only on physical diversion, may help achieve smaller footprints, as long
as the complexities of treating the separated streams are externalized from the sanitation system.
In the future, sanitation of residential houses and source separation may well include
high-tech recycling of wastewater from greywater, brown water, and blackwater sources. There
may be toilets that divert solid waste to treatment to create solid fertilizer, there may be houses
that recycle wastewater to create their flush water and even tap water, and “many urban areas of
the future could simply be without sewerage systems” (Otterphol, 2002). Even now, there is the
technical ability to achieve such autonomy in sanitation with the advent of toilets such as the
Cranfield toilet for SURT systems. With increasing economic viability, there is ever closer
realization for MURT systems as well e.g. the USF’s NEWgenerator system, which uses solarpowered membrane technology to treat wastewater. The aim of decentralization must therefore
be, to find a future where the reliability, availability, maintainability, and safety for sanitation
systems are combined so that a completely off-grid sanitation ideal can be achieved, where all
front-end users have appropriately scaled sanitation within their homes, and do not have to deal
with their own waste/wastewater directly (Särkilahti, et al., 2017) but can still enjoy the benefits
of localized treatment systems, which provide resource recovery, autonomy, and flexibility.
An analysis of trends in wastewater management defines the advantages and
disadvantages of both centralized and decentralized treatment approaches, and it tends to be that
there are many overlapping advantages and disadvantages (Libralato, et al., 2012). Some features
of full centralization as a function of scale are as follows:
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Centralization is more cost-effective based on economies of scale (Junga et al., 2018,
Roefs, et al., 2017, Libralito et al., 2012), though when the cost of wastewater
collection infrastructure is included this can quickly change in favor of
decentralization, particularly if the population is widespread and piping costs are
disproportionately large.



Centralization allows for consistency of flow constituents into the treatment stage by
offering higher buffer capacities for equalization (Roefs, et al., 2017, Libralito et al.,
2012)



In centralization, end users only interact with the front-end interfaces and do not need
to worry about i.e. flush and forget (Abellán, 2017, Särkilahti, et al., 2017).



Because of the scale of infrastructure, sanitation projects are carried out mainly by
public enterprises, since sanitation never was an attractive sector for private
initiatives (Abellán, 2017), so the cost to end-users tends to be lower than privately
operated systems.



It is more costly to install centralized systems in established urbanized locations due
to the vast network of collection systems required (Libralato, et al., 2012)



Land use requirement for centralized systems is often high (Abellán, 2017,
Särkilahti, et al., 2017), though decentralized systems which treat approximately the
same level of users use more land in total when individual land requirements are
added up (Jung, et al., 2018).



Centralized systems have larger maintenance costs and bigger user impact when
systems fail, due to the number of users.
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The initial CapEx outlay is higher in centralized wastewater treatment systems (Jung,
et al., 2018), but centralized systems tend to be on a subscription basis where a
monthly sewerage charge is paid for the public service over generations, so the cost
is simply another utility bill, and most palatable to users, due to the scale of costsharing involved.



There is higher heavy metal contamination in centralized systems due to aggregation
and mixing of flows (Roefs, et al., 2017), whereas decentralized systems concentrate
risks in smaller volumes thus limiting contamination to smaller volumetric sizes
(Kujawa-Roeleveld & Zeema, 2006)



There is a higher potential for larger environmental contamination leading to
eutrophication due to larger volumes if centralized systems fail and discharge into the
environment.



Collected freshwater such as rainwater, are also transported to treatment works, thus
taking up the volume and sometimes having unnecessary treatment. This can be
inefficient and more expensive if there are no options to divert but may also confer
dilution benefits.



Centralized systems are less protected in event of natural disasters due to their scale.



Higher energy demand compared with decentralized systems, which can be modified
to use renewable sources more easily.



Due to scale, centralized systems have a strong dependency on the public electrical
grid.

Decentralized sanitation systems can;


Be cheaper, where there are high centralization infrastructure costs to contend with.
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Offer flow consistency, where there are managed source separation strategies or
installed equalization tank /diversion systems to prevent shock loading.



Be designed so that the only interaction the front-end users have is with the user
interface.



Be of interest to private investors and public sanitation providers, because of the
resource recovery benefits.



Be installed in established urbanized locations.



Require less land compared with centralized systems on an individual basis.



Have lower maintenance costs.



Have a smaller overall impact if the system fails, because fewer people are connected
to a single system than a comparative centralized scenario.



Be easier to replace.



Have lower energy demand, especially if they also have renewable energy source
integrations.

2.2.2.2 Traditional Decentralized Wastewater Treatment System
Traditional decentralized systems are characterized by their lack of energy requirement
for treatment.
The generic types available are broken down based on resource recovery availability,
depending on whether this is present or not.
A break down by (Orner & Mihelcic, 2018) is shown in the table below, and includes a
description of each type, of which there can be unimproved and improved with or without
resource recovery respectively.
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Table 2.9: Types of Traditional Decentralized Wastewater Treatment System
Adapted from: (Orner & Mihelcic, 2018)
Traditional decentralized sanitation type

Resource
Recovery

Unimproved – typically do no more than store
human feces
Improved – these systems are designed to offer
an improvement on the sanitation provision of
unimproved systems, by providing a form of
treatment for fecal waste

Not provided

Improved – these systems offer resource
recovery in addition to the treatment of the
fecal matter

Yes provided

Not provided

Examples of improved and
unimproved traditional
decentralized sanitation
systems.
dig and cover and
bucket latrine
ventilated improved pit
(VIP) latrine
pour-flush toilet
connected to a septic
tank
soak pit/soakaway
septic tanks
double-vault
composting latrine
urine-diverting
composting latrine
Land spreading and
dehydration
Composting
Septic tanks with
biogas/compost
recovery

2.3 The ISO Standard for Non-sewered Sanitation Systems: 30500:2018
There have been attempts to standardize non-sewered sanitation systems and the first
effort at such standardization is the introduction of the ISO 30500 standard for non-sewered
sanitation systems. ISO 30500 is an international standard published by the International
Organization for Standardization (ISO) central secretariat, which develops and publishes
international standards. The primary objective of ISO 30500 is to provide guidance on “general
safety and performance requirements for design and testing as well as sustainability
considerations for non-sewered sanitation systems. Non-sewered sanitation systems for this
document and according to the ISO standard itself is a prefabricated sanitation solution system. It
is assumed to comprise of a frontend (toilet facility) middle (conveyance and storage buffer) and
backend (treatment facility, discharge, and/or recovery) components that
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“a) Collects, conveys, and fully treats the specific input within the system, to allow for
safe reuse or disposal of the generated solid, liquid, and gaseous output, and
b) Is not connected to a networked sewer or networked drainage system.
The ISO30500 document applies to sanitation systems that are either manufactured as one
package or manufactured as a set of prefabricated elements designed to be assembled in one
location without further fabrication or modification that influences the system function. The
plane or surface (e.g. flooring, concrete pad) upon which a fully assembled non-sewered
sanitation system is situated is beyond the scope of the ISO 30500 document” (ISO 30500,
2018).
Experts from 46 countries were involved in the creation of the ISO 30500 standard for
decentralized non-sewered sanitation systems. The experts represented a broad range of
categories, that have vested interests in the advancement of non-sewered decentralized sanitation
systems (ISO Central Secretariat, 2018), and were from sectors such as industry, government,
academia, and non-governmental organizations. The ISO 30500 standard forms a basis for the
development of future regulations and quality standards for non-sewered systems. It reflects
known best practices of various sectors and regions and is an important resource for this sector.
However, as more and more innovative sanitation solutions are created and brought to market,
there is a need to determine the overall reliability, availability, maintainability, and safety of
these systems in context, to achieve the minimum treatment qualities promoted by the ISO
standard.
The standard is founded on the basic principle that human feces poses a health risk to the
safety of humans. Thus, the standard seeks to provide general safety and performance
requirements for product design and performance testing of non-sewered sanitation systems for
prefabricated integrated treatment units. Standards also exist for community-based decentralized
non-sewered sanitation systems (ISO 31800, 2020) the crisis management of water utilities in
harshest conditions (ISO 24518, 2015) and, for governing regions where there are no sewer
systems to speak of (ISO 24521, 2016), these standards are also crucial for sanitation, though
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they are not the focus of this paper. The ISO 31800 standard is of note because it is also relevant
for sanitation in a similar vein to the ISO 30500 standard. However, it caters to sanitation at a
community level, with front-end users of 1000 to 10,000 people. The standard contains criteria
for “functionality, usability, reliability, maintainability, and safety of fecal sludge treatment units
that primarily treat fecal sludge, can operate in an off-grid and non-sewered environment and are
pre-fabricated” (ISO 31800, 2020). It was also created by experts in the field of sanitation and
aims to facilitate the commercialization, scaling, and transfer of these fecal sludge treatment
units into the market.
The proposed solution of a RAMS framework model which incorporates the information
from the ISO 30500 standard and the base aims of the United Nation’s sustainable development
goals for sanitation, is a natural next step for sanitation solutions. The framework developed is
foreseen as a tool that will be used to determine the most likely failure criteria for a range of
decentralized sanitation systems, thus providing a predictive model that helps stakeholders to
determine the best sanitation technologies to provide, for specific scenarios.
A well-designed RAMS framework tool can help reduce expensive unplanned
operational outages, improve reliability by prioritizing failure reduction at design, and improve
overall human and environmental safety, whilst ensuring that the right products are developed
and installed for sanitation provision.
The ISO 30500 standard says very little about maintenance and reliability. The standard
proposes that maintenance be minimal and easy to achieve. It has criteria on the levels of
expertise required by service providers for providing the levels of maintenance required for
systems. On reliability, it says that the system should be robust, and failures should not trigger
consequential hazardous conditions, all of which are pertinent factors for the adequacy of an
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engineered system. However, it is felt that more detail on how these can be achieved practically,
is desirable. Thus, the process of reliability, availability, maintainability, and safety (RAMS)
determination of decentralized sanitation systems are tied in with the functions of the 1SO 30500
requirement. It uses the criteria of the standard to form the baseline safety requirements for nonsewered sanitation systems, and builds on those requirements, by adding the RAMS assessments
for these systems, with the safety aspect modified to include disability-adjusted life years
(DALY). For RAMS assessments to be plausible, it is necessary to know the failure data of
sanitation systems, either from observed failure data or from generic data. Therefore, system
failures must be monitored, measured, and recorded. Where measurement is not feasible
information may be available online for components or can be inferred from similar systems
where data is available. However, for systems that are new to the market and/or have no failure
data available, the best approach is to infer information from similar systems which are
established and in the market and to state the assumptions that relate to the use of that data.
Alternatively, the systems can be piloted and field trialled to generate specific data, such as in the
USF NEWgenerator treatment system.
In the determination of RAMS of decentralized non-sewered sanitation systems, a
probabilistic assessment can be used for analyzing operational weaknesses associated with a
system and can help to systematically identify and prioritize reliability and safety improvements.
The goal of this RAMS framework is to apply such systematic concepts to risk analyses
of typical wastewater treatment and fecal matter removal systems, by using qualitative and
quantitative methods. For traditional systems, the same RAMS approach will be used as much as
possible, but where data is not freely available, then an estimation of likely values will be made,
based on expertise and available information from the literature. Thus, the RAMS methodology
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is designed to complement the ISO 30500 standard and provide a methodical way to use the
standard for designing fit for purpose reliable, available, and maintainable sanitation systems.
2.4 RAMS in Sanitation
In high hazard industries, it is an accepted reality that reliability, availability,
maintainability, and safety (RAMS) approaches are methods that should be used to analyze the
long-term RAMS implications of changes in process systems. Most will follow a process of
management of change, where assessments are made on the changes to environmental safety,
process safety, reputational safety, cost risks of systems, and mitigation measures are proposed to
turn intolerable risks into tolerable risks. If risks cannot be made tolerable, the changes are not
made or the designers go back to the drawing board to determine if there are other mitigation
measures, which can reduce the risks so that the desired changes become acceptable, overall, a
balancing of risk versus reward is required in the assessment of change.
In sanitation, with the industry split into conventional sanitation solutions and nonconventional methods, a risk-based assessment of changes to developing solutions is a relatively
new concept to the non-conventional sector. Centralized wastewater treatment (WWT) systems
are conventional in most industrialized societies; they are generally well understood and have
been for decades. Thus, the concepts of industrial based risk assessments that look at the
reliability, availability, maintenance, and safety regimes of centralized WWT are accepted
methods of change evaluation in centralized sanitation solutions (Tchobanoglous & Burton,
1991). However, the same approach has not been universally applied to the introduction of new
technology into decentralized sanitation solutions. Thus, an approach that allows experts to
follow a framework, which is based on established logical approaches to RAMS assessments and
follow methodologies that are well bedded into other industrial sectors is suited to decentralized
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sanitation systems. The creation of a reproducible methodology for comparing different
technologies within sanitation, with criteria such as the acknowledgment of the end user’s
concept of success versus failure, the suitability of the machine to its location, with an ability to
produce a technical standard for the RAMS of decentralized sanitation is needed.
Looking at what exists in most countries with established sanitation solutions facilities,
wastewater is collected and treated at a central location and/or treated in situ, but there are more
places around the world where wastewater and fecal matter disposal is achieved with systems
such as the unimproved latrine, ventilated improved pit (VIP) latrine and in some cases open
defecation, and in these situations, the conventional centralized methods may not be appropriate
for reasons such as space and lack of existing infrastructure and population density (Mara, 2003).
“Therefore, in areas where construction of a centralized sewage collection system is not
considered economically viable, decentralization is becoming quite popular” (Wilderer, et al.,
2000). As an example,” 25% of the population in the US was already served by small,
decentralized WWTPs (wastewater treatment plants)” (UNEP, 2002), a lot of these are in remote
hard to reach locations. There are many areas in the global north where sanitation is also lacking
(Meehan et al., 2020, Dietz & Meehan, 2019). Systems in these contexts may also benefit from
being replaced by advanced systems that can function off-grid, using minimal energy and most
importantly, which can reduce incidences of water-borne diseases in the environment and the
spread of sickness, which are, associated with unhygienic sanitation conditions.
Systems more often now are also designed to recover valuable nutrients and carbon
resources as well as recover clean water from the treatment system (Capodaglio, 2017). “The
sanitation ladder is a well-established tool to demonstrate and monitor how households can
transition over time from simple to more advanced sanitation technology” (Libby, et al., 2020).
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Situating resource recovery on the sanitation ladder can also be an inclusive part of the RAMS
framework process to improve sanitation globally. This can be done by including the resource
recovery subsystem (back-end subsystem) as part of the sanitation boundary. Then through a
process of stakeholder review plus brainstorming of potential resource-recovery failures, the
resource recovery step can be robustly added to the scope. So, that it’s not just about the
inclusion of resource recovery or any other step in name only, but more about the long-term
reliability of a sanitation system.
Therefore, decentralized sanitation is a game-changer for sanitation, and the
improvements not only apply to developing nations but also to developed nations in areas where
access to centralized systems proves difficult to achieve. This also highlights the global scale of
issues faced in terms of unimproved sanitation, and the subsequent environmental, health, and
economic impacts, which follow. All this has meant that the United Nations’ Sustainable
Development Goals (SDGs) for achievement by 2030 have promoted universal clean sanitation.
Reaching this ambitious objective, however, will require tackling a range of obstacles, including
selecting the most appropriate sanitation option in each context and ensuring the sustainability of
the selected systems. To start it is important to design systems which provide the basic
requirements of sanitation systems, in that any non-sewered sanitation system provides fecal
separation from humans, the population is protected from unintentional pathogenic discharge, the
system is easy to use, is reliable and easy to operate and maintain by the end-users without
constant outside intervention (Wilderer, et al., 2000). Therefore, given the rapid rate of
technology development in this sector, there are very good reasons to develop today, the RAMS
framework, which can guide the imminent mass arrival of these advanced decentralized
treatment units and provide the basic requirements described. So, to assess viable alternatives to
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centralized systems, where centralized options are not viable or desirable, decentralized
sanitation systems can be seen as the types of technologies that can help achieve the UN
sustainable development goals, particularly when related to achieving a “prosperous, high quality
of life that is equitably shared and sustainable” (Costanza, et al., 2014), which is a core UN aim.
Reliability, Availability, and Maintainability work together to ensure continued improved safety
sanitation globally.

Figure 2.8: Reliability, Availability, Maintainability Tandem Link for Safe Sanitation

2.5 Literature Review
Several studies have examined the concept of centralized and decentralized systems in
sanitation provision. Studies such as (Capadaglio, 2017; Eggimann et al., 2015; Eggimann et al.,
2016; G. Libralito, 2012; Kujawa-Roelevled & Zeema, 2006; George Quezada, 2016; Brands,
2014), all looked at the varying set up strategies for sanitation provision and provided some
evidence for the change from centralization to decentralization or hybridization; which is a form
of semi-decentralization, in urbanized conditions, where some centralization brings benefits of
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economies of scale, but full centralization is not attractive and/or possible. Hybridization may be
an acceptable middle ground when centralization is not possible, and decentralization is too
limited, thus hybridization sits in the in-between stage of the two extremes. There is an ideology
gaining ground that the future of decentralized sanitation is modular, where decentralized
systems are erected in phases and a modular fashion so that capacity increases to fit the
population, making the systems more cost-effective over time (Jung, et al., 2018). This approach
allows for a mix of technologies to be used, and as more and more is learned about the
decentralization of sanitation and modular sanitation methods, later versions of technologies that
may well be better versions of previous systems can be added later on. This approach can help
enhance existing models within the hybrid. Hybridization of sanitation thus may help flatten out
the failure curve and increase overall availability by reducing common cause failures, because
one of the advantages of using different technologies to achieve the same result, is that the
probabilities of all the different types of sanitation technologies failing at the same time, and in
the same way is very low compared to systems which are all the same type and can have
common failure modes. Thus, hybridization can help increase overall RAMS. Some studies show
that hybridization such as it is, increases sanitation costs because the cost of connections i.e.
infrastructure costs, has to be re-invested with every new additional module. This leads to
reduced economies of scale, and the costs to end-users increases as a result (Roefs, et al., 2017).
There is also a need to examine other factors which lead to reduced uptake of decentralized
systems either as hybridized systems or simple decentralized models, such as the local
community who may not have the acceptable frameworks in place to facilitate the use of and
payment for these systems fairly and effectively (George Quezada, 2016). Work carried out by
(Sharma, 2008), who reviewed 30 remote property developments in rural Australia, discovered
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that decentralized systems can be acceptable if proper management frameworks are established
first, if the sanitation systems are easy to commission and if they can be deployed to overcome
lack of services very easily. The research found that users very quickly set up systems of
payment and maintenance to keep the systems functional, but they had to be engaged in the
process from the outset. Thus, the key to success was community engagement, which should
include insight into how the communities see themselves in the future. Decentralized sanitation
systems can also be prone to issues related to planning, design, implementation, operation, and
management gaps which cost more money due to lack of familiarity and impede their uptake for
a community. Therefore, when costs are considered in decentralized non-sewered sanitation
technologies, the analysis has to go beyond just the material costs but should look at the
sustainability of the system within the community from a holistic and practical stakeholder
perspective. Assessments should include opportunities for population growth and how
decentralized systems can be adapted for future changes in the community. This approach should
help the sanitation system remain viable long term. Thus, it is perhaps inevitable that all
decentralized sanitation will evolve towards hybridization naturally, because of a community’s
normal evolution. The flexibility given by decentralization allows for such changes and decisions
to be made locally. So, for this research decentralization is seen as the precursor to future
hybridization, therefore hybridization will not be treated as a separate topic, but as a form of
decentralization of sanitation.
Many researchers have focused on the socio-cultural impact of sanitation systems in the
areas where they are installed (George Quezada, 2016; Bassan, et al., 2015; Sharma, 2008); less
research however has been done on the joint impacts of reliability, availability, maintainability,
and safety (RAMS) of decentralized sanitation solution systems. Plus, where there is focus on
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RAMS, the focus is normally on the individual aspects as independent elements i.e. reliability,
availability, maintainability, or safety, not on the interplay of the four aspects as they trade off
each other in practice (Azarkhail, et al., 2012; Chemweno, et al., 2018; Etnier, et al., 2005;
Oliveira, et al., 2008). Though, more commonly the focus is on the analyses of installation cost
differentials between different types of sanitation systems (Kohler, et al., 2016; Junga et al.,
2018). The focus of the RAMS framework is to combine all four elements of RAMS in one
framework, to look at how they interact often for the same outcome. This will enable
stakeholders to test side by side the impact of individual elements of RAMS and how they
influence and interact to increase the suitability of sanitation systems to specific contextual
scenarios. The focus will be on which levers of RAMS are highest ranked in the derivation of
stakeholder definition of failure, which more often than not has societal and cultural
perspectives. However, since there is an interconnectivity between all four aspects, meaning
mitigating a failure in one aspect potentially affects another aspect positively or negatively, an
assessment of all in tandem is entirely logical. This means that issues of sanitation which are
created by a gap in any RAMS aspects and which can be addressed by solving issues in other
RAMS elements are highlighted, and resolved. This approach of using RAMS trade-offs, to
reduce risk and increase chances of system success, is not a new one. There are many industries
where RAMS assessments are already used as part of the normal management systems, but in
these cases, they tend to be very industry-specific (Yadava G. S., 2008) and therefore provide no
real insight into the RAMS aspects required for decentralized non-sewered sanitation
improvements. Hence, the use of such analysis in sanitation is new. The ambition to provide
sanitation must be met by reliable and more adaptive methods such as RAMS assessed
decentralized sanitation facilities, which can act as standalone off-grid systems, but still meet the
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UNs safety requirements for sanitation. The World Health Organization (WHO) estimates that
the global burden of disease could be reduced by up to 15% by improving water, sanitation, and
hygiene (IDRC, 2016), meaning that sanitation and water treatment is a public health emergency
that needs reliable sanitation to solve. This obvious link between sanitation and clean water is
central to the United Nations' Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) for 2030 and the ISO
30500 requirements. So, focusing on the linkage between clean resource (water) i.e. safety,
improved sanitation (UN, 2017) i.e. availability of sanitation, and research into the provision
and/or improvement of clean water in the context of sanitation i.e. reliability of systems through
maintenance, clearly demonstrates a need for RAMS assessments in sanitation (Murphy, et al.,
2009; Ricard Giné-Garriga, 2013; Back, et al., 2018; Water Research Australia, 2014; Carlos, et
al., 2013; Brands, 2014; Davies, et al., 2017), thus solidifying the need to have reliable and
repeatable assessment systems for all sanitation model’s definitions of success. Thus, any
successful decentralized sanitation system must provide clean water reliably, and as a minimum
prevent further contamination of water because of its operation. A benefit of decentralized
sanitation is that it concentrates risks in smaller volumes compared with centralized wastewater
treatment, which enables better control and limits the negative environmental impacts. This
central characteristic of decentralized wastewater treatment systems, therefore, presents another
opportunity to examine decentralized sanitation in the provision of sanitation as a better
alternative to other methods such as centralization. A major identifier of decentralized systems is
that they are characterized by absent or short sewer runs i.e. fewer infrastructure costs (Junga, et
al., 2018; Capodaglio 2017), so in addition to preventing diseases by concentrating the volumes
into smaller spaces, they can also be cheaper, quick to deploy, less disruptive, and better for
emergencies. Small volumes also increase the opportunity to recover resource more practically,
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because less energy is needed to concentrate volumes to extract useful components. Thus,
decentralized wastewater management can increase reuse opportunities (Lijó, et al. 2017) and
they are often cheaper overall compared with centralized systems depending on the population
parameters and economies of scale (Eggimann, et al., 2015). Decentralized systems allow the
users to benefit from the resource, which is generated locally. This is due to the proximity of
users to treatment. In addition to resource recovery, there is also the reduction in the
stakeholder’s infrastructure investment on pipe runs for sewer transfers, as mentioned. The cost
of wastewater collection sewer networks in centralized wastewater treatment systems is a
massive capital expenditure in the infrastructure build cost (Jorsaraei et al., 2014; Junga, et al.,
2018), which makes decentralized systems more palatable in the context of urbanized scenarios
and developing nations. Proximity to wastewater source also means, that there is greater
flexibility in the approach used in integrating the systems to the potential users where “cost
considerations, treatment efficiency, and social values are central themes” (Suriyachan et al.,
2012). Success can be more focused on the end-user, unlike in centralized scenarios (G.
Libralato, 2012), where end users can be many thousands with differing wants and needs, all of
which cannot be met by the single system. There is still a lot to be understood about the
comparative costs of centralized and decentralized systems (Eggimann, et al., 2015; Libralato,
Ghirardini & Avezzù 2012), but, the consensus is that a mix of the two main types of
configurations i.e. Centralized and decentralized, will be required to fulfill the global sanitation
requirement (Eggimann, et al., 2015). The changes required going forward are centred on
sanitation, which is more adaptive based on the end-user population, and therefore requires better
adaptation to the users instead of a one size fits all concept, like those developed in 1800, which
were crucial for their time but need to be re-invented for the twenty-first century.
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Not all decentralized options need to treat sewage. Options such as ventilated improved
pit (VIP) latrines pour-flush latrine and flush toilets with septic tanks (Mihelcic &Orner, 2018;
Mihelcic et al., 2019; Abbas Jorsaraei, 2014) do not treat waste but are decentralized sanitation
solutions. They are however not advanced options. So, at the very least decentralized sanitation
solutions should separate fecal matter and the associated pathogenic content from the users
(humans) of sanitation systems. Having said that, it is important that as engineers seek to
improve sanitation they move towards the use of “appropriate technology” (Murphy, et al., 2009)
in poor, labor surplus developing nations. This means that opportunities should be given for
assessing low-cost advanced sanitation methods, which are focused on poverty reduction
(Murphy, et al., 2009) as well as sanitation improvements, by providing engineered sustainable
long-term hygiene and health. Murphy argues that we must embrace advanced methods which
focus on the “collaboration of interdependent stakeholders”, whilst still focused on wastewater
treatment. Sanitation technology in this context must be sustainable both locally and
environmentally, and Murphy explains that the technology must be refined enough “that the local
users will be capable of maintaining, reproducing, and repairing (the systems) after outside
designers have left the community” (Murphy et al., 2009) and “they (the sanitation systems)
must also be socio-culturally acceptable to their users” (Mara 2003). This aspect of sanitation
provision is vital because, sanitation providers need to see human waste as a resource that can
benefit the society that produces it, so that not only is an investment made in sanitation, but also
the effort is put into sustaining that system of sanitation. Sanitation systems should also meet
international safety requirements such as those covered by (ISO 30500 2018), to be morally
suitable. Ultimately, as these new systems are designed to be introduced to areas where no
sanitation options exist particularly in the regional context, sanitation systems must consider
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gender roles and community hierarchy (Murphy et al., 2009) to be successful long-term.
Systems need to focus on “the delivery of water and sanitation services together with the
promotion of hygiene which is central to public health” (Ricard Giné-Garriga 2013) in a manner
that provides a dignified solution for its users, so that the act of going to the toilet and treatment
the waste, truly can be said to be re-imagined for the developing regional context, and to ensure
long term sanitation success. To start to address some of the issues, failures must be predicted,
identified, and mitigated as part of the design process. There is a well-documented history of
having narrowly defined approaches to sanitation failure and success, especially in developing
nations where once the sanitation systems have been installed the sanitation improvement is
deemed successful because, the mere provision of infrastructure is defined as a success (Ricard
Giné-Garriga, 2013), but these systems tend to fail over the long term (Vliet, et al., 2011). There
are examples of some situations where sanitation has been successfully improved with just
provision of infrastructure and basic hygiene training such as the case in Ahmedabad, India
(Butala, et al., 2010), but even in those instances, the authors accept that the success may not be
general and cannot be externalized to other cases without further investigations. Thus, the rates
of success in any form of engineering including sanitation can such only be increased by a
thorough understanding of the core reasons for failures. This is only possible by identifying areas
that require increased success rates and mitigating failures to ensure success (Bassan, et al.,
2015; Vliet, et al., 2011; Azarkhail, et al., 2012; Carter & Deans, 2011; Etnier, et al., 2005);
Jürgensen, et al., 2016; Nicola Pedroni, 2017; Shakeri & Nazif, 2018). In looking at the success
of advanced sanitation systems, there is an acknowledgment that there are several players in this
field, options such as the USF NEWgenerator (Bair, 2018), hybrid systems such as the Hybrid
MD-RED (Mercer, et al., 2019), the Cranfield nanomembrane toilet (Cranfield University,
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2018), EAWAG Blue Autarky (EAWAG, 2018), Helbling HTClean (Sanitation, 2018) etc., to
name a few. Thus, to truly assess the failure of advanced sanitation systems, assessments need to
be flexible enough so that they can fit many different technology and users. This can be achieved
by borrowing established systems that already work for other sectors and using that process to
analyze failure data and create a repeatable methodology for the assessment of RAMS in
decentralized sanitation systems. This approach allows systems to be compared on an equal
footing with each other i.e. with the specific context that the sanitation systems will be used in as
the common ground. There are many lessons to be learned on how not to install sanitation
systems where policy failure leads to mass failure of sanitation systems (Hueso & Bell, 2013;
Hussain, et al., 2017), so there are many opportunities in the literature to establish what likely
failures will be. Thus, doing a thorough assessment of all failure modes remains a prudent choice
for appropriate sanitation solutions provision (Carter & Deans, 2011; Smoot, 2017).
Cost remains a big aspect of sanitation investment in addition to ensuring robustness.
However, centralized wastewater treatment (WWT) systems have the lowest cost per capita
overall when catering to a larger population “the costs of such systems have limited wide scale
implementation in low-income countries. Decentralized sanitation systems are the alternative
approach to manage wastewater locally” (Hannah G. Davies, 2017). This is because, though in a
large scale population with wastewater treated by centralized systems, the cost per individual
over the lifetime of the technology is smaller than other technologies, the initial installation costs
can be as much as USD 1million for a 100 gallon-per-minute system depending on levels of
BOD and discharge limits (Samotech, 2016) required, which is a huge and possible unattainable
cost basis for most developing nations. In addition to this, investments in centralized WWTP are
typically based on the planning horizon of typically 20–30 years, whilst decentralized systems
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are generally modelled on shorter periods for example pit latrines are estimated to be 10 years
(Mihelcic & Fry, 2009), dependent on location, users, maintenance, materials of construction,
etc., and areas with high water tables such as in Bangladesh lifespan could be as low as 12
months to 18months (Hussain, 2017) for a VIP pit latrine, thus incurring the costs of emptying
the pit or digging new pits relatively quickly. So, for low-income developing areas where
population changes are in flux, being tied to a 30-year plan is somewhat restrictive. The highest
cost contributors to centralized wastewater treatment are mainly the cost of providing energy and
particularly oxygen for the treatment system, as most centralized systems tend to be aerobic
treatment systems. The cost of oxygen in aerobic processes tends to be the highest running cost
within the treatment plant itself, and so gets a lot of attention in the design stages to reduce that
cost. In anaerobic processes, the energy costs are not as high compared with aerobic systems, and
anaerobic systems produce energy as biogas, which can be recycled for use, but even with that,
because anaerobic processes are slower than aerobic processes in water treatment provision due
to slower biological metabolic rates of anaerobes, centralized sanitation systems generally
favored for speed of treatment. Thus, the use of aerobic wastewater treatment presents challenges
in terms of lack of flexibility for growth, operational cost and just the scale of the system that
will be required in the long term to fit a growing urban population, and whether it is possible to
plan for that type of change. The key prevailing economic argument in favor of centralized
WWT plants relates to economies of scale (Libralito, 2012) where it is well established that for
centralized systems, the cost of the collection can be made cheaper overall if enough customers
are being catered for by the system right from the start. This means that generally the more
customers there are within a geographical location using a centralized sanitation system, the
cheaper the cost per person. Therefore, any savings must be recognized and realized at the design
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stages and capital investment savings must be decided at the construction stages. Here
decentralized systems may have the advantage because even though the economies of scale are
less, the costs are mostly incurred during the treatment stages and the cost of construction are
standardized by the number of users using a decentralized unit e.g. the Cranfield nanomembrane
toilet is standardized for a single household unit and the NEWgenerator system tested in Durban
South Africa as part of the “re-invent the toilet challenge” (BMGF Foundation, 2018) is
standardized for 100 users per unit. So, the number of maximum users per decentralized unit
remains the same regardless of the total numbers of the customer on location, which means
planning for the future is more flexible because the population just needs to grow and additional
systems can be added in a modular fashion at a critical over demand point. Thus, for
decentralized sanitation systems the cost of the individual unit and critical parts are more
important than the cost of energy. The absolute cost of the entire unit is, therefore, an important
factor in the development, optimization, and supply of advanced decentralized sanitation systems
(Abbas Jorsaraei, 2014; Eggimann, et al., 2016; G. Libralato, 2012; Opher & Friedler, 2016;
Suriyachan, et al., 2012; Orner & Mihelcic, 2018). Meaning that as long as the population is a
growing one, which is normally the case in most growing urban centers, decentralization has the
advantage of being more flexible, cheaper to start with, and can be networked to form a sort of
centralization if required at later stages, thus creating economies of scale. Standardization of
costs of SURTS and MURTS, so that these systems, particularly advanced systems, are not
exorbitant for rural and developing geographical locations is very important. It is also vitally
important that the economic risks of decentralized systems are carefully assessed against already
established but cheaper systems such as the pit latrine, which are not advanced by any means, but
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have the advantage of longevity, familiarity, and reliability, when properly constructed and do
provide better sanitation when compared with open defecation.
The RAMS framework is not focused on cost as a factor for assessment. However, cost
analysis which is dependent on many factors which this research does not delve into will form a
basis for sanitation provision, simply because this is where most stakeholders are personally
impacted by the system at all lifespan stages, in the form of maintenance costs through the
lifespan. Cost may be used in the RAMS assessment as a comparison factor to decide the
benefits of one mitigation against another where the end goal is improved reliability, availability,
maintainability, and/or safety. For example in routine maintenance versus corrective
maintenance analysis where costs can determine which option is optimal. Developed nations
may also benefit from decentralized methods for polishing or improvement steps in existing
systems (Libralato, et al., 2012). Decentralized technologies being what they are, can help fill
polishing voids and provide flexible methods for sanitation improvements in the developed
world. In the rural context in developed nations, there is a need to improve the existing
decentralized infrastructures e.g. septic tanks (EPA, 2018) which are dominant in these locations
by improving treatment options (Eggimann, et al. 2015; Libralito, et al. 2012; Gikas &
Tchobanoglous 2009; Opher & Friedler 2016; Junga, et al. 2018). Some of these can be achieved
by a focus on RAMS improvements for these locations, which includes the additional steps of
adding advanced decentralized sanitation solutions to existing systems.
In all scenarios, RAMS analysis is based on the Failure Mode Effect Analysis (FMEA)
technique, which has been successfully and extensively used in a wide range of industries (Shi,
et al. 2016). To define RAM S, definitions in literature for the Reliability, Availability,
Maintainability, and Safety are examined. Reliability applies to an engineered system’s
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robustness, and there are many definitions for engineering reliability. However, the most
consistent is the idea that it is the probability of equipment, system, or process functioning
without failure, when operated as prescribed for a given interval of time, under stated conditions
(Eti, et al., 2007; Saleh, et al., 2006; Gobble, et al., 2005). For a system to be reliable, it must
continue to work for a predetermined time during its design life, whilst compensating for the fact
that failures in the system can and do occur (Coppola, 1984; Azarkhail, et al., 2012). The best
definition for reliability as it relates to sanitation provision is determined by (Bastirai, et al.,
2018), where the definition concluded from the review of many definitions of reliability that in
sanitation engineering that, “reliability is the ability to supply water reliably for sanitation
purposes”. Thus, the true impact of sanitation centers on the ability to provide clean water either
by treatment or prevention of contamination of water sources. Availability is like reliability and
is the measure of the degree to which an item is in the operable state during its design life
(Kirkcaldy, et al., 2012; Gobble, et al., 2005). It is similar to reliability, as both use failure rates,
but they differ in that, the use of failure rates in reliability is focused on the failure of the system,
and in availability, it’s on the impact of failure on the usability of a sanitation system.
Availability is, therefore, a more obvious failure to the front-end user, and it measures the
time-based direct impact on users i.e. the ability to use the sanitation device on demand.
Availability is heavily influenced by failure rate but is independent of failure, meaning that a
failed system can still be available. It is more influenced by the meantime to repair (MTTR) of a
system which is a feature of maintainability and spare parts / technical expertise (Antosz, et al.,
2019). Thus the analogy from gas transmission pipeline engineering related to the definition of
availability can be borrowed and it is that “Availability is an indication to the probability of uptime of a component or a system and is a measure to assess how often a system is alive”
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(Zakikhani, et al., 2020), which in the sanitation context means the how often such a system is
“alive” to front-end users in terms of access. Reliability and availability are often in a trade-off
with each other (Eti, et al., 2007) in addition to maintainability. Maintainability refers to the ease
and or speed at which an item can be repaired after failure and put back into service. It can be
preventative or corrective (Kirkcaldy, et al., 2012; Cao, et al., 2018; Zakikhani, et al., 2020).
There are several reasons why preventative measures are chosen instead of corrective
maintenance. Here, the cost is a very important factor for which maintenance strategy is chosen
(Ghodrati, et al., 2013). That is to say, if the failure of a system in service is intolerable for the
reliability or availability of the system then it follows that the system goes through a program
which prevents failure i.e. preventative maintenance, whereas if such failure can be absorbed by
the system with no significant impact on reliability and availability, then a corrective schedule
may be preferred. Weibull techniques lend themselves to maintenance assessment because the
Weibull distribution can be fit to systems where failure occurs randomly. Experience shows that
failure rates in engineered systems tend to follow a bathtub curve distribution (Smith, 2011),
where there are more failures at the early and end stages of life, and fewer failures in the middle
stage in between. Weibull techniques can also be problematic due to limited referencing to them
in literature, but even with that in mind, the use of the method provides a consistent approach for
solving a bathtub failure rate models (Jun-Li, 2016) which is what is expected in most complex /
advanced engineered systems (Soliman, et al., 2014; Mudholkar, et al., 2009), because in these
distributions there tend to be high infant mortality rates at the beginning of life, constant failure
rates in midlife and increasing failure rates again as the system nears the end of life (Aarset,
1987). A book on the origins of the technique (Rinne, 2008) provides information on why the
modified Weibull method works for the determination of maintenance rates, it develops the idea
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that due to the way maintainability is centered on the temporal (i.e. time-based) aspect of failure
i.e. how long repair takes, that the Weibull distribution allows the shape parameter β which
determines the shape (height) of the failure distribution curve and the scale parameter η which
moves the timescales of the distribution, to be given useful values (Ikonen et al., 2002; Almalki
& Nadarajah, 2014), which in turn can be used to predict viable maintenance strategies
(predictive or corrective) based on changing the shape and/or timescale of the failure curve. So,
it is possible to change the shape (β) and determine which failure distribution levels justify
preventative or corrective measures.
Safety, as it relates to the RAMS model in this framework, is based mostly on the ISO
30500 requirement for overall log removal values (LRV) for liquids. Log removal value being
the log scale removal of pathogenic material through the process stages of advanced wastewater
treatment systems (Water Research Australia, 2014). This is to capture the crucial link between
clean water and sanitation. When used in conjunction with the DALY (Disability Adjusted Life
Years) of the receiving population, it allows the impact of diarrhoeal diseases on a population to
be assessed. The DALY is proposed due to the use of statistically available data on a country by
country basis. Thus, for RAMS, the assessment is a correlation of DALY and the ISO 30500
LRV information to create a ranking matrix for the microbial safety of a decentralized nonsewered sanitation system. To further characterize the focus of safety in the RAMS assessments
of decentralized sanitation systems, the Log Removal Values (LRV) of technologies that are
employed focus on problematic pathogen classes which are accounted for in sanitation
implementation (Nakagiri, et al. 2015; Stevens, et al. 2017; ISO 30500, 2018; Eawag/Sandec,
2008; Water Research Australia, 2014). Thus, safety, as it pertains to the RAMS framework, is a
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measure of how good a decentralized sanitation system is at removing disease-causing pathogens
from the wastewater, by measuring the effluent concentrations for problematic species.
There are no perfect solutions in RAMS assessment of systems in service, which means
there will be many judgment calls made based on the expertise of the assessment teams.
Historically, safety and reliability as a concept evolved mostly independently of each other and
have only been unified as a discipline in recent times (Saleh, et al., 2006; Azarkhail, et al., 2012),
thus, it is possible to merge the requirements of safety and RAM. Safety, as depicted in ISO
30500 with the need for Reliability, Availability, and Maintainability (RAM) of decentralized
non-sewered sanitation systems, can be merged, as has happened in other engineering industry
for decades, so that consistency of performance and successful long-term operation, aids the
longevity of resource (Carter & Deans, 2011), in sanitation provision.
2.6 Conclusion
The soundness of sanitation technology includes the assumption that it will meet and
adapt to various sanitation requirements, such as meet local capabilities by utilizing local
materials and resources, be affordable which ensures long-term suitability, and also be easily
maintainable. The technology must be sustainable both locally and environmentally regardless of
scale, so “that the local users will be capable of maintaining, reproducing, and repairing after
outside designers have left the community” (Wilderer et al., 2000; Murphy, et al., 2009).
Technologies need to take into consideration the local customs and norms of the
population they are installed in, so “they must be socio-culturally acceptable to their users”
(Mara, 2003), and as such consider gender roles and community hierarchy by involving key
stakeholders within the community (Murphy, et al., 2009). In very rural developing nation
contexts, there is also a need to improve the existing decentralized infrastructures such as pit
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latrines (Eggimann, et al. 2015; Libralito, et al. 2012; Gikas & Tchobanoglous 2009; Opher &
Friedler, 2016; Junga, et al. 2018), which are dominant in these locations, and to do that, the
failures of these systems must be mitigated and improved by introducing better technologies
which meet the requirements of the community. The scale is an important aspect, as it influences
cost, local feelings of ownership and can be an important determinant of what stakeholders
consider as failure or success of a sanitation system. The integration of ISO 30500 in the
trajectory of decentralized sanitation improvement is very positive, however further if
improvements are to be made to decentralized sanitation, then the reliability, availability,
maintainability, and safety of decentralized sanitation systems must also be reviewed as part of
the definition of successful sanitation systems.
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Chapter 3. Failure Determination for the RAMS Framework Method
3.1 Introduction
To describe the impact of failure in the determination of RAMS for a sanitation system, it
is important to understand what failure is and what failure is not. Failure for this paper is
mathematically defined as, the failure to achieve a function:
Function: [V dC/dT – r) for any subsystem or failure to carry out a, service: [Service X t=0 –
service X…n t=0+] = QCin - QCout
It is important to note that failure could also occur because of loss of control functions,
where the initiating cause is due to electrical faults. This type of failure could be represented as
an inability for a controller to send an electrical current from the sensor to the controller and
subsequently to a component, or that the current is carried to the wrong “service”, that is Service
Y t=x instead of Service X t=x. In either case, there is a failure, which can be represented by an
increase or decrease in the flow of concentration of electrons, from one point to the other. That is
a loss of function: [R (dCe-/dt)] for any subsystem or to carry out a service:
[Service X t=x – service X…n t=x+1] = R e-Ce-in - Re-Ce-out
R = Resistance within the subsystem
C e- = Electrons concentration at time (t) mg/L
t = Time since flow entered subsystem
There are two types of sanitation system states of interest when considering how to assess
RAMS of a system. Sanitation systems can be flow-based or volume-based. Flow-based systems
refer to systems where the determination of failure is based on the loss of flow and volume-based
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systems are where the failure of the system is determined by insufficient or lack of space/volume
to store materials, like waste generated from sanitation systems, flush water, etc.
Failure is generally described as when a system or item stops performing its required
function. In the industry “plant failures are often caused by inadequate maintenance and inability
to predict problems that may occur later during plant usage (Eti, et al., 2007), this is the same
with sanitation systems. Failure also includes improper uses of technology and components
which allow technology to work. In these scenarios, the failure definition should also include
how a system can fail due to improper use. The ability to predict failure in advance with
consideration of RAMS and risk reduction especially during decision-making reduces the
frequency of failures and their consequences considerably. A functioning sanitation system will
benefit from “due attention being paid during maintenance planning and policy decision-making
to the maintenance needs of the system and considerable savings can be made in the operation
processes” (Eti, et al., 2007) by giving due regard to failure reduction assessment at the design
stages. Thus, the RAMS framework is designed around a system of failure identification using
the FMEA, with the FMEA serving as a guide to determining what aspects of a system to
prioritize for RAMS.
The RAMS framework aims to initially assess and prioritize failures by identification,
categorization, and comparisons of common failure types associated with decentralized
sanitation. The process then ranks the failures using a qualitative assessment process, sometimes
semi-quantitative, based on expert knowledge of failure outcome. The approach is almost always
initially qualitative, but once failure criteria have been established, the approach may become
semi-quantitative, by applying probabilities of failure to determine the risks of occurrence of
failure.
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There are six proposed steps to the RAMs Framework Methodology for failure
assessment and mitigation in sanitation. They are as follows:
1.

Define Failure for each stage and assign stakeholder

2.

Brainstorming

3.

Failure Ranking

4.

Failure Hazard effect Assessment

5.

Create a Qualitative Risk Assessment Model (QRM)

6.

Risk evaluation and RAMS assessment reporting

3.2 Failure of SURTs and MURTs
Failure can occur at different stages in SURTs and MURTs, and different stakeholders
are affected by the failure of different components and/or factors within the sanitation system.
Some failures are felt along the entire system e.g. failure of the front-end which affects the
ability of users to use the toilets and also means no wastewater feed to the treatment section,
which then consequentially stops as the equalization system as volume depletes, and then
impacts the entire treatment process. Whereas, some failures only affect certain stakeholders, but
can eventually affect the entire system if left unchecked, for example, a lack of toilet roll affects
the users of the system at the front-end (A). However, if due to lack of toilet roll at the front-end,
toilet users start to use untreatable material such as newspapers, plastic bags, textiles, etc to wipe
up, then this initial failure will impact the rest of the system by causing blockages in the middle
and back-end stages. Therefore, some failures can have a secondary impact, which can impact
the entire system without direct impact from the original cause, whilst some failures only have a
primary impact from the impact of the initiating cause e.g. rupture of pipe from accidental
damage leading to loss of flow. Some failures can be compound impacts that affect a different
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population for which the sanitation system has no observable benefit e.g. river contamination
with sewage affecting a downstream community. Each failure has different consequences for the
users, stakeholders, and the system, so different approaches are required for mitigation. Thus,
failure must be defined mostly in terms of those who are most affected by the failure, and the
impact of such failure on them.
Therefore, for the framework, the stakeholders affected by the failures of each subsystem,
are as follows in order of importance. For the front-end, they are:


Users e.g. community, household, etc



Sanitation engineer



Technology developer e.g. University of South Florida, Cranfield University,
EAWAG, etc



Parts supplier

for the middle they are:


Sanitation engineer



Technology developer



Parts supplier

for the back end they are:


Users e.g. community, household, etc



Sanitation engineer



Technology developer



Municipal services suppliers



Parts supplier
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3.3 Failure and RAMS Framework
Risk analysis in the context of this paper can be described as the identification of failures
which impact reliability, availability, maintainability, and safety (RAMS) within a decentralized
wastewater treatment sanitation system, plus the assessment of the criticality of the risks and the
ranking of such risks based on the potential stakeholder impact and potential for occurrence. If
the failures are not acceptable, risk mitigation controls can be put into place to minimize the
possibility of the failure manifesting, thus eliminating, or minimizing the risk of re-occurrence.
The RAMS framework approach is to create a logical criterion, which portrays a step by
step method for RAMS failure assessments in sanitation and decentralized wastewater treatment.
The framework is characterized by the identification of failure modes of different sanitation
systems. The requirements identified in ISO 30500 are used to create a concept of what is
considered safe, then reliability, availability, and maintainability are traded off for the
achievement of sanitation, by ranking these aspects including safety in order of importance. The
safety aspect here refers to other safety aspects over and above the ISO 30500 requirements. This
approach also helps to assess how different sanitation systems will perform over a prescribed
period, which is nominally a 10year period for decentralized systems, this is much shorter than
the “lifespan and therefore planning horizon of centrally organized water infrastructure, which
can be up to 100years” (Sitzenfrei & Rauch, 2014).
The RAMS framework will look at hazards associated with each stage of the sanitation
solution, rationalize the hazards and risk assess the outcome. The risk assessments will use the
Failure Mode Effect Analysis (FMEA) assessment as the starting point, then the output from the
FMEA is used in the qualitative risk assessment process. To design systems which are less prone
to systematic failures as a result of deficiencies in RAMS, industries such as manufacturing,
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automotive, aerospace, oil, and gas, petrochemical, electronics, medical and mechanical
technology, use tools such as Failure Mode Effect Analysis (FMEA) extensively at the front-end
engineering design (FEED) stages (Shi, et al., 2016). FMEA determines the Risk Priority
Number (RPN) of systems by determining the likelihood of occurrence (O), severity (S), and
detection (D) of a failure mode, which are each given a value of 10 each and multiplying the
values (S x O x D). This creates a rating system where the maximum RPN of 1000 is probable
for the worst-case scenario. System models using failure mode analysis can be further developed
based on the most probable failure modes, which are then further assessed by risk assessment
methodologies. This approach will be useful in the prediction of RAMS for decentralized
sanitation systems, where ultimately the risk of failure is linked to risk analysis and risk
assessments. This combined with the fact that the “risk assessment process performs an
important role in maintenance decision making, through structuring the process of identifying,
prioritizing, and thereafter formulating eﬀective maintenance strategies” (Chemweno, et al.,
2018), will determine the critically of the RAMS in any machine. Risk assessment is tools for
failure consequence assessment and predicting how likely the risk is to manifest, so form an
important link between the list of likely failures and whether they need to be targeted for RAMS.
Other tools such as estimates of the probability of failure on demand (PFD),
determinations of mean time before failure (MTBF), failure rates, mean time to repair (MTTR),
log removal value capabilities for microbial pathogenic removal, are used in the RAMS analysis.
Where public health and safety are to be assessed, the pathogenic Log Reduction Value (LRV) of
a sanitation technology is used as the basis to assess the susceptibility of the population to
specific diarrhoeal disease. The analysis uses widely available Disability Adjusted Life Year
(DALY) information. This concept was touched on in the introduction of ISO 30500 standards,
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it ensures that problematic pathogen classes are accounted for in sanitation implementation
(Nakagiri, et al. 2015; Stevens, et al. 2017; ISO 30500, 2018; Eawag/Sandec, 2008; Water
Research Australia, 2014) and is the microbial “Safety = S” part of the RAMS acronym. Safety
failure is the specific impact most likely to affect front-end users negatively if it goes wrong. So,
a specific focus on reducing the probability of occurrence of diarrheal disease is used to mitigate
the safety risk of RAMS. The approach focuses on the benefits to the receiving populations from
implementing a specific sanitation technology.
Ultimately, several tools can be applied in determining an overall optimum sanitation
system RAMS, but to have a framework that brings all these tools together in a logical fashion
and providing a simple decision tool for sanitation provision at the end, is the aim.
Additionally, there is an overlap between reliability, availability, maintainability, and
safety, and there is often a trade-off between one aspect against the other (Eti, et al., 2007). It is a
false premise to assume that a system is capable of being highly reliable, highly available, highly
maintainable, and safe all at the same time, simply because this would require bottomless
investment and require several spares and space for contaminant diversions. This scenario is
possibly acceptable for a project such as traveling to space, where failure is not an option and
there are vast amounts of investment available. However, on earth trade-offs are always the basis
upon which substantial progress in risk assessments is made. Focusing on the engineering aspect
and the things that are measurable or quantifiable because RAMS is a quality parameter that is
measurable, predictable, and controllable makes sense.
“Reliability is also intricately linked to maintainability, and thus reliability goals are often
set as part of a trade-off between these two properties to achieve optimal availability” (Vikman,
1983). To illustrate, an open-loop MURT may have to trade off availability (time accessible for
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use by front-end users) to maintain an exceptionally reliable sanitation system, which requires a
lot of maintenance i.e. highly reliable, by doing a lot of offline maintenance. The system may
also need to have spare front-end interfaces to recover some of the availability lost so that frontend users are not impacted by offline periods. However, the addition of more front-ends and
storage to accommodate this flexibility leads to more components that are likely to fail and
therefore reduce reliability, which can be increased only with very high maintenance, so the
system must be highly maintainable/easy to maintain. The introduction of the additional
maintenance will then impact reliability which is a measure of how long the system can function
without failure, which can be reduced by more additional components that can fail and require
additional maintenance to remain in service i.e. more high maintenance system. Therefore, the
cycle carries on building upon itself viciously. In this context, safety remains the same and the
goal is meet ISO 30500 standards, so there-in lies the constraint, if safety requirements were
relaxed for example then all other factors are less constrained, but safety is far too important an
aspect to be relaxed. So, to compensate for the inability to continuously incur maintenance costs
to reduce reliability issues and still maintain availability, the system may need to have spare
storage or spare interfaces (as shown) to maintain high levels of availability to the front-end user,
during scheduled maintenance.
This simple approach allows the system to maintain availability, whilst maintaining
required reliability levels, as shown below, in the following Venn diagrams showing the RAMS
skew for changes in parameter for each aspects of RAMS, based on the need to balance with a
linked aspect, and with limited resources and degrees of freedom.
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Figure 3.1: Venn Diagram of a Conceptual Perfect System

Figure 3.2: Venn Diagram of a Highly Reliable System
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Figure 3.3: Venn Diagram of a Highly Available System

Figure 3.4: Venn Diagram of a High Maintenance System
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Figure 3.5: Complex Conceptual Open-Loop Non-sewered Sanitation System for MURT

Figure 3.6: Trade-Off for Maintainability with Capacity to Maintain Availability
Thus, there is always a trade-off between all aspects of RAMS, to meet the required
safety requirements, whilst satisfying all other RAMS aspects. Failure of any aspects is likely to
impact all or some of the other aspects of RAMS, due to this overlap. Actions taken to combat
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the need to find this balance inevitably leads to an increase in complexity as shown in figure 3.5,
which has many more process lines and equipment associated with the boundary, compared with
a basic conceptual MURT boundary. Therefore the goal is always to balance action taken, with
cost and getting a sweet spot in RAMS that allows a system to remain successful for predetermined criteria which can be time to failure, user definition of success, number of
maintenance days, and so on, The criteria can be different in different scenarios, the most
important aspect is that stakeholder definition of success is defined and met. So, in the examples
shown in figures 3.2 to 3.4, the criteria are that safety levels are maintained at a predetermined
high level. This means that all other aspects lose one degree of freedom and whenever moves are
made in any one of the three more flexible aspects, this disproportionately impacts two other
flexible aspects more than if safety was also a flexible aspect.
3.4 Recap of RAMS Framework Objectives
Reliability, availability, maintainability, and safety (RAMS) are especially important and
necessary disciplines that must be applied to ensure the longevity of a system. The longevity of a
system is achieved by applying a systematic phased approach to the risk of failure by defining,
ranking, and assessing the factors that contribute to failure based on the influence failure has on
the RAMS of the system.
A focus on the development of a methodology for assessing the RAMS of decentralized
non-sewered sanitation systems, where systems can be single user reinvented toilet (SURT)
systems or multiple users reinvented toilet (MURT) systems are in order. The focus is on the
importance of off-grid prefabricated-turnkey or design-build sanitation/resource-recovery
technologies in the achievement of human health protection, sanitation, and water treatment.
SURTS and MURTS can be based in any location, but are predominantly investigated for
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remote, rural, and in locations where centralized sewer infrastructure is not currently available,
feasible, or wanted for sanitation requirements. The methodology proposes a framework that can
be used for the assessment of existing, new, and in-development systems and their failure modes.
It proposes using probabilistic methodologies to create logical processes for the assessment of
RAMS for decentralized non-sewered sanitation systems. The framework can be used as a tool
for determining the RAMS levels as a single aspect or as a combination of two, three, or all four
aspects which contribute to RAMS, and is universally applicable, flexible, and repeatable when
assessing decentralized non-sewered sanitation systems.
The approach will be to identify the hazards or situation with a potential for harm in
terms of human injury or ill health (both short and long term) Identify risks, by following a
process of failure analysis. Failures can be defined in several ways i.e. hazardous and nonhazardous, detectable, and non-detectable, human failure and machine failure, and from several
points of view based on stakeholder interaction with the equipment. Identified failures can also
be assessed in terms of their impact on the system and the criticality of the component or section
which is assessed, and the impact of such on the overall reliability of the entire system to a
potential stakeholder. The risk is quantified in a very simplistic sense, based on the probability
that a hazard will manifest with a certain consequence based on a certain frequency and cause
failure, which leads to risk analysis and assessment by examining whether the failures impact
RAMS. Identified risks are assessed in terms of the criticality of their harmful effect and ranked
in order of their risk-bearing potential. If the risk is acceptable, no operator intervention is
needed. If the risk is not acceptable, the risk mitigation process and controls are put in place.
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The basis of risk assessments involves identifying risks, gathering background data,
calculating their likelihood and severity, and outlining risk prevention and management
strategies (Pedroni, et al., 2017)
Control measures are suggested for unacceptable risks to lessen or eliminate the risk. The
control measure is evaluated to reveal possible hidden issues and risks that may arise from
activating the measure. Once implemented, the control measure is monitored to ensure it is being
implemented correctly. This is risk management.
The questions answered by this research seek to determine if a predictive model can be
used for predetermining RAMS levels of a system in a predictive model; whether a consistent,
practical, and reproducible framework that covers all decentralized non-sewered sanitation
systems as single or multiple user systems is viable; and whether a flexible method can be
created for assessing RAMS based on the measurements of volume or flow within the sanitation
system, as a measure of failure.
These questions have formed the basis of the methodology development.
3.5 Methodology for RAMS for Decentralized Single and Multiple User Sanitation Systems
The overall framework methodology is based on a phased approach.


Phase 1 is to define failure for each stage and assign a stakeholder.



Phase 2 is a brainstorming and failure ranking.



Phase 3 is the failure hazard effect assessment.



Phase 4 is to create a qualitative risk assessment model (QRM) and RAMS
assessment.

Finally, a validation of the model is done to determine wider applicability, which is the
risk evaluation and RAMS assessment
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3.5.1 Phase 1 - Define Failure and Assign Stakeholder
The first stage in the development of the framework model is the definition of “Failure”
for each loop and subsystem within the framework. To do this, a description of the function and
service of the front-end, middle, and back-end sections of a sanitation system is created, by using
the following definitions for function and service:
The function is what something does or is used for, while service is a function performed
on behalf of another subsystem. An example illustrating this is as follows; the wastewater
transfer pipe from the pedestal/toilet bowl to the equalization process, it performs the function of
transferring wastewater to the middle; it is identified on the subsystem schematic as “B1 - Raw
untreated water conveyance”. It performs a service for “A” - Front-end/User interface; by acting
as a flow removal system for human feces and wastewater, thus leaving the interface clean and
empty for the next user (i.e. performing a service for the next user), but also performs an
additional function for “B2 - Equalization and pre-treatment storage” by conveying the
wastewater from the front-end to the equalization stage to act as the input for the Middle.
Thus, service is work done on behalf of another part of the system. Therefore, in this
example scenario:
Table 3.1: Function and Service for Wastewater Conveyance B1
B1 - Raw untreated water conveyance
Function Containment system for the transfer of human waste to buffer i.e. transfer from front-end
and separation from human contact.
Service
a) Transfer service for front-end I.e. transfer system for human feces and wastewater
from Front-end/User interface
b) Conveyance for B2 - Equalization and pre-treatment storage” by conveying the
wastewater o the equalization/buffer stage to act as the input to the treatment stage.

The function can also be assessed from a mass balance perspective. The process is to
imagine the mass balance equation for each subsystem node, that is:
Input – Output = Accumulation + Generation or Loss

Equation 1
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so:
Service X t=0 – service X…n t=x = Function
where service X…n indicates an n number of services associated with the subsystem. Using the
mass balance equation:
QCin - QCout = V dC/dT – r


Q = Flow rate through subsystem L/s



V = Volume of subsystem L



C = Concentration at time t mg/L



t = Time since flow entered subsystem



r = Rate of reaction

Equation 2

QCin - QCout = Service X t=x – service X…n t=x+1 = [V dC/dT - r]

Equation 3

Function = [V dC/dT - r]

Equation 4

where:
Function = Accumulation + Generation or Loss and service is the time-based changes
within the system to allow it to perform its function.
An example to illustrate the mass balance scenario is shown as follows:
if Input is Waste from “A” and Output is Conveyance to B2, then, input-output = accumulation +
generation.
Generation = 0
So, Input – accumulation = output at time x
A - B1 = B2 t = x

Equation 5
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or,
A – (B2 t=x+1 – t=x) = B1

Equation 6

Figure 3.7: Typical Non-sewered Sanitation System example
Assuming that B1 which is composed of accumulation and/or generation or loss can be
defined mathematically as follows:
Input – Output = Accumulation - Generation or Loss = B1

Equation 7

QCin - QCout = [V dC/dT - r]

Equation 2

A - (B2 t=x+1 – t=x) = QCin - QCout = B1= [V dC/dT - r]

Equation 8

B1 = [V dC/dT - r]

Equation 9

If we assume no generation or loss in B1, so r = 0 and a constant Volume V:
B1 = [V dC/dT - 0]

Equation 80

B1 = V dC/dT

Equation 91
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Thus, the function of B1 is the steady-state accumulation of flow in a constant volume,
where inlet flow pushes out the outlet flow as output. This function is also defined as
“Conveyance of Flow from A - (B2 t=x+1 – t=x)”
Defined mathematically as: Conveyance of Flow from A - (B2 t=x+1 – t=x = [V dC/dT - 0] = B1
Equation 12
Table 3.2: Mass Balance Representation of Function and Service Flow
B1 - Raw untreated water conveyance
Function
Service

[V dC/dT]
A - (B2 t=x+1 – t=x)
That is: [Service X t=x – service X…n t=x+1] = QCin - QCout

Thus mathematically, the failure to achieve [V dC/dT – r) for any subsystem is a
functional failure and a failure to a Service X t=x is a service failure. Not all failures can be easily
defined, for example, a failure to access the sanitation facilities due to closure is exemplified in
the failure of a front-end user unable to add human waste “input” to the receptacle in “A”, thus a
logical link must be made in terms of process flow.
3.5.1.1 Define Failure for Each Stage and Assign Stakeholder
Failure should be described in terms of whether it is a failure of one of the criteria which
constitutes a failure e.g. loss of water flow to the toilet cistern, or failure of the entire system like
a power failure leading to complete system shutdown. Failure also needs to be defined in terms
of whether the failure is possible in the first instance. Failure can also be described as a
combination of certain failures which when taken together equals a failure of the system, such as
lack of toilet paper, which leads to use of non-flushable material for wiping, which lead to pipe
blockages, and eventually stops the flow of flushed waste from the front-end to the middle of the
wastewater treatment system. Though in this context the root cause/primary failure is the lack of
toilet paper and the asset/system failure is the lack of flow between the two subsections e.g.
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front-end and middle. In an asset management context, these would constitute a gradual failure,
which when modeling reliability can be reversed if caught and rectified. Failure of components,
based on the inherent failures they have is different, and relates to the probability of failure of a
specific component, normally provided by the component manufacturer as failure rate, and is
based on random failure assessment, thus it may or may not happen in the lifetime of the
component. Thus, failure definition is very specific, it requires failure to be specifically
described, without ambiguity for root causes of the failure to be assessed for RAMS
improvements. This begins with the description of the “Function” and “Service” that a subsystem
performs within the sanitation system, which impacts specific stakeholder(s) e.g. a front-end
failure will impact a front-end user more than any other stakeholder such as a sanitation
engineer, Failure definition should also describe whether a failure is sudden or gradual, more or
less likely due to machine failure, human action or due to the materials within the system. For
example, disposal of foaming components in the system, or because of human behavior like
using non-flushable materials for wiping. The aim of this methodical and specific approach to
get precise failure definitions, to populate an initial failure list. A typical failure list generation
involves several stages shown below.
There is a need for expertise in the assessment of failure, otherwise, the process will be
ineffective. A deep and thorough understanding of the system under examination by the people
doing the assessment is crucial, thus there is a requirement for expert knowledge and lack of bias
in the estimation of failure modes. It is perhaps important to assume that the point of the process
is to uncover failure modes that will damage the credibility of a product and get ahead of the
failure before it occurs than to see it as a fault-finding process looking to undermine a new
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technology or process. The ability to be unemotional and methodical at this stage is vitally
important.
Gather all relevant information – Familiarity with the process, control functions, usage functions, service
interactions with other systems / subsystems physical and environmental hazards, current regulation,
stakeholders.

Define process and subsystem boundaries.

Define types of initiating events: wrong usage, lack of disposables, human error, mechanical.

Allocation of failure criteria to subsystems.

Assign impact ranking to RAMS from 1-4 e.g. s=1, A=3, R=2, M=1 based on expertise/expert knowledge

Figure 3.8: Phase 1- Define Failure for Each Stage

3.5.1.2 Gather all the Relevant Information
Gather all the relevant information to populate the initial failure list generated e.g. design
specifications, equipment parts list, maintenance data, spares data, quality control information,
flow rates, volumes, flow diagrams, and so on. These enable the assessment process to be
thorough and informed by facts, rather than speculation.
3.5.1.3 Define all Process and Subsystem Boundaries
An important aspect of defining system boundaries is that it must provide a strict
definition of boundaries that the assessment stays within the bounds of. It is important not to
stray outside the boundaries that have been set and to try to solve problems that are out of scope,
otherwise, the integrity of the entire assessment process will be compromised. The sanitation
value chain (BMGF Sanitation Value Chain, 2010), is modified to show the varying system
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boundaries of a traditional decentralized non-sewered sanitation system pit latrine system as
follows:

Figure 3.9: Sanitation Value Chain – Example scope 1 Onsite
Adapted from: (BMGF Sanitation Value Chain, 2010)


System: The hole dug in the ground, the slab covering the hole and the enclosing
structure



System boundary: Enclosure with pit

Figure 3.10: Sanitation Value Chain – Example scope 2 Onsite
Adapted from: (BMGF Sanitation Value Chain, 2010)


System: The hole dug in the ground, the slab covering the hole, the enclosing
structure, the transfer hose pipe, and the removal truck.



System boundary: Enclosure with pit and tanker
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Figure 3.11: Sanitation Value Chain – Example scope 3 Onsite Sanitation
Adapted from: (BMGF Sanitation Value Chain, 2010)


System: The hole dug in the ground, the slab covering the hole, the enclosing
structure, the transfer hose pipe, the removal truck, the transfer hose pipe from the
tanker to treatment, and the treatment stage.



System boundary: Enclosure with pit to the treatment stage.

An alternative scenario is to treat the tanker and transfer to the treatment stage as a
separate independent stage, which is out of scope for the assessment team. It is unlikely that the
primary stakeholders such as the local users and/or the sanitation engineer, will be involved in
the treatment stages of pit latrine waste, thus can be considered out of scope if only onsite
treatment is to be considered for assessment. It is more likely that a service provider will be
employed to empty the pit and treat the waste at a different location to the community location
where the waste was generated. The service provider, therefore, takes on the responsibility for
the waste treatment from the point of collection onwards. However, for holistic reasons, it is
important for the onsite sanitation primary assessment team to know and understand the final fate
of the waste, and therefore choose the right service provider for treatment. Therefore, the RAMS
process in this regard can be used as a tool to determine what type of treatment is most fitting for
the sanitation value chain. They can use the assessment to decide whether composting, discharge
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to sewer, thermal treatment, etc., are options to use for treatment or something else. This is an
important aspect of achieving sanitation even if the primary assessment team will not be
involved in the later stages of the chain.

Figure 3.12: Sanitation Value Chain – Example scope 4 Onsite Sanitation
Adapted from: (BMGF Sanitation Value Chain, 2010)


System: The hole dug in the ground, the slab covering the hole, the enclosing
structure, the transfer hose pipe, the removal truck, the transfer hose pipe from the
tanker to treatment, the treatment stage, and resource recovery.



System boundary: Enclosure with pit to the resource recovery stage
For the pit latrine system described by scope 4, the front-end is:



A – Front-end/User interface: squat pan, pit, and enclosure



Dx – Municipal water / Water top-up line: non-existent



D2 – Fresh / Treated water storage: non-existent



D3 – Water conveyance to Front-end: non-existent

the middle is:


B1 - Raw untreated water conveyance: Hose from pit to tanker



B2 - Equalization and pre-treatment storage: Tanker



B3 / Bx - Post equalization conveyance: Hose from the tanker to treatment
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the back-end is:


C - Treatment and entropy reduction: Treatment process e.g. composting.



D1- Treated water recycle: non-existent



Cx - Safe discharge: soil enhancer/compost
Table 3.3: VIP Latrine Boundaries

Front-End
User
Inputs
interface
Scope 1
Scope 2
Scope 3
Scope 4
Squat
Blackwater
hole
(Faeces and
urine) into the
pit

Middle
Primary
treatment

Transfer

Human-powered emptying
and Transport/ Mechanized
power emptying and
Transport

Back-End
Treatment

Dehydration by land
application/Composting

Resource
Recovery

Discharge

Compost

A representation of the varying scoped from 1 to 4 is shown table above. It shows
how the different stages are linked and how a sanitation scope can be expanded to include the
full sanitation value chain.
An advanced MURT like the NEWgenerator is a single scope because the waste
generation, transfers, and treatment all happen as part of a single advanced treatment system,
with the front-end user interface acting as a waste receptacle for collecting waste and directing
this to the rest of the treatment system. For the MURT scenario, the front-end is
•

Front-end/User interface: Flush Toilets

•

Dx – Municipal water / Water top-up line up Plastic PTFE pipe containing potable
water

•

D2 – Fresh / Treated water storage: Plastic tank containing clean water

•

D3 – Water conveyance to Front-end: Plastic PTFE pipe containing clean water

for the middle:
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B1 - Raw untreated water conveyance: Plastic PTFE pipe containing blackwater
B2 - Equalization and pre-treatment storage: Plastic tank containing clean blackwater
B3 / Bx - Post equalization conveyance (including transfer by trucks): Plastic PTFE pipe
containing blackwater
for the back-end
C - Treatment and entropy reduction: Plastic reactors and plastic pipes; containing
blackwater, biosolids, biogas, solids, disinfectant, and treated water
D1- Treated water recycle: Plastic PTFE pipe containing treated water
Cx - Safe discharge (Sewer, Surface water, groundwater, etc.): Plastic PTFE pipe containing
treated water.
Table 3.4: NEWgenerator Boundary
Front-End
User interface

Inputs

Middle
Primary
treatment

Transfer

Back-End
Treatment

Resource
Recovery

Discharge

Scope 1
Flush toilet
Clean water
transfer and
storage
systems

-

Blackwater
(Faeces
and urine)

-

Blackwater
(Faeces and
urine)
transfer int
equalization

Membrane reactor

-

-

Treated water
recycle
Safe
discharge

An example of an advanced SURT such as the Cranfield nanomembrane toilet can be
shown as follows:
For the front-end:
•

Front-end/User interface: Flush Toilets

•

Dx – Municipal water / Water top-up line up: non-existent

•

D2 – Fresh / Treated water storage: non-existent

•

D3 – Water conveyance to Front-end: non-existent

for the middle:
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•

B1 - Raw untreated waste conveyance: Archimedes screw

•

B2 - Equalization, and pre-treatment: Moisture aspiration from waste

•

B3 / Bx - Post equalization conveyance (including transfer by trucks): non-existent

for the back-end
•

C - Treatment and entropy reduction: Thermal combustion chamber

•

D1- Treated water recycle: Internal pipe for water recovery

•

Cx - Safe discharge (Sewer, Surface water, groundwater, etc.): non-existent
Table 3.5: Cranfield Nanomembrane Toilet Boundary

Front-End
User interface

Inputs

Middle
Primary
treatment

Transfer

Back-End
Treatment

Resource
Recovery

Dis
cha
rge

Scope 1
-

ClosedLoop toilet

Blackwate
r (Faeces
and urine)

-

-

Archimedes screw
blackwater (Faeces
and urine) transfer
int equalization.
Moisture aspiration

Combustion
chamber

-

Internal
clean
water
recycle

The above tables show that for the advanced decentralized sanitation SURT and the
MURT systems depicted, the entire sanitation system is contained within one single scope,
whereas, for the traditional pit latrine system, the sanitation value chain is broken down into
many scopes within the same chain, following a sanitation value chain. Additionally, the “backend” subsection in any sanitation subsystem carries a higher burden of processes compared with
the front-end and the back-end of sanitation systems, this is because the back-end contains the
“treatment” stage which is essential for pathogen destruction, and usually the most complex
aspect of the system. The above tables also show that there are many ways in which sanitation
can be achieved, but very rarely will two different sanitation technologies be completely alike,
therefore comparisons often will be made between dissimilar technologies. This means that the
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RAMS assessment process must provide enough flexibility to deal with such differences in
technologies.
3.5.1.4 Define Types of Initiating Events.
Initiating events generally fit into three main categories.
1. People behavioural e.g. human activity, human error.
2. Materials release impact e.g. line rupture of pipe containing untreated waste,
inefficient treatment leading to pathogens in final discharge, etc
3. Equipment / Supply failure e.g. wrong size valves, inadequate design, lack of
disposables, lack of spares, etc.
The aim is to approach this systematically. It is important to follow a sequential approach
that helps the team to decipher a causal relationship of failure impacts and discard superfluous
facts. At this stage, it is important to have a clear understanding of the initial events that could
lead to a failure event within each subsystem. This can be achieved by using knowledge of
similar equipment which have had similar failures or having enough experience within the expert
assessment team to determine probable failure modes. The team should also be able to eliminate
all initiating events that are outside the scope of the system i.e. problems that are beyond the
control of the sanitation system and not identified as in-scope.
Also, of note is that equipment/supply failure tends to produce, reliability, and
maintenance failures. This is because the impact of an equipment failure is usually preceded by
reliability and maintenance impacts, though there are always safety failures associated with most
failures in sanitation, due to it being a very safety risk-based topic.
Once the possible failures have been listed, it is important to focus on each failure and
understand the reasons behind them. This is the determination of the initiating events behind the
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failure. A root cause analysis using brainstorming can be performed to determine the initiating
cause of failure and to determine if multiple failures have the same initiating event.
3.5.1.5 Allocation of Failure Criteria to Subsystem
This section attempts to answer the question of how a function, or a system fails, based
on the initiating event. Mathematically, failure can be expressed as the failure to achieve a:
Function of [V dC/dT – r) for any subsystem or to carry out a Service: [Service X t=x – service
X…n t=x+1] = QCin - QCout.
So, once failures have been identified, it is important to establish they are functional failures or a
service failure.
A function failure is when a system fails to perform its primary objective. Such as a valve
failing to close, a pump failing to start an/or pump/pump in the wrong direction, a pipe rupturing.
Service failure usually depicts an inability to perform a function for another part of a system. For
example, a pipe blockage between the front-end and the middle would prevent the flow of
wastewater to the treatment section from the front-end, meaning that the front-end has failed to
deliver a “service” to the treatment section.
It is important to note that most function failures have corresponding system failures. In
some cases no system failures are accompanying a function failure, for example, a pit latrine
which becomes full does not impact any other part of the system, because it’s designed to get full
at some point, so even though it has “failed” in its function because it can no longer be used by
front-end users, its hasn’t created a service failure. If it is designed to be capped and or emptied,
then as long as these happen as per design, the system has been successful in its sanitation goal.
One could argue that if the pit is designed as a composting system, and the waste could not be
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composted or removed for composting due to failure in the service of removal, then that is a
service failure to the re-use (back-end) of the system if that subsystem is within scope.
Thus, the proper allocation of failure criteria requires the consideration of design intent,
the failure impact, and the failure mode of the initiating event. As assessment of all three
determines how a system is likely to fail, meaning it answers the question of, is it a functional or
service-based failure?
3.5.1.6 Assign Impact Ranking to RAMS
To assign impact ranking one needs to determine the primary stakeholder of concern. Are
they the end-user, engineer, investor, community leaders, etc.? The ranking should be from 1 – 4
with a ranking of 4 given to the RAMS aspect with the highest impact from a specific failure,
and 1 being assigned to the RAMS aspect that the least impact. The sum of adding all scores for
individual aspects together should be exactly 10.
For example, if M = 3, then R or A or S can then only equal 1, 2, or 4. If R in this
scenario equals 4, then A or S can equal 1 or 2 only, if S is 2. Then A must equal 1.
Table 3.6: Illustrations of RAMS Diminishing Score Choices
Table of all options
R
1
2
A
1
2
M
1
2
S
1
2
If M =3
R
1
2
A
1
2
M
S
1
2
If M =3 and R = 4
R
A
1
2
M
S
1
2
If M =3 and R = 4 and S = 2, then A must equal 1
R
A
1
M
S
2

3
3
3
3

4
4
4
4
4
4

3
4
4
3

4
3
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This means that for every failure, the impact is different for differing stakeholder’s
perspective.
Table 3.7: Stakeholder Allocation for RAMS
Front

Primary
stakeholder

Secondary
stakeholder

A- Frontend/User
interface

Community/
Users e.g.
community,
household,
etc

Sanitation
Engineer /
Technician/
Service
provider

Sanitation
Engineer /
Technician/
Service
provider

Community/
Users

DMunicipal
water /
Water top
up line

Failure modes of interest (Example rankings)








Failure to maintain hygienic conditions (R=2,
A=3, M=1, S=4)
Running out of consumables (R=2, A=4,
M=1, S=3)
Inadequate utilities that enable sanitation
(R=2, A=3, M=1, S=4)
Loss of access (R=2, A=4, M=1, S=3)
Loss of flow (R=4, A=3, M=1, S=2)
Flow inadequacy compared to design (R=4,
A=3, M=1, S=2)
Leakages (R=4, A=3, M=1, S=2)

Middle
D2 – Fresh /
Treated
water
storage

Sanitation
Engineer /
Technician/
Service provider

Community/
Users

D3 – Water
conveyance
to Frontend

Community/
Users e.g.
community,
household, etc

Sanitation
Engineer /
Technician/
Service
provider



B1 - Raw
untreated
water
conveyance

Sanitation
Engineer /
Technician/
Service provider

Community/
Users e.g.
community,
household, etc











B2 Equalizatio
n and pretreatment
storage

Sanitation
Engineer /
Technician/
Service provider

No available flush water / potable
water (R=4, A=2, M=1, S=3)

Service
provider /
Technology
provider/invest
ors








Loss of flush water (R=3, A=2,
M=1, S=4)
Leakages (R=3, A=2, M=1, S=4)

Loss of flow/Partial or full
obstruction (R=4, A=2, M=3, S=1)
Exposure to the material being
conveyed (R=3, A=2, M=1, S=4)
Inadequacy compared to design
(R=4, A=2, M=3, S=1)
Leakages (R=4, A=2, M=3, S=2)
Inadequacy compared to design
(R=4, A=2, M=3, S=1)
Loss of storage capacity leading to
overflow discharge (R=3, A=2,
M=1, S=4)
Loss of equalization ability due to
low usage (R=3, A=4, M=1, S=1)
Leakages (R=4, A=3, M=1, S=2)
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Table 3.7: (Continued)
Middle
B3 / Bx - Post
equalization
conveyance
(including
transfer by
trucks

Sanitation
engineer/Se
rvice
provider

Community/ Users e.g.
community, household,
etc

-

-



Loss of flow/Partial or full
obstruction (R=4, A=2, M=3,
S=1)
Loss of flow/Loss of service
chain (R=4, A=2, M=3, S=1)
Leakages /Discharge into
environment (R=3, A=2,
M=3, =4)

Back-End
C - Treatment
and entropy
reduction

Community/
Users e.g.
community,
household,
etc

Sanitation engineer

D1- Treated
water recycle

Sanitation
engineer

Community/Users

Cx - Safe
discharge
(Sewer, Surface
water,
groundwater,
etc.

Users e.g.
community,
household,
etc

Sanitation
Engineer/Technology
provider








Unsafe results from laboratory
analysis (R=3, A=2, M=3, S=4)
Unsafe discharge (R=3, A=2,
M=3, S=4)
Loss of flow/Partial or full
obstruction (R=4, A=2, M=3, S=1)
Leakages (R=4, A=2, M=3, S=1)
Discharge of pathogenic material
from wastewater into the
community/household (R=3, A=2,
M=3, S=4)

At the end of phase 1, the assessment team should have a well-defined failure mapping
for each subsystem of the sanitation system, with all the relevant information associated with
each subsystem documented, all system boundaries identified, all initiating events established
and where there are initiating events with common failures, these should be grouped using an
association method such as mind mapping. Mind mapping is in phase 2. Phase 1 should also
answer the question of “how does it fail?”.
Finally, stakeholder impact ranking should be determined for each failure identified.
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3.5.2 Phase 2 - Brainstorming
There is a need for risk identifications to be conducted by a mixture of experts and nonexperts by using brainstorming sessions to identify the plausible weaknesses in the design of a
sanitation system. “Brainstorming is probably one of the most well-known tools of creative
problem solving” (Isaksen, 1998). One of the most important aspects identified for a good
brainstorming session is to have a well-defined problem to brainstorm and for all the participants
to have a clear objective of what is expected from the brainstorming session. In the case of
RAMS brainstorming the team will determine what the most likely failure modes are for the
sanitation system, having previously defined what failure is for each subsystem. They classify
the failures as reliability, availability, maintainability and safety failures, or a failure that impacts
multiple aspects of RAMS. The expert and non-expert team should develop a sequence of events,
the goal of which is to fully understand, if, and how a failure can manifest. There is a danger that
experts and those close to the technology may have an emotional attachment which leads to
defensiveness about the robustness of the technology, but, by leveraging multiple brains to
determine if there are opportunities to design out existing failures and create a more robust
product, better systems are designed. Brainstorming even though a generally informal process
should follow the following criteria:


Failures identified should be reasonably probable.



The sequence of events should be evidence-based, factual, and based on previous
experience of failure.



Conclusions drawn on theoretical failures should be logical and have a reasonable
probability of occurrence e.g. a plane crashing into a sanitation system, is possible,
but there is only a very tiny reasonable probability of occurrence unless the sanitation
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system is located in or near an airport, but even then the probability will be as low as
that of a plane crash during take-off or landing, and specifically in the location with
the sanitation system.


Conclusions should be based on whether any reasonable participant with the same
relevant level of knowledge will come to the same conclusions.



All probable failures should be considered i.e. no failure is too improbable, but not
all failures should be deemed credible.

The process requires a generation of flows of the failure sequence of events, which
focuses on a single node or subsystem until exhausted. A tabular data representation method is
well suited for this and can be used for easy data analysis. The collated failure sequence of
events can then be analyzed using the RAMS framework methodology.
The best ways to brainstorm are to try more than one approach (Rudy & Lisa Jo, 2020).
The best approach is to start with “basic brainstorming,” and then change as needed to ensure the
process generates a good quantity of information and failure ideas.
The brainstorming process requires the selection of a facilitator, the team, and the scope
of the information to be brainstormed to be agreed upon. The scope should remain within the
boundaries agreed in phase 1, it can be smaller but not bigger. The facilitator is tasked with
setting the stage, maintaining scope discipline, and ensuring that the process is productive and
fruitful.
Brainstorming in failure analysis seeks to get people to generate ideas on how a sanitation
subsystem/system might fail in addition to already identified initiating failures. There should be a
requirement during a brainstorming session to apply a no criticism rule, so as not to stifle
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creativity. Ideas should be reviewed and the most viable selected discussed and developed
further from the collection generated.
There are several types of basic brainstorming methods, such as:
Analytic Brainstorming is where the brainstorming focuses on solving the failure to
determine what might cause the failure, for example, a need to prevent blockages would lead a
team to look at all the scenarios that could lead to blockages within a pipe. Examples of analytic
brainstorming tools are:
Visual mind mapping draws pictures of the failure and the relationships within the
sanitation system that can lead to that failure. Books such as Mind Mapping for Dummies
(Rustler, et al., 2012) have helpful information on visual mind mapping. Mind mapping is a
method for outlining thoughts visually (Eaton & K, 2017) and this allows for mental links to be
made more easily, which can allow initiating event associations (i.e. most relevant causes of
failure) to be quickly concentrated and therefore identified. There are several online software for
mind mapping. A sanitation example is shown below. The ability to link the subsequent failures
to a single or reduced number of common causes means that mitigation can have far-reaching
effects, which are over and above a single failure being investigated.
Reverse Brainstorming uses the fact that the human mind is much better at identifying
faults than positives (Hagen, et al., 2016), therefore reverse brainstorming hinges on the idea of
identifying the problem first by asking, how a specific failure can be caused, rather than trying to
imagine the solutions to an imagined failure. So, once a list of ways of creating specific failures
is defined then the team can look at ways to fix the problem. It does appear that when it comes to
complex brainstorming, focusing on constraints generates more ideas than pure ideas generation
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methods which seem to be better suited to simple task analysis problems (Bonnardela, et al.,
2020).
Another brainstorming technique often used is the Five Whys. The five why’s simply asks
the question “Why” five times. The process starts by asking “Why is a failure happening?” for
example:
1.

Why did the toilet not flush?

To which an answer could be provided e.g. There was no water in the water cistern. Then
the next question:
2.

Why was there no water in the water cistern?

Answer: There was a leak in the water pipe.
3.

Why was there a leak in the water pipe?

Answer: Pipe cracked due to age or the pipe ruptured due to accidental damage or the
pipe specification was wrong etc.
4.

Why was the pipe allowed to age to destruction?

Answer: The maintenance replacement schedule was incorrect, or the wrong pipe
specification was used, or pipe aged much faster than anticipated or because there
were no funds to replace the pipe or Human error, etc.
5a. Why was the pipe specification wrong? Answers could be human error or lack of
knowledge, or lack of availability of the correct pipe specification, etc.
5ai. Why was there Human error? Answer: There was a lack of training or distraction.
5b. Why weren’t fund sufficient? Answer: Because the local community cannot
contribute to the maintenance of the system i.e. it is too expensive.
5bi. Why wasn’t there a community management system to procure funds in place?
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And so on. This process allows the team to get to the root cause / initiating event (yellow
bubbles in the figure below) of the failure rather than treating the symptom, which allows for
common failure modes to be identified and grouped.
Star bursting involves asking the question of why a failure would happen. It is based on
asking questions starting with the following words: who, what, where, when, why, and how,
these words are used to generate questions. For example:


Who is most likely to be impacted by the failure?



What will they see?



Where would they most likely encounter the failure?



When is it most likely to occur?



Why would it occur? Which can be tied into the 5 why’s approach.



How will it happen? This is looking more at the discovery of the failure e.g. by
monitoring or by chance etc.

So, for example:


Who will be most impacted by a non-flushing toilet?



Answer: The community /user



What will they see?



Answer: They will try to flush but there is no flush water or no flush handle.



Where would they most likely encounter the failure?



Answer: In the toilet cubicle or restroom.



When is the failure most likely to occur?



Answer: Anytime.



Why would failure occur?
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Answer: Lack of water entering the cistern or vandalism of the toilet flush handle etc.



How will the failure be discovered?



Answer: By a user seeking to use the toilet.

Another example is:


Who is most likely to discover a burst pipe?



Answer: The sanitation engineer



What will they see?



Answer: They will either notice a drop in level (or other online indication) or notice
the leak.



Where would they most likely encounter the failure?



Answer: When they are doing their normal operations on the process.



When is the failure most likely to occur?



Answer: Anytime.



Why would failure occur?



Answer: Lack of proper design materials used in piping or accidental damage.



How will the failure be discovered?



Answer: It’ll be by discovering an actual leak i.e. lagging indicator

The most attractive aspect of the starbursting method is that it allows the stakeholder
impact to be assessed in addition to the initiating event. So, when a system fails the who, why,
where, when, and how are discovered in addition to the “what”.
Finally, "What If" Brainstorming can be used to streamline the brainstorming exercise
and narrow down the focus of the processes. This process involves asking “what if”. What if the
failure happened in a different context?
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For sanitation assessment, the elements of the “What If” analysis should cover questions,
which allows the brainstorming team to assess the system in a different context to the context
already brainstormed, such as:


What if the failure happened at a different time of the day?



What if there are 10-times many more users or 5-times fewer users?



What if there was no treatment facility or the treatment stage stopped working?



What if there was a catastrophic failure due to natural occurrences such as flooding?



What if an important component in an advanced sanitation system is stolen?



What if people don’t maintain the advanced decentralized sanitation system?



What if the system is inadequate for the scenario?



What if the system is undersized, etc.?

This must be done for as many viable contexts as the team deems reasonable, but it is
important to understand that it is impossible to cover all possible scenarios.
The “What If” analysis should answer the questions on what else can be done differently if those
scenarios are viable.
Brainstorming is an important tool for failure mode generation. It gives the team an
opportunity to uncover fatal flaws in design and an opportunity to come up with alternatives and
possibilities for improvement. However, brainstorming is only as good as its participants and the
facilitator. The better the brainstorming facilitator is at selecting participants, setting the stage,
and encouraging discussion, the better the outcomes of brainstorming are likely to be.
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Figure 3.13: Example Mind Mapping a Failure of Toilet Paper
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Figure 3.14: Five Why's Example for a Water Cistern
MW: Municipal Water
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3.5.3 Phase 2 - Failure Ranking
Failure recognition is the precursor to ranking. “Failure-pattern recognition developed
into the identification and study of failure modes. Emphasis has shifted from performing repairs
– the traditional focus of maintenance – to understanding the cause of failure” (Eti, et al., 2007).
This approach aims to ensure that all failures identified at the brainstorming phase are ranked
based on whether they are mitigated, unmitigated, or partially mitigated. The failures should also
be scored based on the mechanism of failure, the consequence of failure, and the stakeholder
most affected by the failure. The impacts of these failures should be used as the priority setting
of failures, which starts early in the assessment process. This allows for a sensible and systematic
approach to failure reduction.
A failure criterion table should be created to assess the priority and impact of the failure
of the sanitation system. An example of a failure definition criteria table is proposed below,
however, this should be created on a case by case basis using the expertise of the design team to
assign priorities. The table of failure definition criteria can be used as a guide to determine
qualitatively whether a failure mode effect analysis is to be conducted, or whether to scrap an
original design and replace it with a new more suitable one, due to the inability to mitigate vital
risks. The approach is qualitatively based on deterministic.
Table 3.8: Figure of Failure Definition Criteria Calculation
Effects x Mechanism x Consequence x Primary Stakeholder = Min: 0 Max:
27

Using the above criteria all failures can be ranked between 0 and 27, thus giving a first
indication of whether the failure can be subjected to a failure analysis tool such as a Failure
Mode Effect Analysis (FMEA), which starts the process used to determine the severity and the
likelihood of occurrence for the failures identified by brainstorming.
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Brainstormed and ranked failures should be given scores to identify which failure
mechanism caused the initiating event, which considers the effect, mechanism, and consequence
of the failure.
The table of failure definition criteria below can be used as a guide to determine these
aspects. The aim is to rank the failures based on effect, mechanism of failure, consequence, and
primary affected stakeholder to compare failure types with each other. The approach is
qualitative and based on deterministic methods of assessments.
Table 3.9: Table of Failure Definition Criteria
Effect
Primary
Secondary

Mechanism
1 Sudden

2 Abnormal gradual
degradation
Compound 3 Normal gradual
degradation

Consequence
3 Unmitigated
2 Partially
mitigated
1 Mitigated

Primary Stakeholder
Service providers / technology
providers/ System / Machine
0.5 Front-end users
1

0

External community

1
2
3

Using the above criteria for scoring failures, failures can be ranked between 0 and 27,
thus giving the first indication on whether a predictable failure which can benefit from predictive
maintenance can be subjected to a failure analysis tool such as a Failure Mode Effect Analysis
(FMEA), Root Cause Analysis (RCA), etc.
Definition of “Effect” looks at the fact that the effect of a failure can be a primary effect
meaning that the manifestation of the failure is felt directly by the user, stakeholder, or is felt
within the sanitation system itself. A direct exposure because of a direct failure is something like,
running out of toilet roll leading to the use of non-flushable materials for wiping. The failure is
running out of toilet paper, and the direct effect is blockages. If the same community uses water
for ablutions after defecating and doesn’t then wash their hands properly afterward, thus leaving
people with higher concentrations of fecal matter on their hands, which increases the probability
of diarrhoeal disease within the same community, this is a secondary effect.
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Secondary effects mean that an action arising from a direct failure creates a secondary
impact or impacts a third party. Ultimately the impact/effect is felt by direct exposure to an
indirect failure. Another example is the transport of untreated waste from one community to
another, where treatment is to be completed at a different location. If the said waste is illegally
dumped in a new community without treatment, the second community is exposed to pathogenic
material which can cause diarrhoeal effects. Whereas the primary community which created the
waste in the first place is unaffected. The difference between the two types of secondary effects
described is that in the latter example the secondary effect is on a secondary group, and in the
former example, the secondary effects impact the primary group, but the causal failure is
indirect.
Compound effect means an effect that has no direct link to the initiating failure but has an
impact on other systems. For example, if the failure of one type of advanced sanitation system in
one community leads to suspicion of all types of advanced sanitation systems of similar design,
even if they have nothing to do with the failed system, then that is a compound effect. Another
example is where plastic bottles are used to bring ablution water to the toilet due to lack of clean
water or toilet paper on location. Thus, leading to plastics pollution. The plastic pollution is not
going to directly impact the sanitation system itself, and it is unlikely that the plastic pollution
overall is solely due to the use of plastic bottles for ablution purposes, however, the lack of toilet
paper or the clean water on location, would have contributed to a plastic pollution problem if one
arose, thus creating a compound effect.
Table 3.10: Definition of Effects
Primary effect
Secondary effect
Compound effect
Cause
Direct
Indirect
Direct or Indirect
Impact of Effect
Direct
Direct
Indirect
Note: Direct and indirect refer to direct and indirect linkages to the initiating cause or failure
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Definition of “Mechanism” indicates whether the failure is sudden e.g. sickness due to
consumption of contaminated water, or gradual e.g. pit latrine volume reduction, membrane
blockage, bearing wear, etc. Degradation can be normal degradation e.g. normal use of toilet roll
leading to running out of toilet roll, or pit latrine fills up as per design. In this instance, failure is
expected and part of the normal operation of the system. Abnormal gradual degradation is where
the failure is gradual but not part of the design intent or normal behaviour of the system e.g.
abnormal wear on pump bearing or abnormal fouling of membrane leading to reduced lifespan
versus design.
Definition of “Consequences” indicates whether a failure is unmitigated where the
manifestation of the failure is not or cannot be mitigated in advance e.g. sudden failure of a
pump, unexpected flooding, etc.
Partially mitigated occurrences happen where there is some mitigation but not all failure
mechanisms can be mitigated e.g. use of toilet roll can be predicted but running out occasionally
cannot be fully mitigated, pump failure can be partially mitigated with regular maintenance but
pumps can still fail in service, etc.
Fully mitigated failures are failures that once identified can be mitigated by design. e.g.
use of solar panels instead of grid electricity, which removes failure associated with loss of grid
power, but consequently introduces new failures such as insufficient battery charge in overcast
conditions or solar panel orientation, vandalism, and theft risk, etc, leading to loss of power. So,
even when a failure is fully mitigated, the mitigation measure could add some new failure modes
to the sanitation system, which would otherwise not exist. Theft is a residual low ranking risk for
advanced decentralized sanitation systems because the advanced components which are
frequently used in these systems are generally attractive to thieves, however, the systems are
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usually manned or remotely monitored in some form, therefore the probability of discovery of
vandalism and/or theft is often very high. Thus, the residual risk of theft and/or vandalism
impacting RAMS of an advanced decentralized non-sewered sanitation system over a long
period without discovery is low. Discovery is assumed will lead to rectification of the problem to
replace the crucial component and prevent future vandalism and theft, otherwise, the system is
not fit for purpose.
The primarily affected stakeholders are the community of affected stakeholders most
directly impacted by the failure event. To illustrate an example of three failures are compared,
three failure ranking assessments are shown below “running out of toilet roll”, “external breach
of the equalization step” and “release of partially treated sludge into the community with
community contact” the assessment are as follows:
Table 3.11: Example Failure Ranking Table
Failure
Running out of
Toilet Roll
External breach
of the
equalization
step
Release of
partially treated
sludge into the
community with
community
contacts

Effect

Mechanism

Consequence

Stakeholder

Score

Primary

1 Normal

Partially
1 Unmitigated

0
.
5

Primary
.

1 Sudden

3 Mitigated

0

System/Technolog
y Providers

1

0

Secondary

3 Sudden

3 Unmitigated

1

External
Community

3

27

Users/Community

2

1

This simple assessment allows for a qualitative assessment of failures. According to the
assessment criteria in the table above, the possibility of contaminated sludge in the community
has the highest likely ranking failure. Whilst the lowest is the external breach on the
equalization stage which is essentially a leak of untreated wastewater into the primary
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community, which when fully mitigated has the lowest score. This shows that even the highest
inherent ranking failures can become less likely with the right sorts of mitigation.
Once a failure ranking has been carried out, a determination is made on what ranked
failures are to be assessed by the Failure Mode Effect Analysis (FMEA) or a similar failure
assessment tool e.g. root cause analysis (RCA), Hazard identification study (HAZID), etc. To
determine the severity and the likelihood of occurrence for the predicted failures.

Figure 3.15: Phase 2
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Figure 3.16: Phase 1 and 2
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3.5.4 Phase 3 - Failure Hazard Effect Assessment
Once a failure ranking has been carried out on the initial brainstormed failure mechanism,
a Failure Mode Effect Analysis (FMEA) or a similar failure hazard assessment tool e.g. root
cause analysis (RCA), Hazard identification studies (HAZID), etc., can be used to determine the
severity and the likelihood of occurrence for the failures. The aim of this is to identify the
likelihood of occurrence of a failure and the effect of that failure manifesting (severity). At this
stage, just a simple “yes it can” and “no it can’t realistically happen” will suffice, together with
some understanding of whether there are opportunities to mitigate the failure either by detection
or adding layers of protection. The main aspect to look out for is whether the more severe
failures can be mitigated in the future, thus minimizing the severity of the consequences of
failure.
3.5.4.1 Steps for the FMEA
FMEAs are used for analyzing the problems associated with processes and products at
the design stage. The objective of the FMEA is to look at all the ways that a process or product
can fail (McDermott, et al., 2009). This is done by identifying product and process inadequacies
early in the development stages when changes and alterations are still relatively cheap and easier
to implement.
Failures can also occur because of user mistakes i.e. human error; these types of failure
should also be part of the FMEA. The FMEA technique has been extensively used in a wide
range of industries (Nicola Pedroni, 2017) and is a basis of most failure mode assessment in
process and product analysis for failure modes (McDermott, et al., 2009). Calculation of FMEA
rating is based on Risk Priority Number (RPN), which is calculated by multiplying the
occurrence (O), severity (S), and detection (D) of a failure mode. Each of these is given a value
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of 10 and therefore a maximum RPN of 1000 is possible for the worst-case FMEA scenarios.
The FMEA is better when determining failures within one system or comparing relatively similar
systems for common design failures, particularly when identifying bad actors in the early stages
of design. FMEA can also be considered in later stages of design to investigate the reliability of
the systems in-situ. FMEA for sanitation development can be used at the early stages to
determine which failures are inherently fatal flaws in sanitation systems, thus providing
opportunities for those failures to be removed from the system and providing opportunities for an
innovative redesign. Also, in sanitation systems that are already in play, FMEA can be used to
better understand the prone to failure components within the sanitation system, and therefore
creating systems for reliability-centered maintenance which can help reduce failure occurrences
in existing systems and improve reliability and sustainability in the long term.
There are four steps to an FMEA, they are as follows:
1.

Review the process or product: This involves a thorough review of the decentralized
sanitation technology with or without resource recovery, including a review of the
engineering design information. This information is available from Phase 1.

2.

Select potential failure modes: This uses the failures identified in the brainstorming
sessions each focused on different elements of the system and the potential paths to
failure of the equipment. It allows all failure modes which meet the criteria of
“possible” in terms of occurrence to be evaluated. This is information is available
from Phase 2.

3.

Potential effects for failure: The failure modes generated from step two are
investigated, this allows the FMEA team to determine potential effects i.e.
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primary/secondary effect or compound effects. This is information is available from
Phase 2.
4.

Assign Severity, Occurrence, and Detection rankings: Each of the identified failures
is ranked on a 10-point scale with 1 being the lowest, and 10 is the highest-ranked
risk in order of riskiness. Metrics for classification should account for problemsolving, safety, and reliability performance improvement. It should account for issues
at the root cause levels and should be built around drivers such as regulatory risk,
operational risk, ease of manufacture, and economic risk. Where risk is identified,
there should be an understanding of how such risks can be managed effectively. This
required the expert team to know how easy or not it is to mitigate the risks. Thus, a
thorough understanding of risks is an important aspect of FMEA assessments.
Regulatory risks should consider the local compliance needs, and whether there are
relevant international standards such as the ISO 30500, codes of practice, and/or
local regulations that are pertinent to the successful operation of a decentralized
sanitation system in situ. Operational risk should define the optimum operating levels
for a MURT and/or SURT, and define what parameters are acceptable for successful
operation, including what the tolerable levels of failure per period are acceptable.
Economic risks should consider the socio-economic impacts of the loss of service on
the front-end users, in addition to the economic limits of operating the system from a
production standpoint i.e. the affordability to the users. All these factors should be
considered when assigning failures on a 10-point scale, for the calculation of the risk
priority number. This is Phase 3.
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3.5.4.1.1 Determine the Risk Priority Number (RPN)
Each of the risks identified is ranked on a 10-point scale with a score of 1 as the lowest
and a score of 10 as the highest for severity, occurrence, and detection. FMEA Risk Priority
Number (RPN) is calculated by multiplying the occurrence (O), severity (S), and detection (D) of
a failure mode, therefore a maximum RPN of 1000 is probable for the worst-case scenario.
A cut off point for calculated RPN risk must be then established. For example, the team
of experts could determine that all RPNs greater than 600 have high residual risk and therefore,
they should all be considered for further risk assessment, whilst risks of 600 and lower, are low
enough to be managed through the normal standard maintenance and failure reduction strategies,
which the system will be subjected to anyway.
To have a good ranking, the scales should be established clearly and concisely, with
ranking made as decisive as possible, leaving little room for ambiguity. (Shi, et al., 2016). The
tables below suggest the following layout when determining ratings for FMEA.
In summary for Phases 1, 2, and 3, it is important to note that one of the failures of the FMEA
method is that it ignores failure dependencies (Chemweno, et al., 2018), in that it assumes that
failures are independent of each other. However, this gap is bridged in the RAMS framework
method through the use of the brainstorming and failure ranking process. Brainstorming allows
failure associations to be made by identifying failures, ranking them, and determining which
failures are most likely to impact RAMS negatively. The ability to link the root causes of failure
by looking at common cause and using the ranked effects where secondary or compound effects
can be allocated bridges this gap made by assessing failures independently in the failure
definition process. Thus, multiple failures with common initiating events or single failures that
can be initiated by multiple events can be captured, as shown in Phase 2.
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The criteria in the Severity, Occurrence, and Detection tables are used to calculate the
Risk Priority Number (RPN) ranking for each hazard identified within a decentralized
wastewater treatment system, preparing the failures identified for qualitative risk analysis.
Table 3.12: Generic Process FMEA Severity Criteria
Severity
Rank Effect
10

Criteria

Failure to meet safety
and/or regulatory
requirements

9

8
7

Major disruption
Significant disruption

6

Moderate disruption

Loss of function may endanger the community without warning and
can breach government regulation without warning and any
associated shut down as a result
Loss of function may endanger the community without warning, but
no government regulations are impacted and any associated shut
down as a result
The unit must be scrapped or 100% system shutdown
A portion of the unit may have to be completely replaced and a
significant part of the production is affected and/or between 48 hr. 56hr shutdown e.g. loss of a pump, tank leak
75% - 100% of the recovered resource must be completely reworked
and/or between 24hr - 48hr shutdown e.g. all treated water has to be
segregated and treated again

5

25% - 75% portion of recovered resource has to be completely
reworked or throughput reduction to 50% or less and/or between
12hr - 24hr shutdown e.g. all treated water has to be segregated and
treated again
less than 25% portion of recovered resource has to be completely
reworked or throughput reduction to 50% or less and/or between
12hr - 24hr shutdown e.g. all treated water has to be segregated and
treated again
Moderate inconvenience to the process

4

3
2

Minor disruption

Slight inconvenience to process operation

1

No disruption

No discernible effect

Adapted from “The Basics of FMEA” (Robin E. McDermott, 2009)
Table 3.13: Generic Process FMEA Occurrence Criteria
Occurrence
Rank Incidents/year Likelihood of Failure
10
9
8
7
6

10
1
0.1
0.01
0.001

Very high
High

Moderate
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Table 3.13: (Continued)
Rank
Incidents/year
Likelihood of Failure
5
0.001
4
0.0001
3
0.00001
Low
2
0.000001
1
No failure due to preventative measures
Very low

Adapted from “The Basics of FMEA” (Robin E. McDermott, 2009)
Table 3.14: Generic Process FMEA Detection Criteria
Detection
Rank

Criteria

Likelihood of Failure

10

No detection opportunity

Almost impossible

9

The failure mode is detectable but is random and
difficult to pin down

Remote

8

Not easy to detect failure mode e.g. detected by chance
by a person in right place at the right time
Failure mode detectable after the fact by tactile, visual,
and/or audible means like alarms and gauges

7

Very low

6

Failure mode detectable before failure by tactile, visual,
and/or audible means like alarms and gauges

Low

5

The failure mode is detectable before failure by
automated means like online transmitters etc.

Moderate

4

Failure mode detectable after failure by automated
means but the system is automated with action to
prevent the affected part from causing further damage
Failure mode detectable before failure by automated
means and will take automated action to prevent
affected part from causing further damage e.g. Trip
systems that shut parts of system down upon detection
of issues
Failure mode takes action to correct the failure cause
and prevent significant production detection.

Moderately High

No failure due to preventative measures

Almost Certain

3

2

1

High

Very High

Adapted from “The Basics of FMEA” (Robin E. McDermott, 2009)
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Figure 3.17 - Phase 3
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Figure 3.18: Phase 1, 2 and, 3
(The above figure is illustrative to show the linkage of phases)
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3.5.5 Phase 4 - Create a Qualitative Risk Assessment Model (QRM)
Once all the major subsystems and failure modes have been identified within the system
using the approach suggested, a qualitative risk assessment is created to determine the risks that
have the highest impacts on RAMS of the system. All of which are based on criteria identified in
the preceding failure ranking stages. This involves creating a suitable risk assessment matrix to
assess hazards that impact the RAMS, based on the probability of occurrence versus the
consequences of a failure and identifying where the risk of failure ranks on the matrix.
The risk is determined by the product of the probability of occurrence/failure and the
severity of the failure. A risk matrix is created by focusing on two aspects:


Severity: The impact of risk and the negative consequences that would result.



Likelihood: The probability of the risk occurring.
A numbered system of ranking such as I – VI or 1 – 4 or any other logical numbered

criteria where high risk correlates with the highest rating, and the lowest number correlates with
the lowest risk is practical for this stage and should be incorporated into the risk matrix, as it
allows categorization of risks at the next stages in the RAMS assessment.
3.5.5.1 Qualitative Risk Assessment Model (QRM)
3.5.5.1.1 Risk Assessment Matrix
The steps to doing a QRM are systematic and re-iterative so that as many of the hazards
and risks identified can be factored into the assessment. However, it is still impossible to analyze
all the possible hazards and risks that may occur because of a sanitation process failure, even
with the most detailed assessment and brainstorming methods. Thus, the most important aim of a
QRM is to capture as many risks as possible are identified, for what is required to meet a
predetermined maximum tolerable risk level which is decided by sanitation experts for the
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sanitation system. The QRM comes after the FMEA and uses the outcome of the FMEA as the
starting point for risk assessment. Qualitative risk assessments focus on two aspects already used
in the FMEA severity and probability of failure. It assesses the impacts of failure based on
economics, public perception, technical knowledge, environmental risk.
The proposed QRM is intricately linked with RAMS. For safety, it is the maximum
tolerable risk level which is acceptable for a person within the community getting the diarrhoeal
disease. For reliability, availability, and maintenance it should be based on the numbers of
system failures, that are acceptable to the population per period. Thus, it is important to conclude
that failure is inevitable, and the RAMS process seeks to understand the most probable causes of
failure and to manage them effectively. This ensures that the overall likelihood of individual
failure occurrences is reduced. The maximum tolerable risk is decided based on the appetite for
risk that stakeholders have, based on the risks assessed for a sanitation system. An example of
maximum tolerable failure criteria is shown in the table below.
Table 3.15: Maximum Tolerable Reliability Failure Risk per unit per annum
PFD
Maximum Tolerable Risk
level

Maximum Tolerable Reliability Failure Risk per unit per annum
1-2 Failures
3-5 Failures
5-10 Failures
V - VI
III-IV
I - II

The maximum tolerable risk reflects the acceptable risk, which is determined from the
risk matrix. Risk matrices focus on two aspects to calculate risk which is the probability of
occurrence multiplied by the severity of the failure.
Severity is the impact of risk and the negative consequences that would result from it arising.
The levels are defined as follows:


I = Insignificant: Risks that bring no real negative consequences or pose no significant
threat to the project.
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II = Minor: Risks that have a small potential for negative consequences but will not
significantly impact overall success.



III = Significant: Risks that could potentially bring negative consequences, posing a
moderate threat to the project or organization.



IV = Severe: Risks with substantial negative consequences that will seriously impact the
success of the project.



V = Major: Risks with substantial negative consequences that will seriously impact the
success of the project and cause irreparable or long-term damage but not necessarily stop
the whole project indefinitely.



VI = Catastrophic: Risks with extremely negative consequences that could cause the
entire project to fail or severely impact the project and stop the project entirely. These are
the highest-priority risks to address.
The likelihood is the probability of a risk occurring and is defined as follows:



I = Rare Extremely rare occurrences, with almost no probability of occurring, 10-5 to less
than 10-6 per year or 0.00001 - 0.000001.



II = Remote: Extremely remote occurrences, with a limited probability of occurring, 104
to less than 105 per year or 0.0001 - 0.00001.



III = Unlikely: Occurrences that are relatively uncommon, but have a small chance of
manifesting, 10-3 to 10-4 per year or 0.001 – 0.0001.



IV = Occasional: Occurrences that are more typical, 10-2 to 10-3 per year or 0.01 – 0.001.



V = Likely: Occurrences that are highly likely to occur, 10-1 to 10-2 per year or 0.1 - .01.



VI = Definite: Occurrences that are almost certain to manifest. 100 - 10-1 to per year or 1 –
0.1.
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To create a risk assessment matrix severity and likelihood are assigned to a Y-axis and an
X-axis and the likelihood and consequence of risk are read off the axis, with the risk determined
as the point where two straight lines meet. A straight line is drawn from the severity allocation of
the hazard on the severity axis, which intersects with the straight line from the likelihood point
from the likelihood axis, meet at the risk point. The outcome of which is then plotted on a chart
to determine its appropriate position on the matrix, the location of the risk in correlation with the
maximum tolerable risk is known as the risk appetite. Some risks are broadly acceptable
meaning the risk is extremely low. For sanitation technologies, the first step is to use the failures
generated by the FMEA output as the hazards to assess on the risk matrix. Depending on how
many failures are identified by the FMEA, it is efficient to decide a cut-off point from where
failures will be assessed based on their RPN scores e.g. RPN scores > 600 only. If there aren’t
many failures all possible failures could be presented for assessment at the QRM stage.
Other criteria below can also be used instead of the FMEA cut off point such as choosing failures
which occur due to specific causes, as follows:


Failure due to people, machinery, equipment, or supply



Failure with an initiating event of XYZ



Failure is in the scope of a specific node of a sanitation system e.g. failure due to a
specific component.



Failure which impacts only Reliability or Availability or Maintainability and/ or
Safety



Failure which impacts a specific function and/or service



Failure which is predictive or reactive



Failures with an assigned stakeholder e.g. front-end user impact failure
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Once the streamlining criteria are exhausted the criteria can be loosened to include less
severe failure modes, until the team is content that all possible significant failures have been
captured. The aim of having a systematic approach is to ensure that all possible failures are
considered, but not necessarily mitigated. This process is important when finding obscure
failures modes which only become obvious once the brainstorming approach has been exhausted.
The classification methods to be included depends on the type of sanitation project being
assessed, but for this research, the criteria chosen are as follows:
•

Economics, because the impact of cost on the users of sanitation is significant in
terms of sanitation success.

•

Public perception, because savvy people/users will only use sanitation that they
consider being of benefit to their health and community.

•

Technical knowledge, because advanced sanitation requires the availability of local
expertise for sustainable long-term operation.

•

Environment, because preventing discharge of pathogenic material into the
environment, is paramount for preventing the spread of diarrhoeal disease-causing
organisms in the environment.

Further details on the criteria are described in detail below.
3.5.5.1.1.1 Economics
This relates to the rough financial cost of installing the technology and the cost of repair
of any major faults that may arise because of a hazard manifesting. Though cost is not included
in the RAMS framework as such, this analysis allows cost issues to be assessed as part of the
sanitation design, particularly where they may become exorbitant, allowing issues to be
addressed early with in the process. This is true for centralized wastewater treatment plants as
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well, where the cost-benefit analysis of the environmental benefits of sanitation must be
established as part of the feasibility assessment for technology improvements (Molinos-Senante,
et al., 2010). It is a qualitative process and basic cost assessment to determine if the system is
going viable based on cost determinants is done. It is important to note that costs are single unit
costs or the costs of a collection of single units and does not include program management costs,
which are the costs of managing sanitation systems long term.
These overall cost assessment profile in the risk assessment process can be represented as
follows in dollars, and broken down from zero cost per person to greater than USD 100 per
person as follows:
Table 3.16: Economics Risk Levels
Risk Level

Economics

VI

> USD 100 per person

V

>USD $10 per person to USD $100 per person

IV

>USD $1per person to USD $10 per person

III

>USD $0.1 per person to USD $1 per person

II

>USD $0.01 per person to USD $0.1 per person

I

< USD 0.01 per person

The assessment of cost determinants need not be detailed or extensive, however, it should
factor in the normal costs of living of the community being assessed and/or the average cost
spent on sanitation at the location being assessed. The choice of USD 0 – USD 100 for the QRM
is due to the baseline for assessment from literature research performed by (Daudey, 2018),
which showed the cost of sanitation in Bangladesh in an urban scenario has the fecal sludge
management (pit/tank) at USD $103/household per year, a septic tank at USD $98/household per
year, small-bore sewer to the main sewer via a treatment system at USD $92/household per year
and same with no initial treatment at USD $92/household per year. Variability in cost in these
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scenarios was, for the conventional centralized system: between USD 19.3- USD
$59.3/household per year difference, for simplified sewerage was; USD $7.5-USD
$15.2/household per year and for a septic tank with fecal sludge management; USD $6.3-USD
$24/household per year. Therefore, a range of USD 0-USD $100 seems wide enough range to
cover all types of sanitation that may be assessed by the RAMS framework in a rural context.
3.5.5.1.1.2 Public Perception
Public perception criteria are determined by any adverse public activity which creates
coverage by the community, media, or any adverse communication that affects the use of the
technology in the short term, medium-term, or which leads to stopping the use of technology
completely.
Public perceptions are assessed based on criteria defined by whether international caution
against technology occurs which leads to stopping use of technology, to minor or no impact on
the community e.g. one toilet or shower not working with other stalls available for example has
no discernible impact on the community. Therefore, should not create a public perception issue.
However, a sanitation system that causes long-term water contamination issues may have public
perception turned against if permanently.
Perception must also include how sanitation users perceive fecal waste and the
interactions with the recovered resource in this context. Though this research does not delve in
detail into the instinctive reaction of humans to excreta, it is an important aspect to be considered
in defining failures of sanitation systems. Research conducted by (Libby, et al., 2020) on double
vaulted composting pit latrines in Panama, which looks at the interaction of users of compost
generated from fecal matter, it was found that; there was general agreement that there are
benefits to compost from fecal matter for soil improvement. However, there was also a need to

117

educate the population on the benefits to start with. This indicates that there is a level of
informing and education required when new sanitation technology is introduced, which
introduces the concept of further interaction with fecal waste or the products of sanitation.
Impacts are broken down into whether the impact on public perception is international,
national, regional, or local. There is also the no impact scenario where there is no discernible
impact on the community.
If public perception is an issue, it will be important to highlight this when creating the
severity of the failure in the risk assessment matrix.
Table 3.17: Public Perceptions Risk Levels
Risk
Level

VI

V

IV

III

Public Perception
International caution against technology which leads to stopping the use of technology.
e.g. Children falling into a pit and drowning leading to stopping pit latrines in South
African schools, leading to international outcry and a call to stop pit latrine usage in all
South African schools
National caution against technology which leads to stopping use of technology for 1
month or less and national media coverage e.g. A technology that is well established
internationally, fails due to regional variations, an example would be putting an
equalization tank in water system above ground (without heating) or close to ambient
zones underground, in an arctic climate, in winter the tank will freeze and flow will stop,
leading to loss of treatment, meaning that the sanitation system has failed in that region
due to lack of proper design, This will likely lead to calls not to use that sanitation system
in that region, thus impacting how it is perceived.
Regional caution against technology which leads to stopping the use of technology for 1
week or less and regional/state media coverage. This refers to a type of technology that is
well established in a region but fails to lead to state media coverage or short term
stoppage e.g. in a centralized scenario, regional flooding leading to sewer back up, the
local community warned not to use toilets but once the issue is fixed people go back to
using their toilets and the technology is not affected, just a minor disruption leading to a
warning. The same scenario for an open-loop system in drought conditions means that
treatment will need to stop in a drought, this will lead to a bad public perception of that
technology in that region.
Local caution which leads to stopping use of technology for 1 week or less and local
media coverage
Failure that impacts community users ability to use sanitation system e.g. in a centralized
scenario, local flooding leading to sewer back up, local community warned not to use
toilets but once the issue is fixed people go back to using their toilets and the technology
is not affected, just a minor disruption leading to a warning.
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Table 3.17: (Continued)
Risk Level Public Perception
Local caution which leads to stopping use of technology for 1 week or less and local media
coverage
Failure that impacts community users ability to use sanitation system e.g. in a centralized
scenario, local flooding leading to sewer back up, local community warned not to use toilets
but once the issue is fixed people go back to using their toilets and the technology is not
III
affected, just a minor disruption leading to a warning.
Community warning because of the release of material from technology and local media
coverage – Short term failure that impacts community users e.g. local flooding leading to
overflow of pathogenic material and local. The local community is warned not to use
water/river etc. until the water test comes back normal, but actual sanitation continues to be
II
used as per design with no stoppage.
No to minor impact on the community e.g. one toilet or shower not working but others
available with no discernible impact on the community (also positive impact) – Failure that
only impacts actual users, and is quickly rectified or is part of the normal operating mode of a
I
sanitation system, so the caution against the technology is limited to the local users.

3.5.5.1.1.3 Technical knowledge required for maintenance
The main advantage of RAMS prediction is the ability to repeat the process for different
repair times, different redundancy rates, and different component failure rates with consistency.
As systems for sanitation and resource recovery have become more engineered, the
failure of multiple components instead of just one single component is more likely. The ISO
30500 requirement for technical expertise has therefore been adapted to create a risk matrix that
satisfies criteria for expertise. The levels of expertise required for repairs have increased, making
local technical expertise crucial, so that repairs do not impact front-end users for longer than
necessary. Thus, systems such as automated decentralized water treatment toilets, which require
a higher level of local expertise compared with simple technologies such as VIP latrines will
present a higher risk if they fail, but if local expertise is available then the impacts are reduced.
Technical knowledge for the risk matrix has been expressed as the level of individual
training required, the number of years required to obtain that required level of training, and the
years of experience post-training needed to make operators of the system competent in the
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sanitation system’s management and repair. This is used to compare how much the system will
be affected by the lack of local expertise to resolve any unexpected issues, which affect function
or service, without the need for outside help. Thus, availability of local technical expertise is a
crucial factor in ensuring that the levels of expertise required for the retaining the functional
levels of advanced decentralized sanitation systems do not decline over time.
Cultural knowledge is also an important aspect of the definition of “knowledge”;
however, it is important to note that for many advanced systems, due to their complexity,
knowledge cannot be expected to be passed down generationally or culturally. In these scenarios,
there is an expectation knowledge is gained due to a high level of learned knowledge from other
experts as a vocation, plus practiced or from educational institutions. Thus cultural knowledge
and how it is applied in the contest of technical knowledge must be defined by the assessment
team based on the know-how as it applies to the engineered sanitation system, and/or generalized
or diluted.
Table 3.18: Technology knowledge risk levels
Risk
Level
VI
V

Technical knowledge required for maintenance
Requires a very high level of technical expertise e.g. education to minimum degree level and
multiple years’ experience in the field
Requires a high level of technical expertise e.g. education to advanced level (1 year) and
multiple years’ experience in the field

IV

Requires moderate technical expertise e.g. Basic education with (up to 1-year training) and
no experience in the field

III

Requires a basic level of technical expertise e.g. Basic education with (1-day training) and no
experience in the field

II

Requires considerably the basic level of technical expertise e.g. Basic education with (1 hour
or less training) and no experience in the field

I

No education or training required
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3.5.5.1.1.4 Environment
Odour is a critical environmental factor in wastewater treatment and is usually the factor
that most people who are in the vicinity of a sanitation system will complain about if it becomes
a nuisance or causes environmental issues. For odor, the environmental criteria are based on the
information in the ISO 30500 standard. Odor control is based on the criteria set out in the draft
standard and is based on the odor criteria below on the risk matrix.
The odor, noise, and environmental ecological impact criteria are more specifically adapted into
hazards on the risk matrix. They are subjective, due to the presumption that background levels of
existing odor and noise are important in establishing what is seen as an additional nuisance by
people, so in these circumstances, a high level of user feedback is important to understand what
failure is for stakeholder. This is in addition to monitoring and data gathering.
Table 3.19: Odour Codes
Odor codes
Type of odor

Odor attributes

0 – No Odour

1 - Pleasant

F – Faecal Odour

2 - Acceptable

X – Other Odour

3 - Unpleasant
4 - Unacceptable

(Source: ISO standard ISO/DIS 30500)
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Table 3.20: Environment Risk Levels
Risk
Level

VI

V

IV

III

II
I

Environment

Catastrophic - Serious contamination of groundwater, watercourse, aquatic environment.
High-level breach of Environmental regulations with a major impact on technology future
uptake due to major failure of technology i.e. technology’s future is irreparably damaged
within the region and with investors as a result.
Noise heard continuously at or intermittently at locations > 5miles from site
Air pollution/odor events felt at odor codes 4(F/X) unacceptable odor continuously at or
intermittently at locations > 5miles from site
Major - Serious toxic effect on beneficial or protected species, fish kill over a 3-mile range.
Medium level breach of Environmental regulations, with a significant impact on technology
uptake but salvageable.
Noise heard continuously at or intermittently at locations 1 - 5miles from site
Air pollution/odor codes 4(F/X)unacceptable odor felt continuously or intermittently at
locations 1 - 5miles from site
Severe - Hazardous material discharged into the watercourse with some fish kill. Moderate
impact of technology future, but environmental damage is seen as not due to the failure of
technology.
Noise heard continuously at locations up to 1 mile from the site
Air pollution/odor codes 3(F/X) unpleasant odor felt continuously at locations up to 1mile
from site
Significant - Strong or offensive odors, breach of local permits. No damage to the technology
future. Continuous odors, rodents, animal activity, flies, etc.
Noise heard intermittently at locations up to 1 mile from the site
Air pollution/odor codes 3(F/X) unpleasant odor felt intermittently at locations up to 1 mile
from the site
Minor - Noticeable nuisance off-site e.g. occasional odors, rodents, animal activity, flies, etc.
Noise heard intermittently at locations locally i.e. within 250yards
Air pollution/odor codes 2(X) acceptable odor felt intermittently only locally i.e. within
250yards
Insignificant - Nuisance on-site only, no off-site effects, codes 1/2(0) no odor/pleasant

The full risk ranking matrix is shown below. This is used to determine the risk level of a
sanitation system before the reliability, availability, maintainability, and safety assessments are
done. The RAMS assessment allows the assessors to quantify the failures which have been
highlighted and to use the probability of failure on demand reductions necessary to bring risks
into the tolerable regions by using mitigations to reduce the failure frequency on the x-axis.
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3.5.5.1.1.5 Risk Matrix
Table 3.21: Inherent Risks Matrix

Rare

VI

Remote

VI

Unlikely

VI

Occasional

Requires a very
high level of
technical
expertise e.g.
education to
minimum degree
level and multiple
years’ experience
in the field

Likely

Technical
knowledge

International
caution against
technology
which leads to
stopping the use
of technology.

* > 10 fatalities
locally
* >20 serious
illness locally
due to
technology
failure OR
* >1 fatality offsite
* >10 illness
off-site e.g.
discharge to the
river causing
incidents at
another location
due to
contamination
traveling
downstream

Definite

Safety

Catastrophic - Serious
contamination of groundwater,
watercourse, aquatic
environment. High-level breach
of Environmental regulations
with a major impact on
technology future uptake due to
major failure of technology i.e.
technology’s future is
irreparably damaged within the
region and with investors as a
result.
Noise heard continuously at or
intermittently at locations >
5miles from site
Air pollution/odor events felt at
odor codes 4(F/X) unacceptable
odor continuously at or
intermittently at locations >
5miles from site

Severity

Public
Perception

VI

> USD
100 per
person

Environme
nt

Risk Level

Economics

Risk Impact

V

V

V
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Table 3.21: (continued)
Risk Impact
Risk
Level

V

Severity

Economics

Environment

Public
Perception

>USD
$10 per
person to
USD
$100 per
person

Major - Serious
toxic effect on
beneficial or
protected species,
fish kill over a 3mile range.
Medium level
breach of
Environmental
regulations, with a
significant impact
on technology
uptake but
salvageable.
Noise heard
continuously at or
intermittently at
locations 1 - 5miles
from site
Air pollution/odor
codes
4(F/X)unacceptable
odor felt
continuously or
intermittently at
locations 1 - 5miles
from site

*2-10
fatalities
locally
* 10 - 20
serious illness
locally due to
technology
failure
National
OR
caution
* 1 fatality
against
off-site
technology * 2-10 illness
which
off-site e.g.
leads to
discharge to
stopping
the river
use of
causing
technology incidents at
for 1
another
month or
location due
less and
to
national
contamination
media
traveling
coverage
downstream

Safety

Technical
knowledge

Definite

Requires a
high level
of
technical
expertise
e.g.
education
to
advanced
level (1
year) and
multiple
years’
experience
in the
field
VI

Likely

Occasional

Unlikely

Remote

Rare

V

V

IV

IV

IV
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Table 3.21: (continued)
Risk Impact
Risk
Level

IV

Economics

>USD $1 per
person to USD
$10 per person

Severity
Environment
Severe Hazardous
material
discharge into
the watercourse
with some fish
kill. Moderate
impact of
technology
future, but
environmental
damage is seen
as not due to the
failure of
technology.
Noise heard
continuously at
locations up to 1
mile from the
site
Air
pollution/odor
codes 3(F/X)
unpleasant odor
felt
continuously at
locations up to
1mile from site

Public
Perception

Safety

Technical
knowledge

Definite

Likely

Occasional

Unlikely

Remote

Rare

Regional
caution against
technology
which leads to
stopping use of
technology for
1 week or less
and
regional/state
media coverage

*1 fatality
locally
* 2 - 10
serious illness
locally due to
technology
failure
OR
* 1 illness
off-site e.g.
discharge to
the river
causing
incidents at
another
location due
to
contamination
traveling
downstream

Requires
moderate
technical
expertise
e.g. Basic
education
with (up to
1-year
training)
and no
experience
in the field

IV

III

III

II

II

II
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Table 3.21: (continued)
Risk Impact
Risk Level

III

Severity

Economics

Environment

>USD
$0.1 per
person to
USD $1
per person

Significant Strong or
offensive
odors, breach
of local
permits. No
damage to the
technology
future.
Continuous
odors, rodents,
animal activity,
flies, etc.
Noise heard
intermittently
at locations up
to 1 mile from
the site
Air
pollution/odor
codes 3(F/X)
unpleasant
odor felt
intermittently
at locations up
to 1 mile from
the site

Public
Perception

Safety

Technical
knowledge

Definite

Likely

Occasional

Unlikely

Remote

Rare

Local
caution
which leads
to stopping
use of
technology
for 1 week
or less and
local media
coverage

* 1 serious
illness or
multiple
minor
illnesses
locally due
to
technology
failure
*50% 70%
attributable
burden

Requires a
basic level
of technical
expertise
e.g. Basic
education
with (1-day
training)
and no
experience
in the field

III

II

II

I

I

I
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Table 3.21: (continued)
Risk Impact
Risk Level

II

I

Severity

Economics

Environment

>USD
$0.01 per
person to
USD $0.1
per
person

Minor - Noticeable
nuisance off-site
e.g. occasional
odors, rodents,
animal activity,
flies, etc.
Noise heard
intermittently at
locations locally
i.e. within
250yards
Air pollution/odor
codes 2(X)
acceptable odor
felt intermittently
only locally i.e.
within 250yards

< USD
0.01 per
person

Insignificant Nuisance on-site
only, no off-site
effects, codes
1/2(0) no
odor/pleasant

Public
Perception

Community
warning
because of
the release of
material from
technology
and local
media
coverage
No to minor
impact on the
community
e.g. one toilet
or shower not
working but
others
available
with no
discernable
impact on the
community

Safety

* 1minor
illness
locally due
to
technology
failure

* First aid
incidents

Technical
knowledge

Definite

Likely

Occasional

Unlikely

Remote

Rare

Requires a
very basic
level of
technical
expertise
e.g. Basic
education
with (1
hour or
less
training)
and no
experience
in the field

II

I

I

BA*

BA*

BA*

No
education
or training
required

I

I

BA*

BA*

BA*

BA*

Definite

Likely

Occasional

Unlikely

Remote

Rare

Likelihood of Occurrence
* Broadly acceptable (BA)
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3.5.6 Phase 4 - Evaluate the Risks
3.5.6.1 Mathematical Method for RAMS assessment
To treat the risks of a wastewater treatment sanitation system, determined by the risk
matrix, risks are identified based on whether they fit a reliability, availability, maintainability, or
safety profile, based on the highest impact ranking. Risks that have high likelihood and high
consequences are treated first with the most resources applied, whereas identified risks with low
likelihood have little to no resources applied. The high likelihood, low consequence risks are low
hanging fruit and should be treated if possible, the methodical process of investing resources in
risk in this manner means that the most problematic risks get the most resources applied to them
and the most effort taken to mitigate them. And improve the sanitation technology of choice.

Figure 3.19: Risk Matrix Likelihood and Consequence Impact on Resource Application
A risk matrix is simply a tool for decision making and therefore the risks must be further
analyzed and reviewed to ensure that any mitigations chosen to reduce risks, will work to reduce risks.
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This is done by creating a mathematical assessment for the RAMS aspects of the failures with the
assumption that fixing the root cause of a RAMS failure will provide the mitigation for the failure. To
know what the RAMS status is, the RAMS framework needs to be further developed to assign a value
to the RAMS based on actual observable data from the processor data which can be assumed about
the system based on observable assumptions. The importance of creating a mathematical model is to
allow for consistent application of mitigative methods for an otherwise qualitative assessment. The
outcome of the risk matrix allows top risks to be treated with RAMS assessments.
Once a technology has been chosen and any outstanding risks mitigated to improve the overall
risk profile to a predetermined maximum tolerable level e.g. II, then the mitigation can be assessed
like it has been implemented to see if what impacts it has on the overall risk profile of the failure after
mitigation. Low ranking risks which cost little, have little impact, and can be easily fixed should be
considered low hanging fruit and fixed. However, risks that rank higher on the risk ranking matrix
should be further investigated via a RAMS assessment.
3.5.6.1.1 Reliability
Reliability “is the probability of the equipment or process functioning without failure
when operated as prescribed for a given interval of time, under stated conditions” (Eti, et al.,
2007). It is also defined as the “probability that a working system would continue to operate
during the duration of its mission” (Saleh, et al., 2006). In software systems which can be a
crucial part of a system, and in sanitation the definition should consider system reliability to
include all failures caused by software. Whether the software has "failed" or responded correctly
to a programmer's error” (Coppola, 1984). Software failure may look the same from a front-end
user or sanitation engineers perspective because the fault in software may not be evident
immediately, an example of this would be a software failure that stops the water recycle flow
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pump before the pre-set trip level in the recycle water tank, which may be fine for a period but
over a longer time interval will impact the levels of water available for flush or increase the
number of times the recycle pump is required to start and stop to close the gap in lost recycle
water recovery, which ultimately impact the reliability of the pump. Thus, reiterating the point
that failure is intricately linked to the stakeholder definition of failure. (Azarkhail, et al., 2012)
saw reliability as a “function, which is a monotonically decreasing function of the lifetime, and is
a quantitative measure for the quality of the item”, and they further say that; if the service life of
the item is allowed to proceed unlimitedly, the item will eventually cease to perform its intended
function (Azarkhail, et al., 2012). Therefore, reliability is a function of time, it is specifically a
function of the numbers of failures in a specified period e.g. 1 year. “The measurement
“Reliability” requires that a system be successful for an interval of time” (Gobble, et al., 2005)
and then fail or fail-to-fail, where fail to fail means for example a valve that is meant to fail
closed, remains open when it is meant to be closed, that is a failure to fail closed. It is important
to note that failure to fail, is a failure. It is also important to note that all systems will fail
eventually.
Under normal circumstances, the reliability is calculated by calculating the meantime
before failure (MTBF) in accordance with the IEC 60050-192
MTBF =
Total number of hours equipment functioned
Number of failure events in that period

Equation 10

For example, an MTBF of 8760hrs (1-year) before a failure occurs; equals 1 failure per
year, and an MTBF of 8760 hours.
The failure rate is the rate at which failure occurs in a specified time and is the inverse of
MTBF.
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Failure Rate (λ) = 1/MTBF

Equation 11

Also known as the number of failure events of a device in the total time the equipment
functioned e.g. 1 failure in a year equals 1 failure in 8760 hours or 0.000114 failures/hour.
λ(t) = ds(t)/ Ns(t)dt

Equation 12

The reliability is the probability that a device will work for t number of hours known as
mission time (t).
So, RA = reliability of device A = probability that device A will work for at least t hours.
Reliability RA = e-λt

Equation 13

For a system that has a mission time of one year and an MTBF of one per year that is:
Reliability = e -(.000114) (8760) = .36
So, reliability is the ability of a sanitation system to operate under designated operating
conditions for a defined period, known as the mission time. The approach used for reliability
assessment can be probabilistic or deterministic. Reliability assessments look at how often an
item fails. The long term aim of this approach is to determine mitigating measures which need to
be employed to prevent such failures from occurring frequently or finding measures which
reduce the numbers of recurrence within a mission time, thus increasing the reliability and
subsequently the availability of the sanitation system, through periodic planned maintenance.
An example of the measure of reliability in the sanitation system is the length of time it
takes a pit latrine to fill up, this is the mission time. If the latrine fills up before the
predetermined time then it is unreliable, however, if it fills up at the designed time or later, it is
reliable. A definition such as that determined by (Bastirai, et al., 2018) from a review of several
definitions of reliability in sanitation, which is; simply “the ability to supply water reliably for
sanitation purposes” makes sense where the system is a water re-use sanitation system such as
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the NEWgenerator or Cranfield toilet systems. This is because whether for flush, bowl cleaning,
diluent, or handwashing the availability of clean or recycled water in advanced decentralized
non-sewered sanitation systems is a critical factor in the reliability of advanced sanitation
systems and plays a critical role in the stakeholder (front-end user’s) experience of the sanitation
system.
In the determination of reliability of a SURT or MURT, a probabilistic assessment is
used as a comprehensive tool for analyzing operational weaknesses associated with the system.
This helps to systematically identify and prioritize reliability improvements in a
repeatable manner. The benefit of this approach lies not in the absolute figures generated from
reliability assessments, but rather in the repeatability of the assessment across different forms of
sanitation systems, and in the adaptability to many different definitions of failure, as long as they
are measurable e.g. water recycle volumetric flow, pit void space, toilet flushes per day, etc.
3.5.6.1.1.1 Reliability of Volume and Flow-based systems
To recap, the failure rate is calculated by calculating the mean time before failure
(MTBF):
Mean Time Before Failure (MTBF) =

Equation 13

Total number of hours equipment functioned
Number of failure events in that period
Failure rate is the rate at which failure occurs in a specified time and is the inverse of MTBF:
Failure Rate (λ) = 1/MTBF

Equation 14

Reliability (R) = e-λt

Equation 16

Unreliability = (1 - R)

Equation 17

Probability of failure on demand (PFD) = λ x (test interval/2)

Equation 18
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However, for non-continuous flow systems such as pit latrines, the probability of failure
on demand is calculated by estimating the remaining void space left to fill in a volumetric
system. To calculate the void left, we can assume the accumulation rate per year in the system
based on (Mihelcic, et al., 2009) is:
Accumulation rate x design life x number of users

Equation 19

where accumulation rate is between 0.02 – 0.09m3/capita per year, dependent on
biodegradability of materials used in anal cleansing and water usage. Highly biodegradable anal
cleansing materials, waste with low water infiltration have an accumulation rate of 0.02 –
0.04m3/capita per year, biodegradable anal cleansing materials, with median water infiltration
have an accumulation rate of 0.04 – 0.06m3/capita per year, non-biodegradable anal cleansing
materials, with high water infiltration is 0.06 – 0.09m3/capita per year (Mihelcic, et al., 2009).
So, the calculation for a volume-based system with a useable volume of 2.5m3, with 4
users, who use the system 10 times per day over 10 years, and have used biodegradable materials
with an average accumulation rate of 0.04 m3/capita per year and low water ingress, will have
usage of 0.16 m3 capacity at the end of one year because:
0.04 m3/per capita per year x 10 years x 4 people = 1.6m3 for 10 years or 0.16m3 per year (shown
below).
Table 3.22: Probability of Failure on Demand for Volume-Based Systems
Year
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

Volume
used
0.16
0.32
0.48
0.64
0.8
0.96
1.12
1.28
1.44
1.6

PFD when the volume is higher than 1.5m3
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
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This simple calculation above can be used for traditional volume-based systems such as
pit latrines, or other volume-based systems such as septic tanks where biodegradability and
natural volume loss can be accounted for through drainage and/or evaporation.
Another option for determining the loss of volume void in a volume-based system is to
use the characteristics of fecal waste which determines the degradability of organic matter. This
version can be better for scenarios where water is used instead of biodegradable material for anal
cleaning, meaning that pits can fill up quickly. This approach should also be considered for
advanced volume-based systems. To do this several assumptions are made on the degradation
behavior of organic matter and water in wastewater storage and treatment.
The assumptions are as follows:


The total organic matter contained in feces can be measured as Chemical Oxygen
Demand (COD).



“feces are characterized into three fractions, fixed solids 16%, non-biodegradable
volatile solids 21% and biodegradable volatile solids 63%” according to
investigations by (Zavala, et al., 2002).



The degradation model for fecal matter in an aerated contained volume assumes that
63% of the fecal matter will be biodegraded every year.



Daily production of feces by individuals can vary by 250grams per day by a human
adult. The ISO 30500 document suggests that for low-income countries the daily
fecal sludge production is 250g – 350g/day.



Moisture content is approximately 75% (Encyclopædia Britannica, 2015).
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The density of feces can also vary widely, however using work done by UKZN
(Radford, et al., 2018), it is said that the average density is 1100kg/m3 for pit latrines
fecal matter, and septic Tank sludge and VIPs, school toilets and community ablution
blocks are assumed to have an average density of 1400kg/m3, with the maximum
value recorded around 2350kg/m3.

The gradual loss for a volume-based system can be assessed using the computation
below:


Mass of Faecal matter generated per person/day in grams = m



The density of fecal sludge = Ƥ g/l



Number of people served by the system = n



Biodegradation fraction (Xd): 0.63

Total Volume of faecal matter created per day (Vpd) = [m x (1/Ƥ) x n x (1-Xd)]
Equation 20
Total Volume of faecal matter created per year (Vpd) = [m x (1/Ƥ) x n x (1-Xd) x 365]
Equation 21
Where water is used for flushing and/or anal cleaning the estimated volume of water used
in the period assessed should be added to Vpd.
So, for one year, assuming 250g/day fecal sludge production, a density of 1100g/l, 10 users, the
total volume of fecal matter produced can be calculated as follows:
[250g/day x (1/1100l/g) x 10 x (1-0.63) x 365days/year]
= 306litres/year.
If 10 liters of water are used per day for flushing and anal cleaning, then an additional
volume of (365 days x 5 liters will need to be added to the total volume), that is 1.8m3.
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So, using the calculation above, for a volume-based system with no drainage or
evaporation, with 2.5m3 of starting capacity, the table below shows the probability of failure om
demand (PFD) in yellow. Essentially the table shows that after several years shown in white, the
PFD of the system is at 100% (shown in yellow cells).
Table 3.23: Probability of Failure on Demand for Volume-Based Systems (2)

Year
1
From this point, PFD is 100%
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

The
volume
used
(m3)
2.1

PFD when the volume is higher than 1.5m3
100%

4.3
6.4
8.5
10.7
12.8
14.9
17.0
19.2
21.3

100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%

When using the calculated system described above and instead of the approximated
method described by (Mihelcic, et al., 2009), the fill rate of a volume-based sanitation system is
calculated as much higher, and PFD is 100% after year 1, showing that lack of volume removal
in volume-based systems is a critical failure indicator for volume-based systems. It shows that
the system will need emptying after 1- year instead of >10. This is because the second approach
assumes a higher density of fecal sludge and higher levels of non-biodegradability. It also
assumes that the fill rate using the second calculation is much higher. For new systems with
technologies still under development, it is better to assume the more stringent sludge behaviors
from estimation 2, and for existing systems, the approximation method in estimation 1 can be
used, or where data is available actual data can be used in the second method.
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For flow systems, they are either stop/start or true continuous flow. In both cases, there
are usually peak periods and non-peak periods. The peak periods relate to the proof test of the
system per time interval. So, for example, if there are two peak periods in the day, one early
morning and the second in the evening, that is an average of two periods where the system is
being pushed to its limits and relates to the number of proof tests per day. So, there are two proof
test intervals (PFI) per day.
If a continuous flow system is being compared with a non-continuous flow-based system,
but both are flow-based systems e.g. a pipe versus a water cistern, the true continuous flowbased system i.e. pipe, should be assessed using the peak flow periods, and the non-continuous
flow systems i.e. water cistern, should be compared based on full/empty numbers per day. So, for
example where there are ten visits per day to a toilet and ten flushes, but all of them happen early
in the morning and in the evening, with the period in between having no peaks, the water cistern
will have 10 PFIs per day and the continuous flow system will have two peak periods per day i.e.
2 PFIs.
So, for flow systems, mean time to failure (MTBF) and the failure rate is calculated using
the equation introduced earlier:
Mean Time Before Failure (MTBF) =
Total number of hours equipment functioned
Number of failure events in that period

Equation 13

and for the volume-based system is calculated using:
Total Volume of faecal matter created per year (Vpd) = [m x (1/Ƥ) x n x (1-Xd) x 365]
Equation 21
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λ is the intrinsic failure rate, excluding early failures (decreasing failure rate) and wearout failures (end of life) increasing failure rates and t is a given time. The failure rate is
calculated as follows:
Failure Rate (λ) = 1/MTBF

Equation 14

A plot of this system usually creates a bathtub curve due to the flat central part which
represents a constant failure rate. A “modified Weibull model can model lifetime data with
monotonic and bathtub-shaped failure rates” (Dongiovanni and Lesmantas, 2016) and even more
“Models with bathtub-shaped failure rate function are useful in reliability analysis and
particularly in reliability-related decision making and cost analysis” (Soliman, et al., 2014),
which are essential for the RAMS framework method. The calculation above also assumes that
failure rate is spread evenly throughout the life span of a flow-based system and is useful for
simple assessment but it is important to note that failure rate will most logically be skewed
higher towards the backend of the usage period. So, the failure skew for flow-based systems is
also modeled by using a Weibull distribution in the maintenance assessment, which the skew of
the distribution to be assessed using a shape parameter estimation.
3.5.6.1.2 Availability
“Availability is the measure of the degree to which an item is in the operable and
committable state at the start of the mission, when the mission is called for at an unknown state”
(Kirkcaldy, et al., 2012). Though availability and reliability might seem similar, they are not the
same thing. Reliability is a measure of failure rates and operating time interval whilst availability
is a measurement of failure rate impact on usability. It can also be a feature of repair time
intervals and repair rates, when such repairs take the system out of use for a period, thus making
the system unavailable. In other words, failure rate and MTBF are both purely measurements of
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time and frequency of failure over time, whilst availability measures the time-based direct impact
on usage. Availability answers the question of whether a system is successful in performing its
function when it was called upon. And if so, what proportion of the total time was the system
successful/available. Availability is a measure of success is important because reliability as a
measurement of success on its own, is not sufficiently useful enough for engineers to determine
the success of a system. Additionally, there is the trade-off between both aspects which means
that they must be considered together. Thus “availability is defined as the probability that a
device is successful at time (t) when needed and operated within specified limits” (Gobble, et al.,
2005), where successful means “useable” and useable is a function of reliability. Availability
does not take into consideration past failures, past repairs, future impending problems, it simply
looks at whether when a system is called into use it is useable/available or not. It does however
take into consideration past unavailability, for it is possible for a system to fail and be unreliable
but not be called upon, therefore have no impact on availability in that period, yet if it is called
upon in its failed state and is not able to perform its function to the user, then it is unavailable.
Quite simply the amount of time, out of the overall time, that a system is in play, where it was
available for stakeholders is its availability.
To calculate availability, we must divide downtime, by the total time the machine was in
service and deduct from 1.
Unavailability = downtime / (uptime + downtime) = td / T

Equation 22

Availability = 1 – (td / T)

Equation 23

Availability = (tu / T)

Equation 24

where td is downtime and tu is uptime (U).
Availability can be expressed mathematically as Uptime/Total time interval.
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A= U/T

Equation 25

Availability gives an estimate of the proportion of the time that a sanitation system is
useful to the benefitting community at the time that the system is physically on location. This
accounts for the time when the system is unavailable due to cleaning, maintenance, failure, etc.
For example, if a closed-loop SURT within the home stops working and there is an
inability to generate recycled water from waste input, and maintenance/repair required to reinstate the system so that the front-end user can once again deposit waste into the front-end of
the system, to start the water recycling process again; could take one week, which includes the
time required for a repair engineer to be available and attend. Then we must assume that the
unavailability is seven days. If there is more than one SURT in the same home and only one of
them is broken, the unavailability of a single failed SURT is less of an issue. If the system were a
MURT with multiple front-end interfaces, there is little to no impact on the front-end user who
can just use another receptacle, but the burden of unavailability falls higher on the sanitation
engineer and/or technology provider, who needs to fix the problem before it impacts all the
multiple front-ends at once.
Additionally, it is important to note that unavailability to front-end users, also includes
downtime attributed to planned maintenance if it impacts the usability of the systems i.e. during
cleaning, this is the case unless there are alternatives front-end options for the front-end interface
user. Closure of the front-end during cleaning is an essential part of what stakeholders require to
continue to use the front-end from a hygiene perspective, so this unavailability has to be borne
by the stakeholder, due to the benefit outweighing the cost. This is the balance required to be
maintained in the RAMS trade-offs i.e. the ability to weigh the benefits of taking part in
maintenance to ensure the continued levels of any RAMS aspects versus the cost to the user.
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The table below shows the criteria of downtime impacts between availability and
reliability.
Table 3.24: Reliability and Availability Concept in Terms of User Impact
Reason for downtime
User accessible
User inaccessible

Planned
Reliable
Reliable

Available
Unavailable

Unplanned
Unreliable (machine)
Unreliable

Available
Unavailable

Availability can also be calculated as follows according to (Eti, et al., 2007)
A = 1/(1+λτ)

Equation 26

where τλ is the product of the failure rate and frequency (time) function. The frequency function
is a theoretical fraction of total time because availability is a concept based on time.
When looking at availability in terms of repair time, one must look at the ability to repair
a system quickly. This is because the speed of repair has a direct impact on uptime, especially
where the user interface is affected. So, there is a need to look at whether there are enough
critical spares available on hand to repair a system when it fails. It is generally accepted that the
failure rate of components within a system is a function of the machine’s technical features,
which means a proper estimation of the critical spare parts required to minimize downtime will
influence the overall availability of a system (Ghodrati, et al., 2013), so those estimations are
crucial for reducing downtime and therefore maintaining a reasonable and practical uptime.
3.5.6.1.2.1 Create a Framework for Availability
Uptime can be expressed mathematically as an Online time/Total time interval.
A= O/T

Equation 27

For decentralized wastewater treatment, the assessment will be focused on estimating
availability for front-end users. Therefore, it requires a determination of the uptime of a system.
Uptime can be determined by data records or from data obtained from similar
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technologies that have the same levels of availability. This analysis of downtime versus uptime
can be quantitative or qualitative. For example, a six-pit latrine block which is cleaned for 1hr
every day may have acceptable availability, if only three pits are cleaned at a time, so that three
are still available for use, thus availability is 100%. Such a scenario does not impact the
availability of the sanitation system, however, if the same six pit latrines are due for emptying
and have a combined pit, which means a closure of all six pits with no alternative access to
sanitation, then this will impact availability.
Thus, availability requires an understanding of the impact on consumers who call on the
system for service. If there is a service failure then there is an availability failure, if there is no
service failure then there is no loss of availability. Mathematically this can also be expressed as:
Unavailability = QCin - QCout = 0

Equation 28

where QC = number of front-end of users per unit of time
A = 1/(1+λτ)

Equation 26

Unavailability = 1 – [1/(1+λτ)] = QCin - QCout = 0

Equation 29

where τλ is the product of the failure rate and frequency (time) function i.e. a theoretical fraction
of total time that system is u1navailable because availability is a concept based on time. So,
access failure is:
Failure = Unavailability = downtime / (uptime + downtime) = td / T

Equation 22

For example, a sanitation system with a failure rate of 1 in 10years and availability of
100% i.e. unavailability of zero, will have an availability (A = 1/(1+λτ) of 1, because frequency
(time) function τ = 0. This is very crucial where the failure mode is part of the normal running
mode.
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3.5.6.1.3 Maintainability
Maintainability refers to the ease and or speed at which an item can be repaired after
failure and put back into service after maintenance. This is a qualitative process that looks at the
availability of spares and technical expertise. If faults are easy to diagnose, items are easily
replaceable and the correct technical expertise (ideally not part of the transient product
development group), is available locally for the equipment, then the maintainability is high. This
aspect of RAMS does not account for existing mitigation, for example, if there are two
equalization tanks and one fails, but the system diverts its flows into the spare tank so that there
is no loss of service, there is no impact on the availability of the sanitation and/or water treatment
system, however, there is still a repair time associated with the failed tank, which impacts
maintainability within the middle section of the system, especially if the tank is out of service for
a prolonged period. Maintainability therefore is concerned more with the ease of repair rather
than the online and offline time. Maintainability seeks to provide a regular period for which
maintenance should be performed on a system, to prevent failures that would take the system out
of service for long periods. For example, in a simple pit latrine, replacing the pit’s lid to keep
flies out is simple and does not need any expertise, however repairing a pump in a MURT or
fixing a blocked pipe in a SURT requires more time, is dependent on the availability of spares
and availability of expertise. Therefore, there is generally a bigger impact on the maintainability
and repair times associated with more advanced systems, due to a need for spares and expertise.
Maintenance strategies normally follow two broad strategies for minimizing failures, they
are:


Preventative maintenance – preventative actions performed either routinely on
schedule or selectively in an attempt to try and maintain a specified function in a
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specified condition by providing systematic inspection, detection, and prevention of
incipient failures (Kirkcaldy, et al., 2012; Cao, et al., 2018)


Corrective maintenance – Actions performed to restore an item to a specified
function. Corrective maintenance can include localization, isolation of faulty part,
change out, reassembly, realignment, and removal of the faulty part. The important
element is that the action is taken after a failure has occurred. (Kirkcaldy, et al.,
2012)

Maintenance strategies must be so balanced that the cost of maintenance does not affect
the overall running costs of the system to the detriment of sanitation provision. Thus, the best
way to analyze the maintenance ranking is to evaluate the cost of maintenance as a function of
stakeholder benefits. Maintenance strategies should address the questions of what maintenance is
required, why, how often, and who does the work i.e. technical expertise required.
In addition to the cost of maintenance a determination of whether the maintenance is
justified is also required, this looks particularly at whether the failed system should be discarded
or maintained. This aspect can be investigated using Weibull techniques, using calculations of
the shape parameter (β).
The calculation of the Weibull shape parameter β and the scale parameter η can be used
to determine the maintenance time requirements for predictive maintenance and therefore
reducing the levels of offline time required for planned maintenance.
OpEx cost (Operational running costs) is predominantly not addressed by this research. This is
because historically, the cost can be the roadblock, so the RAMS process aims to allow cost to be
a secondary focus whilst the suitability of engineered sanitation is assessed as a primary focus. In
the end, the cost has to be addressed, it is an inevitable function of design and must include life
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cycle cost analysis, supply chain assessments, and availability of spares, but assessing RAMS
allows the sanitation system to be assessed on the technical basis first. An important aspect for
spares is the use of 3-D printing for creating spares, this development has increased and reduced
the need to have available spares manufactured and stored in case of failure. 3-D printing has
moved the goal post and, has created an avenue for advanced decentralized sanitation systems to
be spared without the need for extensive supply chains or expensive spares inventory. All these
aspects mean that advanced systems are made more maintainable in remote, developing, and
even in outer space context and increases the argument for assessment of RAMS at the beginning
of sanitation deployment.
3.5.6.1.2.1 Create a Framework for Maintainability
Reliability-based maintenance assessments can form the foundation of sanitation design
but more importantly promote and maintain public health. Maintainability refers to the ease and
or speed at which an item can be repaired after failure and put back into service. Maintainability
takes into consideration the time to repair a system regardless of the availability of the sanitation
system during the time of repair and affects the scale parameter of a Weibull distribution model.
In reliability, we concern ourselves with designing items to last as long as possible before
failure, whereas with maintainability the concern is with designing items that can be repaired and
put back into service quickly. Having sanitation systems that are reliable and easily maintainable
results in high system availability. Maintainability is a function of the skills available to ensure
repair at the right speed and levels, plus having adequate procedures and systems in place to
ensure ease of maintenance. Maintainability is based on a probabilistic model in the same way as
reliability and availability are and is derived in similar ways except that the meantime before
failure (MTBF) is instead the mean time to repair (MTTR).
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MTTR = Total number of hours equipment was in repair
Number of maintenance repair events in that period

Equation 30

Table 3.25: Comparison of Reliability and Maintainability Functions
Reliability
Mean time before failure (MTBF):
Total number of hours equipment functioned /
Number of failure events in that period

Maintainability
Mean time to repair (MTTR):
Total number of hours equipment was in repair /
Number of repair events in that period

Failure Rate (λ) = 1/MT

Repair Rate (µ) = 1/MTTR

Thus, the better way to analyze the maintenance ranking is to evaluate the cost of
maintenance as a function of reliability, by assessing the economic impact in addition to the
amount of time required to achieve improved maintenance levels.
Maintenance is most suited to analysis using a Weibull model. There are two important
aspects of the Weibull distribution suited to determining maintenance strategies:
1. The scale parameter η (Eta), because it scales the value of the age of a system as time
(t). It can be used to determine the maintenance time intervals over the total life of a
sanitation system.
2. The shape parameter β (Beta), determines the slope of the curve when a probability
curve is created for a failure rate function of a sanitation system against time (t). It
modifies the average failure rate spread for a period.
Weibull distributions with β < 1 have a failure rate that decreases with time, also known
as infantile or early-life failures. Weibull distributions with β close to or equal to 1 have a
constant failure rate throughout the life span of the system, indicative of adequate useful life with
random failures. Weibull distributions with β > 1 have a failure rate that increases with time, also
known as wear-out failures. The Weibull shape parameter β indicates whether failure, as it
impacts on maintenance rate, is decreasing, constant or increasing. A β < 1.0 indicates
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decreasing failure rate, β = 1.0 indicates constant or random failure rate, and β > 1.0, and is an
indicator for increasing failure requiring maintenance, mostly due to fatigue, aging, and wearing
out (K R Shailesh, 2018). System components tend to have β <1 in early life, β = 1 during
steady-state, and β > at end of life. Thus, determining the β gives an idea of where in their
lifespan a component or system is, and what type of maintenance strategy is required. These
three sections comprise the three sections of the classic "bathtub curve." A mixed Weibull
distribution with one subpopulation with β < 1, one subpopulation with β = 1, and one
subpopulation with β > 1 would have a failure rate plot that was identical to a bathtub curve
(Weibull.com, 2002)
So, the calculation of the shape parameter (β) determines what type of maintenance
strategy is pursued for a sanitation system. Where β = 1 this justifies preventative maintenance,
and β >1 there may be some justification for preventative maintenance on a cost-benefit analysis
basis or if only minimal repair is required. If the costs of repair associated with the unplanned
failure of the item outweigh the maintenance cost, then the best option may be to discard. β < 1
has options for a replacement for failed components, but only if there are justifications that the
failure is due to early failure rates, otherwise a different type of component which has a different
failure mode may be needed to fulfill the function and reduce or remove the root cause of the
failure e,g. if a gate valve fails to close shut due to sediment deposits within the valve body, then
a ball valve may be a better alternative, because of its mode of operation and design, where the
impact of clearances for valve movement is less extreme. So, a justification for replacement with
a ball valve can be made, but no justification for the refurbishment of the gate valve can be
made. A simple decision table such as that shown below can be created to rank the maintenance
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requirements of a system. However, a detailed qualitative assessment of contributing factors to
failure must be made to understand failure root causes as described in phase 1.
Table 3.26: β meaning for Maintenance
Shape parameter choice
β<1

Comments
No justification for repair/like for like replacement/maintenance i.e. reliable or run
to failure

β=1

Preventative maintenance

β>1

Some justification for Preventative maintenance dependent on cost-benefit analysis

Manual methods for Weibull Distribution for failure data models show that several
manual methods can be used to estimate the Weibull approximations, but the most common
methods are the Bernard method, the Beta and F Distributions approach, and the Johnson
approximation. The approach used in the RAMS assessment is the Bernard method, but the beta
and F distributions and the Johnson approach are discussed below.
To create a Weibull curve, the maintenance time spent on repair should be arranged in
ascending order of time to repair (TTR) and ranked. Then the median ranking of failure events
must be ascertained to determine where failures rank in the order of ascending events.
The median ranking value for the nth failure is given as follows using the Beta and F
Distributions approach.
Median Rank (MR) = 1/[1+((N-i+1/i)F0.5;(N-I +1);2i]

Equation 31

where F0.5;(N-i+1);2i is the distribution at the 0.50 point, with 2(N - i + 1) and 2i degrees of
freedom, for failure n out of N items (Reliability Hotwire, 2016).
This approach is complicated, as it assumes a cumulative and constant occurrence of a
failure in a constant and predictable way. However, the failure mechanism in this assessment is
assumed to be random, so this approach was not used for the Weibull estimation for SURTs and
MURTs.

148

The other method used is the Johnson approximation, which is the most accurate of the
three approaches, however, it is better applied to failures where more than 20 failure events are
being assessed. Thus, for less than 20 items of repair failures, the Bernard approximation is a
sufficient approximation to use for the assessment. The Bernard approximation is also accurate
for failure events greater than 20, so it is a good approximation for SURTs and MURTs shape
and scale parameter estimations, and therefore has been chosen for the RAMS assessment
framework.
The Johnson approximation is shown below.
Median Rank (MR) = [i-0.30685 0.3863 ((I -1)/(N-1))]/N

Equation 32

for N > 20
Median Rank (MR) = 1 – 2-1/N + [(i - 1)/(N – 1)] x (2(1-(1/N)- 1 )

Equation 33

For Bernard approximation, the median rank is calculated where ‘i’ is the number’s rank
in the ascending order of a specific series of numbers (n), is as follows:
Note that the median rank calculation is not the same as the statistical median.
Median Rank (MR) = i−0.3/n+0.4

Equation 34

The median ranks are also an approximation of the theoretical unreliability estimates of
the failures. The median ranks represent the 50% confidence level ("best guess") estimate for the
true unreliability for a failure, based on the total number of failures and the order of numbers (i.e.
first, second, etc.) of the failure in question.
The next step is to plot [ln(1/(1−MR)] on the Y-axis against ln(t) on the X-axis, on a
Weibull graph paper, and do a linear fit of the plot to obtain the slope which is β, the shape
parameter of the distribution. The η parameter is estimated from the equation below.
µ is 1 / MTTR
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Reliability (R) = e-µ = e-(t/ η) β

Equation 35

µ = (t/ η) β

Equation 36

t > 0, this is used to calculate the scale parameter from the failure rate data.
A change in the Weibull Scale parameter, η has the same effect on the distribution as a
change of the x-axis, which is the probability density function of the failure from time zero to
time t. If η is increased, while β is the same, the distribution gets stretched out meaning the
Failure rate is reduced over time, though the total number of cumulative failures remains the
same.
If η is decreased, while β is the same, the distribution gets a sharper peak and the plot
height increases, meaning that unreliability increases over a shorter time leading to a higher
failure rate in a shorter period, with long tails where there are little to no failures. From a
maintenance planning perspective, a more stable failure rate over a longer period is better for
planning. This is because regularly scheduled maintenance will impact the reliability evenly over
the longer period, whereas a higher peaked curve creates an unreliability skew. Meaning a lot of
maintenance over a shorter period, which affects maintenance planning and budget, and is not
good for the system, because long periods of no maintenance will create a system that is more
prone to sudden failure in the long non-maintenance stretches.
η has no units.
Thus, the average time to maintenance “t” can be estimated from the following equation.
Reliability = e-(t/η)β

Equation 35

Thus, changing the shape or scale parameters have a direct impact on the time to maintenance
“t”. This allows the reliability of the system to be increased accordingly by altering the shape or
scale parameters.
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3.5.6.1.4 Safety
A sanitation system above all else must be safe because, without the basic achievement of
pathogen removal by the treatment of wastewater, the achievements of other aspects of the
RAMS are somewhat meaningless. Safety covers both human safety and environmental
protection. So, the ability of a sanitation system to meet the ISO 30500 requirements for
sanitation treatment will form the basis of safety for decentralized sanitation systems safety
assessment.
3.5.6.1.4.1 Safety Assessment
The ISO 30500 standard already reflects known safe sanitation practices of various
sectors and regions; therefore, it is an important resource for sanitation safety assessment. The
standard highlights the log removal value (LRV) requirement for a sanitation technology, it
indicates that an LRV of >6 is required for decentralized non-sewered sanitation technologies
and requires that the levels of pathogenic material and other parameters for assessing quality are
within safe levels.
For a safety assessment, the LRV can be used to determine Microbial Safety Reliability,
by using it in conjunction with the DALY (Disability Adjusted Life Years) method. The DALY
is proposed due to the use of statistically available data on a country by country basis,
additionally “such an approach has the added advantage of not being disease-specific and lends
itself for risk comparisons (Environmental Protection Agency, 2012)
3.5.6.1.4.2 Create a Framework for Microbial Safety
The failure of a sanitation system is defined as the release of pathogenic organisms to the
environment such that it can be directly or indirectly transferred to humans and cause disease.
Failure is quantified on the proposed risk assessment matrix in terms of fatalities and illnesses
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which can be caused locally, and away from the original location of the disease. The calculation
of the attributable burden is determined using the WHO Disability Adjusted Life Years (DALY)
numbers.
“The major pathogen groups, bacteria, viruses, protozoa, and helminths, differ in the
extent to which they can be removed by different treatment processes” (Stevens, et al., 2017). So,
for each stage in the sanitation process flow, a log removal value (LRV) can be calculated by
taking the logarithm of the ratio of pathogen concentration in the inﬂuent and eﬄuent wastewater
of a stage. It is as follows:
LRV = Log 10(influent pathogen concentration/effluent pathogen concentration) Log Reduction
value (LRV) = log(Ci/Ce)
Equation 37
This is calculated for each technology and compared with the (ISO 30500, 2018)
requirements shown below.

Figure 3.20: Liquid Effluent Validation Thresholds and Log-Reduction Values (LRVs)
(Source ISO 30500 Standard for Decentralized Non-sewered Sanitation Systems)
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Figure 3.21: Effluent Performance Thresholds for Environmental Parameters
(Source ISO 30500 Standard for Decentralized Non-sewered Sanitation Systems)

Figure 3.22: Effluent Performance Thresholds for Load Reduction % for Nutrients
(Source ISO 30500 Standard for Decentralized Non-sewered Sanitation Systems)

Figure 3.23: Effluent Performance Range for pH
(Source ISO 30500 Standard for Decentralized Non-sewered Sanitation Systems)
Noise levels LEX,24h represents daily system noise levels, equivalent to the system noise
level averaged over a period, this must not exceed an average of 70 dBA (LEX,24h) over the
course of 24 h, and shall not at any time exceed 90 dBA (LpA, max) during testing. For odor, the
maximum percentage of odor reported as unpleasant and/or unacceptable are also defined, for
normal and simulant odor days between 10% and 2% respectively of reported odors. (Source:
ISO 30500 standards)
Parameters such as chemical oxygen demand (COD), total suspended solids (TSS), pH,
total Nitrogen, and total Phosphorus are inherently removable parameters based on inherent
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engineered design, so once removed they are expected to be permanently removed from the
effluent, with little evidence of re-introduction.
Pathogenic parameters are removable based on log removal value basis but can be reintroduced due to the ubiquitous nature of microbes in nature, which means that diarrheal disease
poses a higher risk than the risk of eutrophication due to COD, TSS, increase in Nitrogen
compounds or Phosphorus compounds or pH, therefore the safety aspect of RAMS is the focus
of microbial safety in the RAMS methodology.
The level of treatment required for the overall system can be determined by using the
worst-case most difficult to treat pathogen group (Water Research Australia, 2014). The
pathogen influent concentration from data and literature can be used to determine the different
levels of removal required at each stage to obtain the overall LRT at the exit of the treatment
stage. An example showing this is shown below.
The yellow line shows the Input raw wastewater  Pre-treatment  Anaerobic digestion
Ultrafiltration  Chlorination = LRV > 7.5 - 11
The blue line shows the Input raw wastewater  Pre-treatment  Anaerobic digestion
Ultrafiltration  UV disinfection  Chlorination = LRV > 7.5 - 11
The red line shows the Input raw wastewater  Pre-treatment Ultrafiltration  UV
disinfection = LRV > 5.5 - 10
For the safety aspect framework, the focus will be the removal of pathogenic material
from liquid effluent. Other parameters such as chemical oxygen demand (COD), total suspended
solids (TSS), Total Nitrogen (TN), and Total Phosphorus (TP), are assumed to be reduced and/or
removed by the sheer reliability of the sanitation process, therefore focus on them is not in the
microbial safety aspect, though it could be argued that all parameters are interlinked. For each
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stage in the process where a microbial reduction target is part of the design intention, a log
removal value (LRV) is inherently part of the design. In effect, the entire water treatment process
is treated as a series of subsystems within a train, with each subsystem achieving a certain target
removal which counts cumulatively toward the overall log removal value at the effluent
discharge point.
Noise pollution for any sanitation technology considered with this framework should also
be acceptable under ISO 30500 as a minimum because the sanitation delivery equipment is
assumed to be built to the ISO 30500 requirement for noise. Therefore, further analysis of noise
is limited to the environmental criteria assessment in the qualitative risk assessment (QRM) step.
So, LRV achieved in the Primary treatment step (e.g. physical methods such as filtration,
settling, heat treatment, etc), plus LRV achieved at biological treatment step, plus LRV at
disinfection step equals Overall Log Removal Value for an advanced sanitation solution system.
For a safety assessment, the LRV can be used on its own to determine Microbial Safety
Reliability, however, by using it in conjunction with the DALY (Disability Adjusted Life Years),
the system can be fitted to a receiving population/community. This allows the safety assessment
to be based on the real human data-based and safety improvements can be based on the impact
on the community, and not just on the perceived or real benefits of the sanitation system alone.
According to the world health authority (WHO) “One DALY can be thought of as one lost year
of “healthy” life.
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Figure 3.24: Several LRV Target Pathways for achieving LRV of >6 for Safety
(Different colored lines indicated different flow path, each color is a single path)
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The sum of these DALYs across the population, or the burden of disease, can be thought
of as a measurement of the gap between current health status and an ideal health situation where
the entire population lives to an advanced age, free of disease and disability” (WHO, 2019). The
DALY has often been criticized in the past, because “Mortality rates might not directly reflect
the contribution of preventable causes of death” (Thacker, et al., 2006). In 2015, the European
Commission researched the validity of using DALYs as a suitable health measure for
determining health-based technologies (European Commission, 2015). The assessment and the
recommendations showed that in clinical diseases the interrelationship between diseases that
cause death and disability are not so independent as the DALY numbers suggest. To normalize
this, it is important that as part of the RAMS framework, the probability of disease or death from
the DALY number uses the LRV to create a link between diarrhoeal disease and the
geographical location by using probabilities of failure and the probabilities that diseases will
affect the community. This assessment of DALY can therefore be assumed to be correlated with
the LRV information to create a ranking matrix for Microbial Safety of decentralized sanitation
systems. To do this the attributable burden of disease is estimated as defined by the WHO
(WHO, 2013). Attributable burden allows assessors to see qualitatively, what impact the addition
of a sanitation technology to a community of users has.
The disability-adjusted life years (DALY), is used as “a single measure to quantify the
burden of diseases, injuries and risk factors” (Christopher J. L. Murray, 1996) and is calculated
as follows:
DALY = YLL + YLD

Equation 38

Where YLL is the years of life lost and YLD is the years lost due to disability. DALYs
are calculated by taking the sum of these two components (Katherine Gibney, August 2013).
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Methods used in this paper are based on WHO methods described in “WHO methods and
data sources for global burden of disease estimates 2000-2011” (WHO, 2013), which adopted
the simpler form of DALY, first proposed in the book on the Global burden of Disease by
(Christopher J. L. Murray, 1996). In the book, the age-weighting and time discounting are
dropped, and the years lost due to disability (YLD) are calculated from prevalence estimates
rather than incidence estimates, this method was adopted in the WHO method. YLDs are also
adjusted for independent comorbidity.
The values used for health impact in this paper were calculated from the consequence for
diarrheal diseases which are the most prevalent in waterborne pathogens from unsanitary
conditions. The numbers are based on the WHO age-standardized DALYs per 100,000 and by
cause, using member state publication from DALY for diarrheal diseases. For the local impact,
the calculation is based on the impact on the local population. The worst-case scenario is
assumed to be a situation where there is no sanitation or recovered treated water, and the entire
population is at risk from diarrheal diseases from lack of sanitation.
Using an adaptation of the information in section 4 of the article by the WHO (WHO,
2013) “Methods for estimating the environmental burden of disease”, the equation below is
suggested for impact factor for new sanitation technology, from which the attributable burden
can be derived.
To calculate the fraction of disease attributable to a risk factor for any defined population:
Attributable burden = IF x Estimated Population

Equation 39

where IF is the impact factor:
The Impact factor can be calculated by the equation proposed in (WHO, 2013)
IF = ∑PiRri - ∑Pi'Rri

Equation 40
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∑PiRri
•

IF = Impact factor

•

Pi = Proportion of the population in the exposure category (c)

•

Pi’ = Proportion of the population in the exposure category (c) after an intervention
or other change.

Rri = Relative risk at exposure category (c) compared to the reference level. This is the
probability of failure of a sanitation system leading to a pathogenic safety issue. So, Rri is the
probability of dying or being disabled in a life span from diarrheal disease:
DALY rate total diarrheal deaths as given per proportion of population

Equation 41

Furthermore, the risk of exposure to disease-causing material also needs to be estimated.
Contact risk (c) = Exposure time in minutes / total number of minutes per day
Equation 42
Rri = Probability of Exposure = Contact risk (c) x risk of technology failure (Reliability
calculated failure rate λ) x DALY rate total diarrheal deaths

Equation 43

From, using the above value for the probability of exposure in calculating the impact factor, the
IF as a function of the entire population gives the attributable burden for the entire population.
3.6 Phase 4 – Reporting the RAMS Assessment
Once the QRA risk assessment and the RAMS assessments have been performed, then
the FMEA and/or qualitative risk assessment can be done again with the mitigations included as
part of the assessment. This will enable the expert team to get an indication of how implementing
changes that impact failure rates impact the RAMS of the sanitation system. For example,
increases or reductions in maintenance schedules because of shape parameter estimation could
indicate that a shift towards a shape parameter of 1 is needed. A shift towards 1, could mean
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more scheduled maintenance which may reduce the risk of equipment failing and reduce its risk
level on the risk assessment chart, which is positive. If no change occurs with the additional
maintenance, there might be no justification for spending the extra money on maintenance, and
other options for RAMS failure reductions can be considered for the same reliability failure. The
inclusion of the mathematical RAMS analysis, which looks at the highest impacts attributable to
the risk and presents options for using mathematical methods to reduce such impact, allows the
RAMS framework to take into consideration the criticisms of risk matrices “that any underlying
uncertainty associated with a particular risk is lost in the graphical representation once the risk is
assigned to a single box” (Dillon, et al., 2018).
The approach allows the expert team to assess, if chosen mitigations for RAMS improvement,
are the best options from a cost-benefit standpoint. Clear improvements can be charted, and
benefits are shown for the before and after picture.
The outputs of the RAMS assessment can be represented as a numbered system e.g. low,
medium, high, which allows results to be represented graphically; or color matrix as shown
below. Several aspects can be chosen as critical indicators of RAMS ranking some examples are
reliability, availability, maintainability, and microbial safety, in addition to these other factors for
comparison that are decided based on expertise and stakeholder requirement should be included
such as, sludge removal requirements, technical expertise requirement, diarrhoeal disease
reduction, drowning safety, vandalism public perception, CapEx, OpEx, etc
Low means scores for reliability, availability, maintainability, and safety below 0.8.
Medium means scores for reliability, availability, maintainability, and safety between 0.8
and 0.95.
High means scores for reliability, availability, maintainability, and safety above 0.95.
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Table 3.27: Simple ranking table for RAMS Technology Comparisons
Aspect
Reliability

Low Medium High

Availability

Low Medium High

Maintainability Low Medium High
Safety

Low Medium High

3.7 Conclusion of RAMS Framework Method
Building quantitative and qualitative models involves subjectivity and assumptions.
These assumptions should be based on sound judgment notwithstanding limited data sets.
The (ISO 30500, 2018) standard has been used as a guide to determine the baseline requirements
for this framework in terms of safety assessment, which is believed to be the principal achievable
requirement of any sanitation system. The RAMS determination is an opportunity to define
success by limiting avoidable failures which can be predicted by analyzing the RAMS data of a
system. This work is the first investigation that proposes a framework for assessing the RAMS of
decentralized non-sewered sanitation systems. It is based on the determination of Reliability,
Availability, Maintainability, and Microbial Safety of decentralized non-sewered sanitation
systems, as a function of failure methods. It requires failure modes to have been identified,
rationalized and validated using a process of definition, brainstorming, ranking, prioritization,
and risk assessment. Thereby, creating a logical methodical approach to determining the RAMS
of SURTs and MURTs. This makes the process repeatable and robust. It is not, by all means,
exhaustive or infallible, however, it does present a process for methodical determination of
failure modes in sanitation. It relies quite heavily on the objectivity of the experts and nonexperts involved in the brainstorming process and the availability of data and information from
which RAMS judgments can be made. However, as long as the basic premise of justifiable
occurrences of failure is used to estimate the failure of sanitation technologies, then the process
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is globally applicable to all types of decentralized non-sewered sanitation systems. The
methodology is also applicable to a wider range of engineering RAMS assessments in the
context of failure ranking through the identification of probable failure modes. This methodology
provides a predictive model, which introduces to sanitation engineering a concept of RAMS.

Recent events such as the 2020 COVID pandemic that struck the world also provides an
opportunity to assess the resilience of advanced sanitation systems and other engineered systems
generally. The ability of a system to deal with changing world events, such as being out of
service unexpectedly due to lockdowns, changes to supply chains, restrictions; etc. means that
systems such as advanced decentralized sanitation systems need to be built with resilience in
mind.
Resilience is that part of reliability that allows systems to adapt flexibly to changes and is
not directly addressed as part of this research but provides pauses for thought in the design and
operation of engineered systems. Part of the process of RAMS assessment, therefore, needs to
consider the ability of systems to be flexible and to adapt quickly to scenarios that are rare and
unpredictable. These considerations are what would make for very reliable systems in the long
term. It is not possible to design for every eventuality, therefore a balance is required in the form
of the assessing the balance between reliability, availability, maintainability and safety aspects of
decentralized systems.
The aim should be to design systems, which don’t only work in normal circumstances
alone, but those that have enough room for manoeuvre in the design. This means that if normal
changes to “a new normal” there is enough flexibility in the design to adapt to such changes, or
as a minimum there is enough flexibility that the design can be quickly changed to adjust to the
new circumstances , regardless of whether the changes are temporary or permanent. There
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should be procedures in place to ensure temporary modifications are robustly assessed, before
adapting existing advanced decentralized sanitation systems. Where temporary changes are made
permanent, after a period of temporary use or trial, new assessments of the RAMS implications
should be made on the new basis of permanent status of the changes. These processes should be
formalised and done by the expert team. Ultimately, the goal is to ensure that changes that are
made or added to decentralized sanitation systems after initial commissioning and sign off, do
not inadvertently compromise RAMS. Thus, the same levels of rigour should apply to future
changes and modifications.
Advanced decentralized sanitation systems over and above traditional and centralized
systems have the advantage of being modular, smaller and more flexible. Therefore, changes will
be easier to incorporate, however this means there is more room for complacency due to human
error, so extra vigilance to ensure modifications are assessed in the right way, throughout the life
cycle of decentralized sanitation systems are crucial, so that the systems are not compromised.
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Part 3

Part 1

•

Development of the overall
RAMS requirement

•
•
•

Phase 1- Define Failure for each stage and
assign stakeholder
Phase 2- Brainstorming
Phase 2- Failure Ranking
Phase 3- Failure Hazard effect Analysis

Part 4
Part 2
Allocation of RAMS requirement
to subsystems

• Phase 4 - Create a
Qualitative Risk Assessment
(QRM) Model
• RAMS Assessments

Figure 3.25: Structure of the RAMS Framework
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Chapter 4. Application of RAMS in Sanitation - Case Studies for Multiple Users
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter, the RAMS approach is applied to two decentralized technologies suitable
for multiple users. The pit latrine represents a low-tech but commonly utilized solution, while the
NEWgenerator represents an advanced MURT that can be an alternative to the pit latrine. The
comparison of the two technologies has a particular significance for South Africa. In South
Africa, many rural schools are off-grid (without electricity, running water, and sewers). Hence,
they rely on pit latrines for sanitation service. A recent accounting identified close to 4000
schools that rely on pit latrines (BBC, 2018) . However, some of these pit toilets have been
unsafe and have tragically claimed the lives of children who fell in. Thus, there is a national
mandate to replace pit latrines in schools with other technologies by 2022 (News 24, 2020).
Among the technologies potentially appropriate as replacement is MURTs, such as the
NEWgenerator. The application of the RAMS framework provides a way to forecast the
suitability of new technologies to replace existing technologies.
Case Study 1 is the RAMS Assessment of a Pit-Latrine. The RAMS of a community pit
latrine serving 10 people will be assessed using the RAMS framework. The aim of this is to
understand some of the factors worth considering when assessing a traditional decentralized
sanitation system. The assessment will center on the traditional method of emptying fecal waste
from pit latrines, with treatment at a different location to where the waste origin. It is assumed
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that the pit latrine’s waste removal and treatment are managed by a service provider, and
collected waste is turned into compost.
Case Study 2 is the RAMS assessment of a MURT. This case study will be performed on
a MURT such as the University of South Florida NEWgenerator sanitation system. The case
study will be focused mostly on the treatment system which is the main body of the MURT. The
reason for the focus on the treatment system is that the ISO 30500 standard, does not specify
design parameters for the front-end of a decentralized non-sewered sanitation system, but is
detailed in the specifics for the parameters of the backend treatment stage.
4.2 Case Study 1 – RAMS Assessment of a Pit-Latrine
“Pit latrines remain widely used and are the commonest basic form of sanitation. Of the 2.7
billion people using on-site sanitation worldwide, an estimated 1.77 billion were said to use some
form of pit latrine as their primary means of excreta disposal” in 2015 (Nakagiri, et al. 2015).
Moreover, pit latrine usage in the world has increased due to the programs being progressed
around the globe to achieve the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals (SDG), which have led to
increases in knowledge and education on the need to segregate fecal matter for sanitation
purposes. A popular choice is pit latrines. The rise in the usage of pit latrines also increases the
occurrences of microbial contaminants into groundwater that may adversely affect human health
(Graham, 2013; Nakagiri et al., 2015). In the urban context, it is important to learn the shortfalls
associated with the design, construction, operation, and maintenance of pit latrines and come up
with strategies to improve their performance in these settings (Graham & Polizzotto, 2013). A
study conducted on 130 pit latrines in typical urban poor areas of Kampala, Uganda, showed that
more than half of the pit latrines were full and overflowing, with strong malodorous smell noted
in many of the latrines and there were also issues with flies (Nakagiri, et al., 2015). These cases
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of sanitation failure in volume-based sanitation systems are by no means unique to developing
countries, the united states EPA also asserted that of the 20% of sanitation systems in America
which are not connected to centralized systems, 30% are not properly managed meaning, so on
average every 6 out of 100 sanitation systems aren’t managed properly in America (EPA, 2018).
Learning from the common types of failures that are attributable to pit latrines and other off-grid
volume-based septic sanitation technologies, particularly in rural areas or remote areas, it is easy
to see how the use of advanced decentralized sanitation systems can be better and more robust
for addressing sanitation issues. To assess this question, the failure of pit latrine systems is
described as a failure to meet design life as well as deliver basic levels of hygiene. However,
there are also other failures such as secondary failures which can contribute to failure to meet
design life.
Failure definition can be many things, but typically in sanitation they can be things such
as:


Loss of ullage before design life



Accidental injury (falling into pit, drowning)



Loss of containment leading to spread of diarrheal disease



Structural failure from poor design and construction



Overflow from pits or full pits due to flooding



malodorous smells and/or fly infestation from poor maintenance, meaning pit is
abandoned by users



Groundwater pollution leading to loss of containment and poor hygiene



Groundwater infiltration, as above



Discharge of pathogenic material during emptying, leading to loss of hygiene
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Unsecure fecal dumping, as above



Lack of community engagement (women and the disabled (IEW 2012), leading to the
abandonment of pit before full design life.

The design specification is shown below.


Circular pit, 1-meter diameter, 5-meter depth, 10 users



Accumulation rate: 0.06m3/person/year



Solids storage depth: 4.5metres



Available volume: 3.5m3



Spares required: vent pipe, pit cover



Maintenance: Daily cleaning



Design life span: 10 years

The case study is a VIP latrine that collects human feces in a pit and is an improvement
on the standard pit latrine. Like any pit latrine, it consists of holes normally dug in the ground
and an enclosure for privacy. Latrines generally use little to no water.
When pit latrines are properly built, they consist of;


A hole/holes dug in the ground with a means to drain water,



An opening in the slab,



A vent for the pit for ventilation



A loose-fitting cover (to aid ventilation) for the opening in the slab, to prevent flies
getting into the hole and breeding/prevent objects falling into the hole,



An enclosing structure with ventilated pipe for passive airflow and which helps odor
removal,
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An enclosing structure which covers and protects the pit latrine and provides privacy
for users (Mihelcic, et al., 2009).

Figure 4.1: Diagram of a Pit Latrine
The long-term reliability of a community pit latrine serving an increasing number of
people starting from 10 up to 100, will be assessed using the RAMS assessment.
This case study will create a baseline starting from a single pit latrine serving 10 people
and assess what increasing the number of users/pit latrines does to the RAMS of the system. The
aim is to predict whether, at some inflection point, the use of an advanced decentralized
sanitation system is a better option, even in a rural/developing nation context. The assessment
will be based on looking at the cost of maintaining pit latrines at optimum levels of hygiene and
RAMS for up to 100 people. It is assumed that the system is professionally managed and looked
after and the variables in this scenario are the number of users and the number of systems that
will be managed.
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When properly built pit, latrines are extremely useful in the developing world for
reducing the spread of diarrheal diseases. They reduce the fecal-oral transmission of material
from flies’ legs and bodies, to food by separating fecal material from the human environment.
They are low cost and therefore prevalent in the developing world, so they are a core part
of sanitation provision, however in the context of “appropriate technology” may not always be
the most sustainable option or the best sanitation option. The pit latrine system assessed is
assumed to have the full sanitation value chain scope.
So, in this case the process and system boundary are assumed to be as shown in the list below,
but may have less or more stages in other scenarios.
For the front-end:
A- Front-end/User interface: Squat pan/Hole in the ground
Dx – Municipal water / Water top-up line up N/A
D2 – Fresh / Treated water storage: Ablution water
D3 – Water conveyance to Front-end: N/A
For the middle:
B1 – Raw untreated water conveyance: N/A
B2 – Equalization and pre-treatment storage: Pit
B3 / Bx – N/A
For the back end:
C – Treatment and entropy reduction: Offsite treatment/pit sealing
D1- Compost generation
Cx – Safe discharge: Land spreading
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Figure 4.2: Pit Latrine Scope for Case Study
(Adapted from (BMGF Sanitation Value Chain, 2010)
4.2.1 Pit Latrine Risk Ranking Assessment Data Analysis
The distribution of the risk ranking for the example VIP latrine is illustrated in the Pareto
chart below. The full data is available in the appendix of the manuscript named Phase 1 and
Phase VIP Latrine. In the table the types of initiating events, that is whether the failure is
initiated by people, material or equipment are defined. The failure allocation based on whether
the failure is function or service-based is determined, and the RAMS impact ranking from 1 – 4
for all aspects of safety is done. The table is formatted so that each row is a single failure node,
with all the failure definition criteria detailed along the single row across. It also shows the RPN
scores. The tables and figures below show the statistical levels of different risk scores to
illustrate the frequency at which they occur, and the levels of risk associated with each RAMS
impact. There were 19 risk items identified of which occurrences of the risk ranking score of 27
out of 27 happened once. The table below shows the rest of the distribution. 100% of the risks
identified were safety rated at the highest.
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Table 4.1: Table of VIP Latrine Risk Ranking Score Frequencies
Score
0

frequency
1

1
1.5
2
3
6
27

2
1
3
9
2
1

Total

19

Figure 4.3: Pareto of VIP Latrine Risk Ranking Scoring Frequencies
Stakeholder assignment which looks at which stakeholder is most impacted by identified
failures showed that in 58% of the cases, the front-end user is most impacted, but in the
remaining 42% of cases, the sanitation engineer and local community are most affected.
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0%

100%

Safety

Relaibility

Availability

Maintenance

Figure 4.4: VIP Latrine Proportion of Highest Ranked Aspects R, A, M or S

5%

37%
58%

User community
Sanitation Engineer / Technician/ Service provider
Local government
Figure 4.5: VIP Latrine Proportion of Stakeholder Assignment
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For the FMEA VIP Latrine, it was determined that the focus of the failure mode effect
analysis (FMEA) will be all 19 impacts determined for the risk definition phases of the VIP
latrine failure analysis. The full FMEA table is shown in the appendix and is named FMEA VIP
Latrine. The histogram chart of RPN scores for all the risks is shown below.
Table 4.2: VIP Latrine RPN Scores and Frequency of Occurrence
RPN

Frequency

216

1

240

3

560

1

720

9

800

2

900

3

Total 19

Figure 4.6: VIP Latrine RPN Scores Frequency of Occurrence
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Most of the scores are at a high 720, there are also 3 risks at 900. The 900 level risks are
mostly because there are a lot of unmitigable safety factors associated with a pit latrine due to the
risk of groundwater contamination, structural failure, and falling in. The basic nature of pit
latrines, particularly around groundwater contamination, which can still happen even with the
best design, means that mitigation is often hard to achieve without a change of design. However,
there is an opportunity to reduce the probability of failure by adopting good design principles
and situating pit above ground in places with high water tables, where possible. For the risk of
children falling into pits, where this risk has not been mitigated as part of the basic design of the
pit latrine, the hole could be made smaller to reduce the risk of falls in. Otherwise, a pour-flush
pan can be used instead of a standard hole in the ground which will eliminate the risk. Pour flush
pit latrines require about 3-liters of water per flush (Mihelcic, et al., 2009). The risk of structural
collapse can be mitigated by using designs where the user interface is placed of solid ground
diagonally above the pit and not directly above, then a short sewer pipe is used together with a
pour-flush system to flush the waste into the pit. This can be combined with a u-bend within the
short pipe to create a water seal, which provides the added benefit of stopping odors and act as a
fly seal for the pit latrine, as shown in the sanitation value chain image below.
The table following shows the qualitative risk assessment process for the VIP latrine,
showing how the mitigations for economics, technical knowledge, public perception,
environment, and safety were assessed for the 19 risks identified. The process is qualitative. The
tables show the risk matrix sections cut out for where there are risks identified and the analysis
tables that follow each QRM show the maximum tolerable risks and risk levels as defined for the
VIP latrine for this study. The table following shows the result of the FMEA which are put
forward for the QRM, shown for the front-end, the middle, and the back-end respectively.
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Highest RAMS

stakeholder

RPN

Detection

Occurrence

Severity

Potential Causes of
failure

Potential Effects of
failure

Failure Mode

Initiating event

Name

Unique identifier

Table 4.3: Front-end Top VIP Latrine Aspects to Consider for QRM

1

Pit latrine
enclosure

Lack of proper use of
facilities/lack of cleaning

Unsanitary/fecal
matter in the
housing

Unsanitary/fec
al matter in
the housing

Lack of basic
hygiene training

9

10

8

720

User/Communi
ty

S

2

Pit latrine
enclosure

Missing cover

Fall into pit

Fall into pit

Inadequate latrine
design

10

10

8

800

User/Communi
ty

S

3

Pit latrine
enclosure

Lack of cover / ineffective
design for air flow

Malodorous
smells

Malodorous
smells

Inadequate latrine
design

3

10

8

240

User/Communi
ty

S

4

Pit latrine
enclosure

Lack of proper design

Structural failure

Structural
failure

Inadequate latrine
design

10

10

8

800

User/Communi
ty

S

3

10

8

240

3

9

8

216

User/Communi
ty
User/Communi
ty

3

10

8

240

User/Communi
ty

6

Pit latrine
enclosure
Pit latrine
enclosure

Vandalism
Lack of proper design of
structure/ door

7

Pit latrine
enclosure

Lack of ablution water facilities
local to pit

5

Missing pit cover

Missing pit
cover

No privacy

No privacy

Lack of education
on the importance
of pit covers in
reducing the risks
of fall in
Inadequate latrine
design

Lack of
flush/ablution
water

Lack of
flush/ablution
water

Inadequate latrine
design

S
S

S
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Highest RAMS

stakeholder

RPN

Detection

Occurrence

Severity

Potential Causes of
failure

Potential Effects of
failure

Failure Mode

Initiating event

Name

Unique identifier

Table 4.4: Middle Top VIP Latrine Aspects to Consider for QRM

8

Pit

Design failure/ground water
damage

Pit collapse

Pit collapse

Inadequate latrine
design

9

10

8

720

User/Communit
y

S

9

Pit

Inappropriate design

Groundwater
contamination

Ground water
contamination

Inadequate latrine
design

9

10

10

900

User/Communit
y

S

10

Pit

Lack of emptying

Full/overflow

Full/overflow

Inadequate
maintenance

8

10

7

560

User/Communit
y

S

11

Pit

Inappropriate design

Groundwater
infiltration

Groundwater
infiltration

Inadequate latrine
design

9

10

10

900

User/Communit
y

S

720

Sanitation
Engineer /
Technician/
Service
provider

S

12

Transport

Insecure transportation measures

Discharge of
pathogenic
material

Discharge of
pathogenic
material

Inadequate
maintenance

9

10

8
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Discharge of
pathogenic
material

Discharge of
pathogenic
material

inadequate
treatment design

9

10

8

720

Dumping

Dumping

Lack of basic
hygiene training

9

10

10

900

13

Treatment

4

Treatment

Insufficient inoculation of
pathogenic material
Lack of or disregard of
sanitation knowledge and
implications

15

Treatment

Insufficient inoculation of
pathogenic material

Ineffective
treatment

Ineffective
treatment

inadequate
treatment design

9

10

8

720

Inappropriate
discharge of
pathogenic
material

inadequate
treatment design

9

10

8

720

16

Treatment

Insufficient inoculation of
pathogenic material

Inappropriate
discharge of
pathogenic
material

17

Treatment

Insufficient inoculation of
pathogenic material

Ineffective
treatment

Ineffective
treatment

inadequate
treatment design

9

10

8

720

Compost not reused

Compost not
re-used

inadequate
treatment design

9

10

8

720

Discharge of
pathogenic
material

Discharge of
pathogenic
material

inadequate
treatment design

9

10

8

720

Lack of outlet
18

Treatment

19

Land
spreading

Insufficient inoculation of
pathogenic material

Sanitation
Engineer /
Technician/
Service
provider
Local
government
Sanitation
Engineer /
Technician/
Service
provider
Sanitation
Engineer /
Technician/
Service
provider
Sanitation
Engineer /
Technician/
Service
provider
Sanitation
Engineer /
Technician/
Service
provider
Sanitation
Engineer /
Technician/
Service
provider

Highest
RAMS

stakeholde
r

RPN

Detection

Occurrenc
e

Severity

Potential
Causes of
failure

Potential
Effects of
failure

Failure
Mode

Initiating
event

Name

Unique
identifier

Table 4.5: Back-End Top VIP Latrine Aspects to Consider for QRM

S

S

S

S

S

S

S
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4.2.2 Qualitative Risk Assessment (QRM) Model for VIP Latrine
After analysis, it is found that the top-scoring RAMS aspects for the FMEA ranking are
all safety aspects, as shown below with RPNs ranging from 216 to 900. Overall, there are 19
aspects, and they follow the distribution below:
Table 4.6: Aspects of the VIP Latrine Distribution Table
RPN Frequency
216

1

240

3

560

1

720

9

800

2

900

3

RAMS
Safety = 1
Safety = 3
Safety = 1
Safety = 9
Safety = 2
Safety = 3

The three top aspects that scored an RPN of 900 are groundwater contamination,
groundwater contamination, groundwater infiltration because infiltration means there is a
pathway to groundwater for contamination to occur. All 3 aspects have the potential to impact
other communities and therefore create compound failure. Also, the impacts will probably occur
suddenly, and until people start getting sick with the diarrheal disease there may be no warning
or prior indication that the failure has occurred unless regular testing occurs of drinking water
sources. These three top aspects do not impact the user interface directly.
The MTR below is proposed for assessing maximum risk appetite, and the qualitative risk
analysis of all identified risks follows.
Table 4.7: VIP Latrine Maximum Tolerable Reliability Failure Risk Per Annum
Maximum Tolerable Reliability Failure Risk per unit per annum
PFD

0 Failures

Maximum Tolerable Risk level V - VI

1-2 Failures

3-4 Failures

III-IV

I - II
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QRM for economics is shown in the following table, and it shows that a lot of economic risks score a risk value of V, meaning
zero tolerability. There are also several IVs which mean occurrences of 1-2 failures/year are tolerable.
Table 4.8: VIP Latrine Inherent Risks Matrix Economics
Risk Level

Economics

Definite

Likely

Occasional

V

>USD $10 per person to USD $100 per person

14,

8,9, 11, 12,13,15,16,17,19

4

IV

>USD $1 per person to USD $10 per person

2,5,6,7

9,10,

III

>USD $0.1 per person to USD $1 per person

1,3,18

Unlikely

Remote

Rare

Pit latrine
enclosure
1
2

Pit latrine
enclosure
Pit latrine
enclosure

3
4

5

Pit latrine
enclosure
Pit latrine
enclosure

Lack of proper use of
facilities/lack of
cleaning

Unsanitary/fec
al matter in
the housing

Unsanitary/fec
al matter in
the housing

Lack of basic hygiene
training

III

Missing cover
Lack of cover /
ineffective design for
airflow

Fall into pit

Fall into pit

Inadequate latrine design

IV

Lack of proper design

Malodorous
smells
Structural
failure

Malodorous
smells
Structural
failure

Vandalism

Missing pit
cover

Missing pit
cover

MTR

Score

Potential
Causes of
failure

Potential
Effects of
failure

Failure
Mode

Initiating
event

Name

Unique
identifier

Table 4.9: Front-end VIP Latrine Maximum Tolerable Risk (MTR) Economics

1-2 Failures

1-2 Failures
1-2 Failures
III
Inadequate latrine design
0 Failures
Inadequate latrine design
Lack of education on the
importance of pit covers in
reducing the risks of fall in

V
1-2 Failures
IV

Table 4.9: (Continued)
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Unique identifier
Name

6

Pit latrine enclosure

7

Pit latrine enclosure

Initiating
event
Lack of
proper design
of structure/
door
Lack of
ablution
water
facilities
local to pit

Failure Mode

No privacy

Lack of
flush/ablution
water

Potential
Effects of
failure

Potential
Causes of
failure

No privacy

Inadequate
latrine design

Lack of
flush/ablution
water

Score
IV

MTR
1-2
Failures

IV

1-2
Failures

Inadequate
latrine design

9

Pit

Inappropriate design

Groundwater
contamination

Groundwater
contamination

10

Pit

Lack of emptying

Full/overflow

11

Pit

Inappropriate design
Insecure
transportation
measures

Groundwater infiltration

Full/overflow
Groundwater
infiltration
Discharge of
pathogenic
material

12

Transport

Discharge of pathogenic
material

Inadequate latrine
design
Inadequate
maintenance
Inadequate latrine
design

MTR

Score

Potential Causes of
failure

Potential Effects of
failure

Failure Mode

Initiating event

Name

Unique identifier

Table 4.10: Middle VIP Latrine Maximum Tolerable Risk (MTR) Economics

0 Failures
V
IV

1-2
Failures
0 Failures

V
0 Failures

Inadequate
maintenance

V
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Table 4.11: Back-End VIP Latrine Maximum Tolerable Risk (MTR) Economics
Unique
identifier

Failure Mode
Name

13

14

15

16

Treatment

Treatment

Treatment

Treatment

17

Treatment

18

Treatment

19

Land
spreading

Initiating event
Insufficient
inoculation of
pathogenic material
Lack of or disregard
of sanitation
knowledge and
implications
Insufficient
inoculation of
pathogenic material
Insufficient
inoculation of
pathogenic material
Insufficient
inoculation of
pathogenic material
Lack of outlet
Insufficient
inoculation of
pathogenic material

Discharge of
pathogenic material

Dumping

Ineffective treatment
Inappropriate
discharge of
pathogenic material

Ineffective treatment
Compost not re-used
Discharge of
pathogenic material

Potential Effects
of failure
Discharge of
pathogenic
material

Dumping

Potential Causes of
failure

Score

MTR

V

0
Failures

inadequate treatment
design
V

0
Failures

V

0
Failures

Lack of basic
hygiene training

Ineffective
treatment
Inappropriate
discharge of
pathogenic
material

inadequate treatment
design

Ineffective
treatment
Compost not reused
Discharge of
pathogenic
material

inadequate treatment
design
inadequate treatment
design

V

0
Failures

V

0
Failures

inadequate treatment
design

inadequate treatment
design

III
V

1-2
Failures
0
Failures

QRM for the environment is shown in the following table, and it shows that a lot of environmental risks score a risk value of
IV, meaning occurrences of 1-2 failures/year are tolerable for the highest scoring and the rest having higher tolerability or are broadly
acceptable.
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Table 4.12: VIP Latrine Inherent Risks Matrix Environment
Risk
Level

II

Environment
Severe - Hazardous material discharged into the watercourse with
some fish kill. Moderate impact of technology future, but
environmental damage is seen as not due to the failure of
technology.
Noise heard continuously at locations up to 1 mile from the site
Air pollution/odor codes 3(F/X) unpleasant odor felt continuously
at locations up to 1mile from site
Significant - Strong or offensive odors, breach of local permits.
No damage to the technology future. Continuous odors, rodents,
animal activity, flies, etc.
Noise heard intermittently at locations up to 1 mile from the site
Air pollution/odor codes 3(F/X) unpleasant odor felt intermittently
at locations up to 1 mile from the site
Minor - Noticeable nuisance off-site e.g. occasional odors,
rodents, animal activity, flies, etc.
Noise heard intermittently at locations locally i.e. within 250yards
Air pollution/odor codes 2(X) acceptable odor felt intermittently
only locally i.e. within 250yards

I

Insignificant - Nuisance on site only, no off-site effects, codes
1/2(0) no odor/pleasant

IV

III

Definite

Likely

Occasional

Unlikely

Remote

Rare

9,11,12,13,14,15,16,17

19

1, 3

2,6,7

4,5, 8,10,18

Table 4.13: Front-end VIP Latrine Maximum Tolerable Risk (MTR) Environmental
Unique
identifier

Failure Mode
Name

1

Pit latrine
enclosure

Initiating event
Lack of proper use of
facilities/lack of
cleaning

Unsanitary/fecal
matter in the housing

Potential
Effects of
failure
Unsanitary/fecal
matter in the
housing

Potential Causes of failure

Score
II

MTR
3-4
Failures

Lack of basic hygiene training
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Table 4.13: (Continued)
Unique
identifier
Name
Pit latrine
enclosure

2

5

Pit latrine
enclosure
Pit latrine
enclosure
Pit latrine
enclosure

6

Pit latrine
enclosure

3
4

Pit latrine
enclosure

7

Potential
Effects of
failure

Potential Causes of failure

Score

Fall into pit

Fall into pit

Inadequate latrine design

I

Malodorous
smells
Structural failure
Missing pit
cover

Malodorous
smells
Structural
failure
Missing pit
cover

No privacy

No privacy

Lack of
flush/ablution
water

Lack of
flush/ablution
water

Failure Mode
Initiating event
Missing cover
Lack of cover /
ineffective
design for
airflow
Lack of proper
design
Vandalism
Lack of proper
design of
structure/ door
Lack of
ablution water
facilities local
to pit

II

MTR
3-4
Failures
3-4
Failures

Inadequate latrine design
Inadequate latrine design
Lack of education on the importance of pit covers in
reducing the risks of fall in

I

3-4
Failures
3-4
Failures
3-4
Failures

I

3-4
Failures

I
I

Inadequate latrine design

Inadequate latrine design

Pit

Pit collapse

Inappropriate design

Groundwater
contamination

Pit collapse

Groundwater contamination

Potential
Causes of
failure

Potential
Effects of
failure

Failure
Mode

Initiating
event
Design failure/groundwater
damage

MTR

9

Pit

Score

8

Name

Unique
identifier

Table 4.14: Middle VIP Latrine Maximum Tolerable Risk (MTR) Environmental

Inadequate latrine
design

I

3-4
Failure
s

Inadequate latrine
design

IV

1-2
Failure
s
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10

Pit

Lack of emptying

Full/overflow

Full/overflow

Inadequate maintenance
I

11
12

Pit
Transpor
t

Inappropriate design
Insecure transportation
measures

Groundwater
infiltration
Discharge of
pathogenic material

Groundwater infiltration
Discharge of pathogenic
material

Inadequate latrine
design

IV
IV

Inadequate maintenance

MTR

Score

Potential
Causes of
failure

Potential
Effects of
failure

Failure
Mode

Initiating
event

Name

Unique
identifier

Table 4.14: (Continued)

3-4
Failures
1-2
Failures
1-2
Failures

Table 4.15: Back-End VIP Latrine Maximum Tolerable Risk (MTR) Environmental
Unique
identifier

Failure Mode

13

Name
Treatment

14

Treatment

15

Treatment

16

Treatment

17

Treatment

18

Treatment
Land
spreading

19

Initiating event
Insufficient inoculation of
pathogenic material
Lack of or disregard of
sanitation knowledge and
implications
Insufficient inoculation of
pathogenic material
Insufficient inoculation of
pathogenic material
Insufficient inoculation of
pathogenic material
Lack of outlet
Insufficient inoculation of
pathogenic material

Discharge of pathogenic
material
Dumping

Potential Effects of
failure
Discharge of pathogenic
material
Dumping

Ineffective treatment

Ineffective treatment

Inappropriate discharge
of pathogenic material

Inappropriate discharge
of pathogenic material

Ineffective treatment

Ineffective treatment

Compost not re-used
Discharge of pathogenic
material

Compost not re-used
Discharge of pathogenic
material

Potential
Causes of
failure
inadequate
treatment design
Lack of basic
hygiene training
inadequate
treatment design
inadequate
treatment design
inadequate
treatment design
inadequate
treatment design
inadequate
treatment design

Score
IV
IV

IV
IV
IV

I
III

MTR
1-2
Failures
1-2
Failures
1-2
Failures
1-2
Failures
1-2
Failures
3-4
Failures
1-2
Failures

QRM for public perception is shown in the following table, with the highest occurrences falling into the 3-4 failures/year are
tolerable as long as the consequences are very low, and the rest are broadly acceptable.
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Table 4.16: VIP Latrine Inherent Risks Matrix Public Perception
Risk
Level
III
II
I

Public Perception
Local caution which leads to stopping use of technology for 1 week or less and
local media coverage
Community warning because of the release of material from technology and
local media coverage
No to minor impact on the community e.g. one toilet or shower not working but
others available with no discernable impact on community

Definite

Likely

6

9,11,

1,2,3,5,7

4 ,8,12,
10,13,14,15,
16,17,18,19

Occasional

Unlikely

Remote

Rare

Table 4.17: Front – End VIP Latrine Maximum Tolerable Risk Public Perception
Unique
identifier

Failure Mode
Name

1
2

Pit latrine
enclosure
Pit latrine
enclosure

4

Pit latrine
enclosure
Pit latrine
enclosure

5

Pit latrine
enclosure

6

Pit latrine
enclosure

7

Pit latrine
enclosure

3

Potential Effects of
failure

Potential Causes of failure

Unsanitary/fecal
matter in the
housing

Unsanitary/fecal matter
in the housing

Lack of basic hygiene training

Missing cover
Lack of cover /
ineffective design
for airflow
Lack of proper
design

Fall into pit

Fall into pit

Inadequate latrine design

Malodorous smells

Malodorous smells

Inadequate latrine design

Structural failure

Structural failure

Vandalism
Lack of proper
design of structure/
door
Lack of ablution
water facilities local
to pit

Missing pit cover

Missing pit cover

Inadequate latrine design
Lack of education on the
importance of pit covers in
reducing the risks of fall in

Initiating event
Lack of proper use
of facilities/lack of
cleaning

Score
I

I
I

No privacy

No privacy

Lack of
flush/ablution water

Lack of flush/ablution
water

MTR
3-4
Failures
3-4
Failures
3-4
Failures

I

3-4
Failures
3-4
Failures

III

1-2
Failures

I

3-4
Failures

II

Inadequate latrine design

Inadequate latrine design
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Table 4.18: Middle VIP Latrine Maximum Tolerable Risk (MTR) Public Perception
Unique
identifier

Failure Mode
Name

8

Pit

Initiating event
Design failure/groundwater
damage

9

Pit

10

Potential Effects of
failure

Inappropriate design

Pit collapse
Groundwater
contamination

Pit collapse
Groundwater
contamination

Pit

Lack of emptying

Full/overflow

Full/overflow

11

Pit

12

Transport

Inappropriate design
Insecure transportation
measures

Groundwater infiltration
Discharge of pathogenic
material

Groundwater infiltration
Discharge of pathogenic
material

Potential
Causes of
failure
Inadequate
latrine design
Inadequate
latrine design
Inadequate
maintenance
Inadequate
latrine design
Inadequate
maintenance

Score
II
III
I
III
II

MTR
3-4
Failures
1-2
Failures
3-4
Failures
1-2
Failures
3-4
Failures

Table 4.19: Back-End VIP Latrine Maximum Tolerable Risk (MTR) Public Perception
Unique
identifier

Failure Mode
Name

13

Treatment

14

Treatment

15

Treatment

16

Treatment

17

Treatment

18

Treatment
Land
spreading

19

Initiating event
Insufficient inoculation of
pathogenic material
Lack of or disregard of
sanitation knowledge and
implications
Insufficient inoculation of
pathogenic material
Insufficient inoculation of
pathogenic material
Insufficient inoculation of
pathogenic material
Lack of outlet
Insufficient inoculation of
pathogenic material

Discharge of pathogenic
material

Potential Effects of
failure

Potential Causes
of failure

Discharge of pathogenic
material

inadequate
treatment design

Dumping

Dumping

Ineffective treatment
Inappropriate discharge
of pathogenic material

Ineffective treatment
Inappropriate discharge
of pathogenic material

Ineffective treatment

Ineffective treatment

Compost not re-used
Discharge of pathogenic
material

Compost not re-used
Discharge of pathogenic
material

Lack of basic
hygiene training
inadequate
treatment design
inadequate
treatment design
inadequate
treatment design
inadequate
treatment design
inadequate
treatment design

Score
I

MTR
3-4
Failures

I

3-4
Failures

I

3-4
Failures
3-4
Failures
3-4
Failures
3-4
Failures
3-4
Failures

I
I

I
I
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QRM for safety is shown in the following table, and it shows that some safety risks score a risk value of V, meaning
that failures in those circumstances are not an option, there are also occurrences of 1-2 failures/year in the tolerable range, though
these are associated mostly with structural and design failures and not microbial safety failures which can lead to diarrhoeal diseases.
Table 4.20: VIP Latrine Inherent Risks Matrix Safety
Risk Level

V

IV
III

Safety
*2-10 fatalities locally
* 10 - 20 serious illness locally due to technology failure
OR
* 1 fatality off-site
* 2-10 illness off-site e.g. discharge to the river causing incidents at another
location due to contamination traveling downstream
*1 fatality locally
* 2 - 10 serious illness locally due to technology failure
OR
* 1 illness off site e.g. discharge to river causing incidents at another location
due to contamination travelling downstream
* 1 serious illness or multiple minor illnesses locally due to technology failure
*50% - 70% attributable burden
* 1minor illness locally due to technology failure

II

Definite

Likely

Occasional

Unlikely

Remote

Rare

Occasional

Unlikely

Remote

Rare

9,11,12,14,

2

4,8,13,15,16,17,19

1

10

3,5,6,7

18

Definite

Likely

Table 4.21: Front-end VIP Latrine Maximum Tolerable Risk (MTR) Safety
Unique
identifier

1
2
3

Failure Mode
Name

Initiating event

Pit latrine
enclosure
Pit latrine
enclosure
Pit latrine
enclosure

Lack of proper use of
facilities/lack of cleaning
Missing cover
Lack of cover / ineffective
design for airflow

Unsanitary/fecal matter
in the housing

Potential Effects of
failure
Unsanitary/fecal matter
in the housing

Fall into pit

Fall into pit

Malodorous smells

Malodorous smells

Potential
Causes of
failure
Lack of basic
hygiene training
Inadequate
latrine design
Inadequate
latrine design

Score
III
IV
II

MTR
1-2
Failures
1-2
Failures
3-4
Failures
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Table 4.21: (Continued)
Unique
identifier

4

Failure Mode
Name

Initiating event

Pit latrine
enclosure

Lack of proper
design

5

Pit latrine
enclosure

6

Pit latrine
enclosure

7

Pit latrine
enclosure

Potential
Causes of
failure

Score
IV

MTR
1-2
Failures

II

3-4
Failures

Missing pit cover

Inadequate
latrine design
Lack of
education on the
importance of pit
covers in
reducing the
risks of fall in

II

3-4
Failures

No privacy

No privacy

Inadequate
latrine design

Lack of flush/ablution
water

Lack of flush/ablution
water

Inadequate
latrine design

II

3-4
Failures

Structural failure

Vandalism
Lack of proper
design of
structure/ door
Lack of ablution
water facilities
local to pit

Potential Effects of
failure

Missing pit cover

Structural failure

8
9
10
11

Pit
Pit
Pit
Pit

Design
failure/groundwater
damage
Inappropriate
design

Pit collapse
Groundwater
contamination

Pit collapse
Groundwater
contamination

Lack of emptying

Full /overflow

Full /overflow

Inappropriate
design

Groundwater
infiltration

Groundwater
infiltration

Inadequate
latrine design
Inadequate
latrine design
Inadequate
maintenance
Inadequate
latrine design

IV

MTR

Score

Potential Causes
of failure

Potential Effects
of failure

Failure Mode

Initiating event

Name

Unique identifier

Table 4.22: Middle VIP Latrine Maximum tolerable risk (MTR) Safety

1-2
Failures
0 Failures

V
IV

1-2
Failures
0 Failures

V
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Table 4.22: (Continued)
Unique
identifier

Failure Mode
Name

12

Transport

Initiating event
Insecure
transportation
measures

Discharge of
pathogenic material

Potential Effects of
failure

Potential
Causes of
failure

Discharge of
pathogenic material

Inadequate
maintenance

Score
V

MTR
0 Failures

Table 4.23: Back-End VIP Latrine Maximum tolerable risk (MTR) Safety
Unique
identifier
Name

Treatment
Treatment

Insufficient inoculation
of pathogenic material

16
17

14
15

Treatment

Potential Effects of
failure

Potential
Causes of
failure

Discharge of
pathogenic material

Discharge of
pathogenic material

inadequate
treatment design

Dumping

Lack of basic
hygiene training

Initiating event
Insufficient inoculation
of pathogenic material
Lack of or disregard of
sanitation knowledge
and implications

13

Failure Mode

Dumping

Treatment

Insufficient inoculation
of pathogenic material

Ineffective treatment
Inappropriate
discharge of
pathogenic material

Ineffective treatment
Inappropriate
discharge of
pathogenic material

Treatment

Insufficient inoculation
of pathogenic material

Ineffective treatment

Ineffective treatment

18

Treatment

19

Land
spreading

Lack of outlet
Insufficient inoculation
of pathogenic material

inadequate
treatment design

Score

MTR

IV

1-2
Failures

V

0 Failures

IV

1-2
Failures

IV

1-2
Failures

IV

1-2
Failures

IV

inadequate
treatment design

Compost not re-used

Compost not re-used

inadequate
treatment design
inadequate
treatment design

Discharge of
pathogenic material

Discharge of
pathogenic material

inadequate
treatment design

II

3-4
Failures
1-2
Failures

QRM for technical knowledge is shown in the following table, and it shows technical knowledge failures is more acceptable
overall compared with other inherent failures, but only where advanced technical expertise is not needed, indicating that because the
pit latrine is not a technically advanced sanitation system this aspect of the QRM has limited application for this scenario.
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Table 4.24: VIP Latrine Inherent Risks Matrix Technical knowledge
Risk Level
IV

III
II

Technical knowledge
Requires moderate technical expertise e.g. Basic education with (up to
1-year training) and no experience in the field

Requires a basic level of technical expertise e.g. Basic education with
(1-day training) and no experience in the field
Requires a very basic level of technical expertise e.g. Basic education
with (1 hour or less training) and no experience in the field

Definite

Likely

Occasional

Unlikely

Remote

Rare

13,15,17,19

3,4,7,8,9,10,11,18
1,2,5.6,12,14, 16

Table 4.25: Front-end VIP Latrine Maximum Tolerable Risk Technical Expertise
Unique
identifier

Failure Mode
Name

Initiating event
Lack of proper use of
facilities/lack of cleaning

Unsanitary/fecal
matter in the
housing

1

Pit latrine
enclosure

2

Pit latrine
enclosure

Missing cover

Fall into pit

3

Pit latrine
enclosure

Lack of cover / ineffective
design for airflow

Malodorous
smells

4

Pit latrine
enclosure

Lack of proper design

Structural
failure

5

Pit latrine
enclosure

Vandalism

Missing pit
cover

6

Pit latrine
enclosure

Lack of proper design of
structure/ door

7

Pit latrine
enclosure

Lack of ablution water
facilities local to pit

Potential Effects of
failure

Potential Causes of failure

Score

Unsanitary/fecal
matter in the housing

Lack of basic hygiene
training

II

MTR
3-4 Failures

3-4 Failures
Fall into pit

Inadequate latrine design

II
1-2 Failures

Malodorous smells

Inadequate latrine design

III
1-2 Failures

Structural failure

Missing pit cover

Inadequate latrine design
Lack of education on the
importance of pit covers in
reducing the risks of fall in

III
3-4 Failures
II
3-4 Failures

No privacy
Lack of
flush/ablution
water

No privacy

Inadequate latrine design

II
1-2 Failures

Lack of flush/ablution
water

III
Inadequate latrine design
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Table 4.26: Middle VIP Latrine Maximum Tolerable Risk Technical Expertise
Unique
identifier

Failure Mode
Name

Potential Effects of
failure

Potential Causes of
failure

8

Pit

Initiating event
Design
failure/groundwater
damage

9

Pit

Inappropriate design

Groundwater contamination

Pit collapse
Groundwater
contamination

10

Pit

Lack of emptying

Full /overflow

Full/overflow

11

Pit

Groundwater infiltration

Groundwater infiltration

12

Transport

Inappropriate design
Insecure
transportation
measures
Insufficient
inoculation of
pathogenic material

Inadequate latrine
design
Inadequate latrine
design
Inadequate
maintenance
Inadequate latrine
design

Discharge of pathogenic
material

Discharge of pathogenic
material

Inadequate
maintenance

Discharge of pathogenic
material

Discharge of pathogenic
material

inadequate treatment
design

13

Treatment

Pit collapse

Score
III

MTR
1-2
Failures
1-2
Failures
1-2
Failures
1-2
Failures
3-4
Failures

III
III
III
II

IV

1-2
Failures

Table 4.27: Back-End VIP Latrine Maximum Tolerable Risk Technical Expertise
Unique
identifier

Failure Mode
Name

14

Treatment

15

Treatment

16

Treatment

17

Treatment

18

Treatment

Initiating event
Lack of or disregard of sanitation
knowledge and implications
Insufficient inoculation of
pathogenic material
Insufficient inoculation of
pathogenic material
Insufficient inoculation of
pathogenic material
Lack of outlet

Potential Effects of
failure

Dumping

Dumping

Ineffective treatment
Inappropriate discharge of
pathogenic material

Ineffective treatment
Inappropriate
discharge of
pathogenic material

Ineffective treatment

Ineffective treatment

Compost not re-used

Compost not re-used

Potential Causes
of failure
Lack of basic
hygiene training
inadequate
treatment design

Score
II
IV
III

inadequate
treatment design
inadequate
treatment design
inadequate
treatment design

IV

III

MTR
3-4
Failures
1-2
Failures
1-2
Failures
1-2
Failures
1-2
Failures
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Table 4.27: (Continued)
19

Land
spreading

Insufficient inoculation of
pathogenic material

Discharge of pathogenic
material

Discharge of
pathogenic material

inadequate
treatment design

IV

1-2
Failures

To illustrate the impact of each QRM aspect each failure’s highest-scoring risk is compiled in the table below as follows,
showing that economics and safety are of the utmost importance in terms of pit latrine risk aspects.

Pit latrine
enclosure

5

Pit latrine
enclosure
Pit latrine
enclosure

6

Pit latrine
enclosure

7

Pit latrine
enclosure

4

8

Pit

User/Communit
y

240

User/Communit
y
User/Communit
y

216

User/Communit
y

240

User/Communit
y

720

User/Communit
y

III

II

I

III

II

S

IV

I

I

IV

II

III

II

I

II

III

V

I

II

IV

III

IV

I

I

II

II

IV

I

III

II

II

IV

I

I

II

III

IV

I

II

IV

III

Highest
Impact
S

S
S

S

Economics/
Safety
Economics/
Safety
Economics/
Technical
knowledge
Economics/
Safety/Technica
l knowledge
Economics
Economics/
Public
perception
Economics/
Technical
knowledge

S

S

Economics/
Safety

Highest
mitigatin
g factor

Technica
l
knowledg
e
Highest
mitigatin
g factor

Public
perceptio
n
Safety

S

Stakehol
der

240

800

Environ
ment

3

800

User/Communit
y
User/Communit
y

720

Economi
cs

2

Pit latrine
enclosure
Pit latrine
enclosure

1

RPN

Name

Unique
identifier

Table 4.28: Highest Tolerable Risk (MTR) for Each Aspect

Addition of a pour-flush pan with
water seal
Addition of a pour-flush pan with
water seal
Addition of a pour-flush pan with
water seal
Sound structural design using
knowledgeable builders with a
track record
Addition of a pour-flush pan with
water seal
Sound structural design using
knowledgeable builders with a
track record
Training of users to bring their
water or adding water facilities to
the latrine e.g. tap with clean
water
Sound structural design using
knowledgeable builders with a
track record
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14

15

Treatment

Treatment

Treatment

User/Communit
y

720

Sanitation
Engineer /
Technician/
Service provider

720

Sanitation
Engineer /
Technician/
Service provider

900

Local
government

720

Sanitation
Engineer /
Technician/
Service provider

IV

III

V

III

IV

I

I

IV

III

V

IV

III

V

III

IV

II

V

IV

I

V

IV

V

IV

Highest
mitigating
factor

V

Highest
mitigating
factor

Highest
Impact

Stakeholder

RPN
900

Technical
knowledge

`13

Transport

User/Communit
y

Safety

12

Pit

560

User/Communit
y

Public
perception

11

Pit

900

Environment

10

Pit

Economics

9

Name

Unique
identifier

Table 4.28: (Continued)

Economics/ Safety

Sound structural design using
knowledgeable builders with
a track record

Economics/ Safety

Good maintenance and
emptying strategy

Economics/ Safety

Sound structural design using
knowledgeable builders with
a track record

II

Economics/ Safety

Good maintenance and
emptying strategy

IV

IV

Economics/Environm
ent Safety/Technical
knowledge

Sound structural design using
knowledgeable builders with
a track record

I

V

II

Good maintenance and
emptying strategy

I

IV

IV

Economics/Environm
ent/Safety/Technical
knowledge
Economics/Environm
ent/Safety/Technical
knowledge

S

S

S
V
S
V

S

S

Good treatment process
retained as part of the
sanitation supply chain

S
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19

Land spreading

720

Highest
mitigating
factor

Highest
mitigating
factor

IV

I

IV

III

Economics/Environ
ment/Safety

Good treatment process
retained as part of the
sanitation supply chain

IV

I

IV

IV

Economics/Environ
ment/Safety/Technic
al knowledge

Good treatment process
retained as part of the
sanitation supply chain

III

I

I

II

III

Economics
/Technical
knowledge

Good treatment process
retained as part of the
sanitation supply chain

V

III

I

IV

IV

Economics /Safety/
Technical knowledge

Good treatment process
retained as part of the
sanitation supply chain

Economics

Highest
Impact

Stakeholder

RPN
720

Technical
knowledge

Treatment

720

Sanitation
Engineer /
Technician/
Service
provider
Sanitation
Engineer /
Technician/
Service
provider
Sanitation
Engineer /
Technician/
Service
provider

Safety

18

Treatment

720

Public
perception

17

Treatment

Sanitation
Engineer /
Technician/
Service
provider

Environment

16

Name

Unique
identifier

Table 4.28: (Continued)

V

S
V

S

S

S
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The mitigating factors to fix some of the aspects identified in the use of VIP pit latrines
so that they are better suited to the location is highlighted in the tables preceding is the Risk
Reduction Factor. Though, this is not to imply that VIP latrines are not sufficiently improved.
Only to say that when looked at in terms of “appropriate technology” (Murphy, McBean and
Farahbakhsh 2009), there are several improvement factors that may benefit pit latrines, by
applying the risk assessment methodology to the pit latrine. Improvements such as pour-flush
with a short sewer over the solid ground to a pit adjacent to the pit could be used to mitigate
several of the identified risks. The pit hole can be changed to have a cover for the hole instead of
just the hole, and the short pipe could have a u-bend to create a water seal, to reduce odors and
fly infestations. Additionally, in areas with a high water table, there may be a benefit in situating
the storage above ground instead of below ground, but this introduces new risks such as aboveground structural collapse and the danger of people falling from a height. Thus, highlighting the
fact that additional improvements can introduce new risk and/or create cost increases which
means that economics becomes the determining factor for RAMS improvements.
Economics/Environment/Safety/Technical knowledge plays an important part in the treatment
stages of the sanitation supply chain for improved pit latrines, as shown in the QRM
assessments, The ability to re-assess the risks after the mitigations have been applied provides
indications of the benefits of assessing the pit latrine for RAMS shown as the risk reduction
factor RRF
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Table 4.29: Front-end VIP Latrine Table of Highest Mitigating Factor

Unique identifier

Pit latrine enclosure

2

Pit latrine enclosure

Pit latrine enclosure

5

Pit latrine enclosure

7

8

Risk reduction Action

Economics/ Safety

III/III

Economics/ Safety

IV/IV

Appropriate cleaning at regular intervals
paid for by the community / have a sound
method of community contribution to
maintenance costs
The use of a pan system instead of a hole
means no need for a lid

Economics/ Technical
knowledge

III/III

Economics/
Safety/Technical
knowledge

V/IV

Economics

IV

Economics/ Public
perception

IV/III

Economics/ Technical
knowledge

IV/III

Economics/ Safety

IV/IV

Pit latrine enclosure

4

6

Risk score

Risk

1

3

Highest mitigating factor

Pit latrine enclosure

Pit latrine enclosure

Pit

Risk
Reduction
Factor
E:10-100
S:10-100

E:10-100
S:10-100

Use of pan system with water seal instead
of a hole means no malodorous smell
escape
Sound structural design using
knowledgeable builders with a track record
/ have a sound method of community
contribution to maintenance costs/ have
local knowledge of the potential risk of
latrine failure and how to mitigate
Use of pan means no lid

E:10-100
TK:1-10

Sound structural design using
knowledgeable builders with a track
record, to build an enclosure with privacy
as part of design e.g. internal locks and
ways to sound alarm calls for people in
danger
Training of users to bring their water or
adding water facilities to the latrine e.g. tap
with clean water
Location of tap close to the pit, so that
municipal water is available. If there are no
options for taps, a system of water storage
for ablution use on location would suffice.

E:10-100
PP:10-100

E:10-100
S:10-100
TK:1-10

10-100

E:10-100
TK:1-10
E:1-10
S:10-100
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Table 4.30: Middle VIP Latrine Table of Highest Mitigating Factor

Unique identifier

9

10

11

12

Highest mitigating factor

Risk score

Risk reduction Action

Risk reduction
Factor

Economics/ Safety

V/V

Sound structural design using
knowledgeable builders with a track record
and use of liners to prevent groundwater
leaks / have a sound method of community
contribution to maintenance costs

E:10-100
S:10-100

Economics/ Safety

IV/IV

Employ good maintenance and emptying
strategy

E:10-100
S:10-100

Economics/ Safety

V/V

E:1-10
S:10-100

Economics/ Safety

V/V

Sound structural design using
knowledgeable builders with a track record
and use of liners to prevent groundwater
leaks / have a sound method of community
contribution to maintenance costs
Employ good maintenance and emptying
strategy/Audit the service chain to ensure
that the service providers are using the
appropriate disposal method. Be willing to
pay for good disposal.

Risk

Pit

Pit

Pit

Transport

E:1-10
S:10-100

Table 4.31: Back-End VIP Latrine Table of Highest Mitigating Factor

Unique identifier

13

Highest mitigating factor

Risk score

Risk reduction Action

Economics/Environment/Saf
ety/Technical knowledge

V/IV/IV/IV

Providers are using the
appropriate disposal
method. Be willing to pay
for good disposal.

Risk

Treatment

Risk
reduction
Factor
E:1-10
En:10-100
S:10-100
TK:10-100
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14

15

16

17

18

19

Risk
reduction
Factor

Risk
reduction
Action

Risk score

Highest
mitigating
factor

Risk

Unique
identifier

Table 4.31: (Continued)

Economics/Environment/
Safety/Technical
knowledge

V/IV/V/II

Providers are using the appropriate
disposal method. Be willing to pay
for good disposal.

E:100-1000
S:1-10

Economics/Environment/
Safety/Technical
knowledge

V/IV/IV/IV

Good treatment process retained as
part of the sanitation supply chain

E:1-10
En:10-100
S:10-100
TK:10-100

Economics/Environment/
Safety

V/IV/IV

Good treatment process retained as
part of the sanitation supply chain

Economics/Environment/
Safety/Technical
knowledge

V/IV/IV/IV

Good treatment process retained as
part of the sanitation supply chain

E:1-10
En:10-100
S:10-100
E:1-10
En:1-10
S:10-100
TK:1-10

Economics /Technical
knowledge

III/III

Economics
/Safety/Technical
knowledge

V/IV/IV

Develop a good supply chain and
local knowledge for selling the
compost created.
Good treatment process retained as
part of the sanitation supply chain

Treatment

Treatment

Treatment

Treatment

Treatment

Land spreading

E:1-10
TK:1-10
E:1-10
S:1-10
TK:1-10
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The RAMS assessment for the pit latrine follows below.
4.1.2.1 VIP Latrine Reliability Assessment
Assuming the volume of each pit is 3.5m3 serving a community of 10 going up to 100.
Fill rate is calculated using (Mihelcic, et al., 2009): Accumulation rate x design life x number of
users.
Users use highly biodegradable anal cleansing materials, with median water infiltration
(0.04 – 0.06m3/capita per year). Failure = Summation of Fill volume/year > Total ullage
available. The tables below show the comparison between the constant fill rate as a factor of
increasing users and years. The results show how many pits are required for each community
size and the mean time before failure for the chosen criteria i.e. when the pit will need to be
capped or emptied. It shows that the reliability of a single pit with an emptying average of every
5years is limited to a maximum of 20 people and that if a community of 100 is to be served, at
the same emptying rate, ten of the 3.5m3 pits will be required to maintain reliability (not full
before design life). For more than 100 people the costs are high and similar to that of reasonably
priced advanced sanitation systems, as long as they are assumed to have the same levels of
hygiene provision. For example, the table shows that at a user rate of 40 people, with one single
pit the mean time before failure is 1-year, because the pit is at 2.4m3 of the 3.5m3 available, it
can’t go on for 2years because at that point the pit would be over capacity at 4.8m3, which is
greater than the 3.5m3 available. The same criteria with two pits with a new capacity of 2 x 3.5m3
is a fill time of 2-years (i.e.m3 4.2 > 7.0m3) and with 3 pits with capacity 3 x 3.5m3 the MTBF
(fill time) is 4-years (12m3 > 10.5m3). These examples are shown in the bold black and red
numbers in the table below for illustration.
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Table 4.32: VIP Pit Latrine Design Life Versus Accumulation Rate Chart
Number of Latrines
at 3.5m3 capacity
each

m3/person/year
People
Year

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

1

0.6

1.2

1.8

2.4

3

3.6

4.2

4.8

5.4

6

2

1.2

2.4

3.6

4.8

6

7.2

8.4

9.6

10.8

12

3

1.8

3.6

5.4

7.2

9

10.8

12.6

14.4

16.2

18

4

2.4

4.8

7.2

9.6

12

14.4

16.8

19.2

21.6

24

5

3

6

9

12

15

18

21

24

27

30

6

3.6

7.2

10.8

14.4

18

21.6

25.2

28.8

32.4

36

7

4.2

8.4

12.6

16.8

21

25.2

29.4

33.6

37.8

42

8

4.8

9.6

14.4

19.2

24

28.8

33.6

38.4

43.2

48

9

5.4

10.8

16.2

21.6

27

32.4

37.8

43.2

48.6

54

10

6

12

18

24

30

36

42

48

54

60

Year

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

1

0.6

1.2

1.8

2.4

3

3.6

4.2

4.8

5.4

6

2

1.2

2.4

3.6

4.8

6

7.2

8.4

9.6

10.8

12

3

1.8

3.6

5.4

7.2

9

10.8

12.6

14.4

16.2

18

4

2.4

4.8

7.2

9.6

12

14.4

16.8

19.2

21.6

24

5

3

6

9

12

15

18

21

24

27

30

6

3.6

7.2

10.8

14.4

18

21.6

25.2

28.8

32.4

36

7

4.2

8.4

12.6

16.8

21

25.2

29.4

33.6

37.8

42

8

4.8

9.6

14.4

19.2

24

28.8

33.6

38.4

43.2

48

9

5.4

10.8

16.2

21.6

27

32.4

37.8

43.2

48.6

54

10

6

12

18

24

30

36

42

48

54

60

1

People

2
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Table 4.32: (Continued)
Number of Latrines at 3.5m3 capacity each

m3/person/year
People
Year

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

1

0.6

1.2

1.8

2.4

3

3.6

4.2

4.8

5.4

6

2

1.2

2.4

3.6

4.8

6

7.2

8.4

9.6

10.8

12

3

1.8

3.6

5.4

7.2

9

10.8

12.6

14.4

16.2

18

4

2.4

4.8

7.2

9.6

12

14.4

16.8

19.2

21.6

24

5

3

6

9

12

15

18

21

24

27

30

6

3.6

7.2

10.8

14.4

18

21.6

25.2

28.8

32.4

36

7

4.2

8.4

12.6

16.8

21

25.2

29.4

33.6

37.8

42

8

4.8

9.6

14.4

19.2

24

28.8

33.6

38.4

43.2

48

9

5.4

10.8

16.2

21.6

27

32.4

37.8

43.2

48.6

54

10

6

12

18

24

30

36

42

48

54

60

Year

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

1

0.6

1.2

1.8

2.4

3

3.6

4.2

4.8

5.4

6

2

1.2

2.4

3.6

4.8

6

7.2

8.4

9.6

10.8

12

3

1.8

3.6

5.4

7.2

9

10.8

12.6

14.4

16.2

18

4

2.4

4.8

7.2

9.6

12

14.4

16.8

19.2

21.6

24

5

3

6

9

12

15

18

21

24

27

30

6

3.6

7.2

10.8

14.4

18

21.6

25.2

28.8

32.4

36

7

4.2

8.4

12.6

16.8

21

25.2

29.4

33.6

37.8

42

8

4.8

9.6

14.4

19.2

24

28.8

33.6

38.4

43.2

48

9

5.4

10.8

16.2

21.6

27

32.4

37.8

43.2

48.6

54

10

6

12

18

24

30

36

42

48

54

60

Year

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

1

0.6

1.2

1.8

2.4

3

3.6

4.2

4.8

5.4

6

3

People

4

People
5

202

Table 4.32: (Continued)
3

Number of Latrines at 3.5m
capacity each

m3/person/year
People

5

Year

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

2

1.2

2.4

3.6

4.8

6

7.2

8.4

9.6

10.8

12

3

1.8

3.6

5.4

7.2

9

10.8

12.6

14.4

16.2

18

4

2.4

4.8

7.2

9.6

12

14.4

16.8

19.2

21.6

24

5

3

6

9

12

15

18

21

24

27

30

6

3.6

7.2

10.8

14.4

18

21.6

25.2

28.8

32.4

36

7

4.2

8.4

12.6

16.8

21

25.2

29.4

33.6

37.8

42

8

4.8

9.6

14.4

19.2

24

28.8

33.6

38.4

43.2

48

9

5.4

10.8

16.2

21.6

27

32.4

37.8

43.2

48.6

54

10

6

12

18

24

30

36

42

48

54

60

Year

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

1

0.6

1.2

1.8

2.4

3

3.6

4.2

4.8

5.4

6

2

1.2

2.4

3.6

4.8

6

7.2

8.4

9.6

10.8

12

3

1.8

3.6

5.4

7.2

9

10.8

12.6

14.4

16.2

18

4

2.4

4.8

7.2

9.6

12

14.4

16.8

19.2

21.6

24

5

3

6

9

12

15

18

21

24

27

30

6

3.6

7.2

10.8

14.4

18

21.6

25.2

28.8

32.4

36

7

4.2

8.4

12.6

16.8

21

25.2

29.4

33.6

37.8

42

8

4.8

9.6

14.4

19.2

24

28.8

33.6

38.4

43.2

48

9

5.4

10.8

16.2

21.6

27

32.4

37.8

43.2

48.6

54

10

6

12

18

24

30

36

42

48

54

60

Year

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

1

0.6

1.2

1.8

2.4

3

3.6

4.2

4.8

5.4

6

2

1.2

2.4

3.6

4.8

6

7.2

8.4

9.6

10.8

12

3

1.8

3.6

5.4

7.2

9

10.8

12.6

14.4

16.2

18

4

2.4

4.8

7.2

9.6

12

14.4

16.8

19.2

21.6

24

5

3

6

9

12

15

18

21

24

27

30

6

3.6

7.2

10.8

14.4

18

21.6

25.2

28.8

32.4

36

People

6

People

7
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Table 4.32: (Continued)
Number of Latrines at 3.5m3
capacity each

7

m3/person/year
7

4.2

8.4

12.6

16.8

21

25.2

29.4

33.6

37.8

42

8

4.8

9.6

14.4

19.2

24

28.8

33.6

38.4

43.2

48

9

5.4

10.8

16.2

21.6

27

32.4

37.8

43.2

48.6

54

10

6

12

18

24

30

36

42

48

54

60

Year

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

1

0.6

1.2

1.8

2.4

3

3.6

4.2

4.8

5.4

6

2

1.2

2.4

3.6

4.8

6

7.2

8.4

9.6

10.8

12

3

1.8

3.6

5.4

7.2

9

10.8

12.6

14.4

16.2

18

4

2.4

4.8

7.2

9.6

12

14.4

16.8

19.2

21.6

24

5

3

6

9

12

15

18

21

24

27

30

6

3.6

7.2

10.8

14.4

18

21.6

25.2

28.8

32.4

36

7

4.2

8.4

12.6

16.8

21

25.2

29.4

33.6

37.8

42

8

4.8

9.6

14.4

19.2

24

28.8

33.6

38.4

43.2

48

9

5.4

10.8

16.2

21.6

27

32.4

37.8

43.2

48.6

54

10

6

12

18

24

30

36

42

48

54

60

Year

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

1

0.6

1.2

1.8

2.4

3

3.6

4.2

4.8

5.4

6

2

1.2

2.4

3.6

4.8

6

7.2

8.4

9.6

10.8

12

3

1.8

3.6

5.4

7.2

9

10.8

12.6

14.4

16.2

18

4

2.4

4.8

7.2

9.6

12

14.4

16.8

19.2

21.6

24

5

3

6

9

12

15

18

21

24

27

30

6

3.6

7.2

10.8

14.4

18

21.6

25.2

28.8

32.4

36

7

4.2

8.4

12.6

16.8

21

25.2

29.4

33.6

37.8

42

8

4.8

9.6

14.4

19.2

24

28.8

33.6

38.4

43.2

48

9

5.4

10.8

16.2

21.6

27

32.4

37.8

43.2

48.6

54

10

6

12

18

24

30

36

42

48

54

60

People

8

People

9
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Table 4.32: (Continued)
People

10

Year

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

1

0.6

1.2

1.8

2.4

3

3.6

4.2

4.8

5.4

6

2

1.2

2.4

3.6

4.8

6

7.2

8.4

9.6

10.8

12

3

1.8

3.6

5.4

7.2

9

10.8

12.6

14.4

16.2

18

4

2.4

4.8

7.2

9.6

12

14.4

16.8

19.2

21.6

24

5

3

6

9

12

15

18

21

24

27

30

6

3.6

7.2

10.8

14.4

18

21.6

25.2

28.8

32.4

36

7

4.2

8.4

12.6

16.8

21

25.2

29.4

33.6

37.8

42

8

4.8

9.6

14.4

19.2

24

28.8

33.6

38.4

43.2

48

9

5.4

10.8

16.2

21.6

27

32.4

37.8

43.2

48.6

54

All in all, the calculations show that the numbers of desludging required for the numbers
of people assessed and required to maintain a PFD of 0, will be high. So, the high numbers of
pits are unlikely to be built and we are left with needing many desludging activities, which then
creates very expensive desludging activities or fecal matter unsafely disposed of and impacting
the community with diarrheal diseases. The costs and maintainability aspect makes such a
scenario impractical
To estimate the economic cost of the number of pit latrines required, WASHcost numbers
for pricing are used. According to WASHcost (WASH 2012), the construction cost of a pourflush pit latrine system is between USD 13 - USD 51 per person, so the cost of meeting the same
design timeframe of the pit latrine of 10 years is either the cost per person x number of persons
for 18 pits at 3.5m3 (which is what is needed to not have to empty for 10 years for 100 people) or
the cost of emptying a 10 pit system (for example) every 5 years. Assuming 18 pits, because
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extrapolating the calculations above show that 18 x 3.5m3 pits are what would be required to
achieve a once in ten-year empty rate:
USD $13 per person per pit x100 person x 18 pits =USD $23,400
to
USD $51 per person per pit x100 persons x 18 pits =USD $91,800
Thus, the approximate cost of construction is USD 23,400 - USD 91,800.
Alternatively, if the plan is to have 10 pits and empty every five years, assuming that he
emptying cost of the individual pits is USD 1000 per pit, then for 10 pits over the 10 years, the
cost of construction plus emptying is as follows:
USD $13 per person per pit x100 person x 10 pits =USD $13,000
to
USD $51 per person per pit x100 persons x 10pits =USD $51,000
Emptying costs can therefore be calculated as follows:
10years/5years x USD $1000 x 10pits = USD $20,000
Thus, the approximate cost of construction is USD 33,000 - USD 71,000
Thus, a cost-benefit analysis can be done between having a 10-pit system with 5-yearly
emptying or an 18-pit system with 10yearly emptying.
Table 4.33: Different VIP Latrine Maintenance Strategies for 100 People
Low end cost
High end cost

Emptying cost
10 pit system plus 2 empties 18 pits system 1 empty /abandon
USD $33,000
USD $23,400
USD $71,000
USD $91,800

The above also highlights the importance of the highest risk factor of the risk assessment
for the VIP latrine which was economics, meaning the use of a pour-flush system with a VIP
latrine for a large number of users creates a more expensive sanitation system than a standard
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latrine with costs rivalling that of advanced systems, but it reduces and eliminates a lot of the
risks highlighted in the risk assessment related to safety, falling in, fly infestation and odor
control. Issues with groundwater contamination risks remain high, but with good design and
building practices, these are also partly mitigated somewhat. Otherwise, above-ground storage
can be considered, though that introduces the risk of its own, such as fall from height.
Alternatively, at similar costs for the strategies for 10pits or 18pits, advanced decentralized nonsewered sanitation systems can be considered, which provide more of the safety protections,
treatment, and groundwater protection, that pit latrines do not. However, they may not be the
best option for specific scenarios, so decisions need to be made based on the specific location,
culture, environment, and other factors that influence stakeholder definitions of failure, which
may not be limited to the cost of infrastructure alone.
4.1.2.2 VIP Latrine Availability Assessment
Overall availability can be expressed mathematically as online time /Total time interval
i.e. frequency (time) function.
Uptime = O/T
The uptime of the imaginary pit latrine system, if it is functional and accessible is always
100% due to the simple nature of the sanitation, assuming the front-end is always accessible. As
there will always be several pits in operation. This means that even if there is an issue with
access to some of the user interfaces, there is a high probability that there are going to be several
alternative front-ends available for use.
4.1.2.3 VIP Latrine Maintainability Assessment
As with availability, the maintainability of a pit latrine is more simplistic than that of an
advanced decentralized system. However, it is good practice for the maintenance of the pit
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latrine to be factored into the recurring cost of the sanitation measure. Wash COST info sheet 2
(WASH 2012) indicates that a regular maintenance cost of USD 0.5 to USD 6 per year should be
paid towards the maintenance of a pit latrine with a pour-flush system, rising to about USD 11.5
per year. This cost of maintenance is much less than the associated maintenance costs required
for advanced systems because the maintenance is mainly going to be the cost of cleaning, and
not the cost of parts and spares needed for the maintenance of more advanced sanitation systems.
Additionally, the cost of maintenance for the advanced system will be variable and
dependent on the type of maintenance, the component, and whether or not high levels of
technical expertise is required for repair, this is not the case for the pit latrine, and therefore it is
fair to assume lower maintenance costs overall. However, the regular cleaning maintenance
requirement will be higher in the pit latrine, because of the need to keep pathogenic material
contained and separated from humans and the food chain, is much higher for the latrine system
when compared to an advanced sanitation system, because there is no treatment step. Therefore,
the number of maintenance attendances required to ensure a lifetime of fecal separation for a
well-maintained pit latrine will be higher than the number of individual maintenance
requirements of an advanced system that treats waste destroys pathogenic material on-site if
cleaning is factored in as maintenance.
4.1.2.4 VIP Latrine Safety Assessment
There is no LRV requirement associated with the pit latrine, as it is not possible to
remove pathogenic material in the pit. However, if the waste is transferred to a treatment site
where the waste is converted to composting material or treated in a wastewater treatment system
of some sort, there will be a log removal value associated with the destruction of pathogenic
material through that process. This applies if the full sanitation value chain is included in the
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scope of the sanitation system. Helminth eggs for example can be reduced after treatment with
the highest reduction in helminth eggs reported in treatment using biological systems such as
waste stabilization ponds and constructed wetlands between LRV of 1-3 (Amoah, et al., 2018).
Thus, the safety assessment for the RAMS framework should look at the complete sanitation
chain if it is included within the scope. For the imaginary pit latrine of this assessment, a Log
removal value of 0 is assumed for this scenario as details of the treatment process is not specified
in the assumptions. For septic tanks, an LRV of 1 is assumed (Tilley, et al., 2018) and for
composting, it varies depending on the process used for composting. As expected, thermally
processed compost will have more pathogenic reduction than standard composting where the
material is simply mixed and allowed to bio-stabilise naturally. For composting, the risk of
helminth transmission remains high for land spreading (Amoah, et al., 2018, Chaoua, et al.,
2018, Stevens, et al., 2017).
The above analysis is assuming that there are regular cleaning and maintenance of the
hypothetical pit latrine. This assumption is not generally supported by literature and literary
sources suggest that pit latrines are generally neglected. However, the assumption was made to
enable the sanitation types to be compared based on the sanitation types, rather than whether low
or high levels of sanitation management are employed.
The table below shows that there was an average reduction in FMEA RPN values for the
pit latrine of 73%. Severity, Occurrence, and detection are represented as S, O, D, in the tables.
The chart gives a pictorial representation of the table, which shows the improvement in RPN
from implementing the recommended improvement measures, and shows how a RAMS
framework process can be used to create better sanitation systems. It looks at the overall process
in terms of assumed stakeholder definitions of failure and/or success.
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The use of RPN allows some of the aspects of risk analysis related to sanitation
improvement to be applied at the early stages of risk assessment. This is done by the inherent
assessment of likelihood of occurrence of risk, probability of detection of hazards and severity of
impacts from the consequences of risks materializing. It allows the initial comparisons to be
made on whether improvement are worthwhile, and whether investments or efforts to improve
traditional decentralized sanitation systems are worth it. This is important, mainly because in
some contexts, sanitation systems such as pit latrines where they are properly built and well
maintained are a better option than no sanitation at all. In these scenarios, the use of traditional
sanitation systems such as pit latrines will provide separation between faecal material and human
contact, and goes a long way to reduce the safety risks associated with poor sanitation from
unrestricted open defection.
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Figure 4.7: RPN of VIP Latrine Before and After RAMS Mitigations
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Table 4.34: Front-end Pit Latrine FMEA Post Improvement Measures
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3

10
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Table 4.34: (Continued)
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Table 4.35: Middle Pit Latrine FMEA Post Improvement Measures
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Table 4.35: (Continued)
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Table 4.36: Back-End Pit Latrine FMEA Post Improvement Measures
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Table 4.36: (Continued)
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7

8
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Figure 4.8 Improved Pit Latrine Design for Mitigation
4.2 Case Study 2 - RAMS Assessment of a MURT
The NEWgenerator is a containerized solar-powered anaerobic membrane bioreactorbased system for wastewater treatment. It was developed at the University of South Florida
through the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation’s Reinvented the Toilet Challenge. Flow data
gathered from the NEWgenerator’s field trial in Durban, South Africa, is used to focus
assessment on toilet water flows, as a measure to determine if RAMS can be assessed by using
assumed data about the system.
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The NEWgenerator is a backend decentralized sanitation treatment process that is
designed to connect to sources of wastewater, such as toilets, urinals, handwashing stations,
showers, and laundry. The flow is equalized through screening and buffering to get consistent
throughput and is then treated in an anaerobic membrane reactor. After the reactor the process
flow is passed through an ultra-filtration module, where solid biomass is removed from the
process, the nutrient is captured from the process stream and the final flow is disinfected using
Electrochlorinator, which is achieved by sodium chloride salt electrolysis. The final clean
effluent can either be discharged to surface waters or recycled.

Figure 4.9: Simplified Process Flow Diagram for the NEWgenerator
In the USA water reuse for wastewater treatment systems with flows between 400 – 1500
gallons per day, whether in residential and /or commercial which are catered for by the
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NSF/ANSI 350. The NSF/ANSI 350 standard applies to residential uses which imply surface reuse and close human interactions and NSF/ANSI 350-1 which covers greywater use for nonresidential purposes and subsurface discharge only. The standards indicate the testing
requirement for both types of uses, where the NSF is more restrictive and indicates that testing
must be done continuously for 26 weeks and regular sampling at no more than 3-day intervals to
establish the reliability and safety of recycled wastewater for surface or subsurface future usage.
The reuse options for water generated from advanced decentralized non-sewered sanitation
systems should be adapted to meet either the NSF 350 or the NSF 350-1 standard depending on
the future usage, as part of meeting the minimum RAMS requirements for water re-use
opportunities. The Nutrient Capture system of the NEWgenerator is designed to remove excess
Nitrogen from the process effluent and to create a product stream which is high in nutrient and
can be used for irrigation and plant feed at the same time. The process of nitrogen removal for
advanced non-sewered sanitation systems should meet the requirements in the effluent for
nitrogen reduction. The NSF/ANSI 245 applies to 400- 1500 gallon per day systems and requires
a minimum 50% reduction in Nitrogen. The standard also prescribes that to meet NSF/ANSI
245, then a system must as a minimum already meet the NSF/ANSI 40 standard for cBOD5 and
TSS reduction, both standards also call for a pH range of 6 -9 which is line with the ISO 30500
and ISO 31800 standards. The NSF/ANSI 350 calls for pH ranges of 6.5 – 8.5 in contrast. The
NSF 350 standards also call for stricter chemical oxygen demand concentrations, total suspended
solids concentration, turbidity, E. Coli, residual disinfection component concentrations such as
residual chlorine, color, odor, oily film, and foaming, which should be the standard for water
reuse in the United States and can form the basis of success in other regions, as a minimum the
ISO 30500 requirements should be adhered to for sanitation provision in developing countries.
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Table 4.37: Comparison of Requirements of ISO 30500 and NSF 350 Standard

COD (mg/l)
TSS (mg/l)
Total Nitrogen
Reduction (%)
Total Phosphorus (%)
pH
Turbidity (NTU)
Color
Noise
Odor % (Simulant and
Normal)
Storage Vessel
disinfection (mg/l)
Oil and foam

ISO 30500 Standard
Class A
Class B
(Unrestricted Urban)
(Surface
Discharge)
< 50
< 150
< 10
< 30
70
80
6-9
Not Prescribed
Not Prescribed
< 70 dBA
2 and 10

NSF 350
Class R
Residential

Class C
Commercial

10
10

10
10
50
Not Applicable
6.5 – 8.5

5
2
Measured and reported
Not Applicable
Not offensive
> 0.5 - < 2.5

Not Prescribed

Not detectable

Failure assumptions are as follows:


Loss of system before full design life of 10years – the risk of the system not meeting
design life specifications, is classed as exceptionally low. Thus a lifespan of 10-years
(Gates Foundation, 2018), the minimum specified by ISO 30500 is used.



Loss of containment leading to spread of diarrheal disease – the probability of this
occurrence is considered very low due to the containerized nature of the
NEWgenerator



Pipe failure or tank failure – the probability of pipe failure has been determined to be
in line with standard plastic PVC pipe failures in non-hazardous service, therefore
the MTBF is assumed to be 1 in 20 years. Due to the nature of use in wastewater
treatment, with no hazardous chemicals, the assumption seems valid. However, the
pipes may suffer from deterioration due to ultraviolet light exposure from the sun,
this is factored into the PFD quoted.
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Electrochlorinator failure – the Electrochlorinator is assumed to have similar failure
rates to standard Electrochlorinators employed in swimming pool chlorination.
However, service is more arduous in a sanitation scenario. So, it is assumed to fail
twice per year with a replacement and downtime scenario of 4.5 days per failure.
Additionally, it is assumed to have a weekly salt refill cycle which takes an hour per
refill. It is assumed that during this time, the Electrochlorinator is unable to provide
disinfection and as such pathogenic breakthrough into the effluent is possible.
Therefore, assumptions for pathogens in the effluent are based on this period of
Electrochlorinator maintenance due to salt refill requirements. Maintenance time
reduction calculations are not calculated for this activity, as it is assumed that the
time required to fill the system manually, is at the optimum. It is also assumed that
automation of salt fill will introduce more complexity to the entire system, which
will impact reliability and maintenance with the introduction of new components,
and so is not a desirable outcome for RAMS, and therefore is not considered as an
improvement or mitigation.



UF membrane failure – the standard membrane types used in the NEWgenerator
have a lifespan of 10 years. The NEWgenerator has an online backwash program
which cleans the membrane in service, to reduce fouling and extend online time. The
membrane is assumed to be chemically cleaned annually with a maintenance time of
24hours. Maintenance of the backwash pumps is assumed to occur simultaneously.



Loss of water recycling – the NEWgenerator is designed to produce recycled water
on an intermittent basis and store in a water storage tank for future usage, therefore
loss of water recycling is only valid if there is a corresponding loss of water storage
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tank. The tank is an HPDE tank and has an MTBF of 1 in 10 years. Therefore, as
long as the system is operational and producing water, the availability of recycled
water is assumed to be 100%. This leaves scenarios where demand for water
surpasses supply, as the main points of investigation for reliability. Thus, the
reliability test will be a water supply and demand test case scenario.


Lack of privacy (women and the disabled (IEW 2012) – an important part of
sanitation is the provision of privacy. This is particularly important culturally in
many places around the world, therefore failure to provide privacy for people using
sanitation facilities is classed as a failure of the sanitation technology. The
NEWgenerator is designed to connect with front ends which are enclosed and offer
privacy to front-end users.



Improper use of the NEWgenerator, such as the use of non-biodegradable material
(e.g.) newspapers for anal cleaning.

The system boundary is as follows:

Figure 4.10: NEWgenerator Sanitation System Flow
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where the front-end is as follows:
•

Front-end/User interface: Flush Toilets

•

Dx – Municipal water / Water top-up line up Plastic: PTFE pipe containing potable
water

•

D2 – Fresh / Treated water storage: Plastic tank containing clean water

•

D3 – Water conveyance to Front-end: Plastic PTFE pipe containing clean water

the middle is as follows:
•

B1 - Raw untreated water conveyance: Plastic PTFE pipe containing blackwater

•

B2 - Equalization and pre-treatment storage: Plastic tank containing clean blackwater

•

B3 / Bx - Post equalization conveyance (including transfer by trucks): Plastic PTFE
pipe containing blackwater

the backend is shown as follows:
•

C - Treatment and entropy reduction: Plastic reactors and plastic pipes; containing
blackwater, biosolids, biogas, solids, disinfectant, and treated water

•

D1- Treated water recycle: Plastic PTFE pipe containing treated water

•

Cx - Safe discharge (Sewer, Surface water, groundwater, etc.): Plastic PTFE pipe
containing treated water

It is important to note that the middle can be very small, or non-existent in decentralized nonsewered sanitation systems. In which case, the conveyance could be achieved through a
mechanical movement method, such as the use of an Archimedes screw in the Cranfield
nanomembrane toilet, which conveys waste from the bowl (front-end) to the treatment section
(back-end) within the advanced sanitation system.
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6/10/2018 23:30
11/10/2018 23:30
16/10/2018 23:30
21/10/2018 23:30
26/10/2018 23:30
31/10/2018 23:30
5/11/2018 23:30
10/11/2018 23:30
15/11/2018 23:30
20/11/2018 23:30
25/11/2018 23:30
30/11/2018 23:30
5/12/2018 23:30
10/12/2018 23:00
15/12/2018 23:30
20/1/2019 23:55
25/1/2019 23:55
30/1/2019 23:30
4/2/2019 23:30
10/2/2019 23:30
15/2/2019 23:30
20/2/2019 23:30
25/2/2019 23:30

Figure 4.11 - NEWgenerator Front-end, Middle, and Back-End.

350

300

250

200

150
Sum of Municipal Water

Sum of Toilets

100
Sum of Handwashing

50
Sum of Showers

0
Sum of Laundry

Figure 4.12: Flow Distribution for NEWgenerator flows from Field Data
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4.2.1 NEWgenerator Risk ranking Assessment and Data Analysis
Data gathered in the chart above shows that toilet flush flow is the predominant flow for
water usage as it is the closest matching to the municipal water demand for the NEWgenerator.
Municipal water is the back-up flow for the NEWgenerator water demand and is, therefore, a
good indicator of the offline period for the NEWgenerator when failure of the system is assessed
from an open-loop MURT perspective. The assessment will not look at the handwashing flows,
the shower flow, or the laundry flow for offline indication. Failure from the front end-user
perspective is mostly mitigated by the presence of the equalization tank between the front end
and the NEWgenerator, which means that there is buffer capacity that prevents treatment issues
from manifesting at the front end immediately after the incident.
The full data for the NEWgenerator risk rationalization assessments are not included in
this report due to the volume of data, and numbers of rows in the tables (149 rows of data),
however in the appendix modified tables showing the classifications of the data are included as
Table B2 and Table B3. The tables show the types of initiating events and whether failures are
initiated by people, material, or equipment. The failure allocations in the table are based on
whether failures are function or service failures, and the RAMS impact ranking from 1 – 4 for all
failures on the list are identified, as well as all the stakeholder impacts identifications.
It is of note that the NEWgenerator generates biogas. However, this is inherently
designed to be safe as part of the system with the use of a bladder bag designed to rupture easily
without creating projectiles if high pressure were to occur, additionally the NEWgenerator
enclosure is vented to prevent the accumulation of biogas. These mitigations mean that the
consequence of any explosions events will be highly reduced, in addition to being highly
unlikely meaning that the risk is very low ranking. This means that this is not assessed for further
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mitigation, if however, the system is changed existing mitigations are removed then the biogas
collection system will need to be assessed for new risks. Storage of biogas mitigations include
practices such as underground storage to minimize the risks of gas explosions. There also several
pumps in the system, which can lead to elevated pressures within the treatment system These are
mitigated by high-pressure switches which work to shut down sources of elevated pressure such
as pumps within the system, to protect the treatment system and reduce secondary risks of loss of
containment due to pressurized releases.
The risk ranking process is designed so that each row is a single failure node, with all the
failure definition criteria detailed along a single row across. The ranking also shows the RPN
scores from the FMEA assessment. The tables and figures below show the statistical analysis of
the risk prioritization process, based on the different risk scores, to illustrate the frequencies at
which they occur, the distribution of the risk assessment ranking for the NEWgenerator is shown
in the histogram chart below.
Table 4.38: Table of NEWgenerator Risk Ranking Score Frequencies
Score

Frequency

1

10

1.5

37

3

8

4.5

0

6

19

9

63

18

13

Total

150
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Figure 4.13: Pareto of NEWgenerator Risk Ranking Scoring Frequencies
The histogram shows that 76% of the risks identified had reliability risks ranked highest,
21% were safety rated highest and 3% had availability rated highest. There were no maintenance
risks rated in the highest risks identified, though many maintenance risks scored second-highest,
in cases where reliability scored highest.
3%

0%
21%

76%

Safety

Reliability

Maintenance

Availability

Figure 4.14: NEWgenerator Proportion of Highest Ranked Aspects as R, A, M or S
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Stakeholder assignment which looks at which stakeholder is most impacted by identified
failures showed that in 85% of the cases, the sanitation engineer is impacted, but in the
remaining 15% of cases, the front-end users are affected. This correlates with the fact that the
NEWgenerator is an advanced system with the most important aspects of the system located in
the treatment system itself, so due to the limited interaction of front-end users with the treatment
system itself, it is logical that the sanitation engineer who has the most interaction with the
treatment system, is the stakeholder prevalently impacted overall by failures within the
NEWgenerator. This result will be true of most advanced non-sewered decentralized sanitation
systems as reliability failures are more likely to happen in the middle and back-end, where the
bulk of complex components are likely to be located, and also where the sanitation engineer is
the stakeholder of interest.

15%

85%

User community
Sanitation Engineer / Technician/ Service provider
Figure 4.15: Pie Chart of NEWgenerator proportion of stakeholder assignment
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It was determined that the focus of the failure mode effect analysis (FMEA) will be on
risk impacts which scored higher than 6, in phases 1 and 2. There are 75 such risks, which covers
51% of the 149 risks considered for the system. 67% of the 75 risks identified had safety risks
ranked highest, 28% had maintenance rated at highest and 5% had reliability rated highest, as
shown in the pie chart below. Availability was not rated highest in any scenario, however, ranked
either second highest or 3rd highest in many risk scenarios.

28%

0%

5%

Safety

Reliability

67%

Availability

Maintenance

Figure 4.16: NEWgenerator Proportion of Highest Ranked Aspects > 6
Stakeholder assessment of the top risks (i.e. risks scoring >6) showed that the sanitation
engineer was a stakeholder of interest in 97% of cases, and front-end users in 3%. Meaning that
for the risks which scored >6 in phases 1 and 2, the sanitation engineer is the stakeholder most
affected, indicating an increase from 85% if all risks are considered. Thus, in the top 51% risks,
the sanitation engineer is the stakeholder most impacted in 97% of cases.
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3%

97%
User community

Sanitation Engineer / Technician/ Service provider

Figure 4.17: NEWgenerator Proportion of Stakeholder Assignment > 9
When the FMEA was conducted on the top 75 risks, the data showed that the highest
scores for RPN were 729 of which there was one occurrence. The data for the FMEA is shown in
the appendix as Table B3.
The following table and the histogram chart which follows, show the distribution of the
statistical scores. The table and histogram show RPN scores above 400, which were chosen for
further assessment through the QRM stages. Thus, there were 15 such items (shown in red on the
table below), to consider from the risk rationalization process of the NEWgenerator for further
mitigation. Once these have been examined and mitigated, then the rest of the risks can be
assessed systematically, by prioritizing the entire list of aspects identified, by using a new cut off
point.
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Table 4.39: NEWgenerator RPN Scores and Frequency of Occurrence
RPN

Frequency

20

1

160

1

168

1

189

1

210

2

216

1

224

9

240

1

252

1

256

6

280

6

288

5

315

1

320

9

360

11

378

1

384

2

400

3

432

1

448

2

450

4

480

1

504

1

540

2

576

1

720

2

729

1
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Figure 4.18: Full Chart of all NEWgenerator RPN Scores
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4.2.2 Qualitative Risk Assessment Model (QRM) for NEWgenerator
The RAMS for all 15 top risks are shown below. Of the top 15 risks identified, 10 are
safety-related and 5 have reliability impacts. 5 are front-end user risks as a stakeholder of interest
and the remaining ten have the sanitation engineer as the stakeholder of interest. After a review
of the risks, the risks to the NEWgenerator are mostly improved by better instrumentation and
more advanced flow diversion tactics. Where risks of leak and rupture are identified, having the
CAB as secondary containment mitigates some of the environmental concerns. For loss of
biomass activity, having an option for a diversion tank before the treatment process, which
diverts contaminated flow to a holding tank and prevents the contaminated wastewater from
flowing onwards to the reactor mitigates the impact on biomass. It will protect the reactor from
biomass death. For the failure of the membrane, regular maintenance will reduce the likelihood,
and the disinfection of effluent will remove any breakthroughs. There is no requirement to
change the plastic pipes or tanks if they are used as per specification and regularly checked for
crack development so that issues are caught before they develop into a full rupture. These
measures taken with good design and good reliability strategies will improve the risk priority
numbers of the top risks by 55% on average, as shown in the chart.
Table 4.40: RAMS Aspects Distribution Table
RAMS Category
RPN

Frequency

432

1

448

2

450

4

480

1

504

1

540

2

Safety = 1
Safety = 2
Safety= 3 Reliability = 1
Reliability = 1
Safety = 1
Reliability = 2
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Table 4.40: (Continued)
RAMS Category
RPN

Frequency

576

1

720

2

729

1

Safety = 1
Safety= 1 Reliability = 1
Safety = 1

4.2.2.1 NEWgenerator RAMS Assessment Matrix
The level of consequences for economic, environmental, public perception, safety, and
technical expertise was weighed against the probability of occurrence in the 15 top aspects that
were identified. The criteria used for the maximum tolerable risk of failure occurrence are shown
in the table below. The failures are assumed to be caused by the top 15 risks identified and are
scored on the matrix based on the probability of occurrence and consequence.
Table 4.41: NEWgenerator MTR Failure Risk Per Unit Per Annum
Maximum Tolerable Reliability Failure Risk per unit per annum
PFD

1-2 Failures

3-5 Failures

5-10 Failures

Maximum Tolerable Risk level

V - VI

III-IV

I - II

The NEWgenerator economics risk assessment is as follows:
Table 4.42: NEWgenerator Inherent Risks Matrix Economics
Risk Level
V
IV
III
II
I

Economics
>USD $10 per person to USD
$100 per person
>USD $1 per person to USD
$10 per person
>USD $0.1 per person to USD
$1 per person
>USD $0.01 per person to
USD $0.1 per person
< USD 0.01 per person

Definite

Likely

Occasional

15

9,

11,14

1, 3,4,5,7,8,

2,6
10,
12, 13

Definite

Likely

Occasional

Unlikely

Remote

Rare

Unlikely

Remote

Rare
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The highest-ranking failures associated with economic risk in the NEWgenerator are
failures of the Electrochlorinator and the membrane reactor, as shown below.
Table 4.43: NEWgenerator Maximum tolerable risk (MTR) Economics
Unique

Potential

identifier

9

Failure Mode

Effects of

Name

Initiating event

failure

Reactor

discharge of

Loss of biomass

Loss of

disinfectant

activity

treatment

rupture

Loss of

Score

MTR
5 - 10

V

Failures

material to frontend
11

Reactor

design failure or
damage

containment and

1-2
V

Failures

ground
contamination
with pathogenic
material
13

Backwash

Design failure

Rupture

line

loss of
backwash

3-5
III

Failures

program leading
to loss of
membrane
14

15

Chlorination

Tank damage or

Rupture

Loss of

tank

failure

Chlorination

Failure of

Contaminated

Loss of

tank

treatment

water in the

disinfection

disinfection

1-2
V

Failures

1-2
V

Failures

treatment tank
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The NEWgenerator environment risk assessment is shown below.
Table 4.44: NEWgenerator Inherent Risks Matrix Environment
Risk Level

Environment

II

Minor - Noticeable nuisance off-site e.g.
occasional odors, rodents, animal
activity, flies, etc.
Noise heard intermittently at locations
locally i.e. within 250yards
Air pollution/odor codes 2(X) acceptable
odor felt intermittently only locally i.e.
within 250yards

I

Insignificant - Nuisance on site only, no
off-site effects, codes 1/2(0) no
odor/pleasant

Definite

Likely

Occasional

Unlikely

Remote

Rare

Occasional

Unlikely

Remote

Rare

6,10,1
1,12
1,2,3,4,5
,7,8,9,13
,14,15

Definite

Likely

The table below shows that there are no high-level environmental risks associated with
the NEWgenerator, because the treatment system is housed within a metal secondary
containment structure called a CAB, and all the pathogenic material are removed in the treatment
process.
Table 4.45: NEWgenerator Maximum Tolerable risk (MTR) Environmental
Unique
identifier
1

2

3
4
5

Failure
Mode

Name
Plastic pipe with a
valve

Initiating
event
Blockage in
Pipe

overhead water storage
tank

Damage/design
failure

Rupture

overhead water storage
tank

Blockage of
outlet

Overflow

overhead water storage
tank

Blockage of
outlet

Overflow

Municipal top up
line/treated water to up
line

Blockage in
pipe

No flush
water

No flush
water

Potential Effects
of failure
No flush
capacity/long
time for the
cistern to fill
Loss of flush
water/system out
of service
No clean water
for flush
Reduced flush
capacity
No flush capacity
after storage
capacity is
consumed if also
no recycling

Score
I

MTR
5 - 10
Failures

I

5 - 10
Failures

I

5 - 10
Failures

I

5 - 10
Failures

I

5 - 10
Failures
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Table 4.45: (Continued)
Unique
identifier
6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

Name
Pipe to
Pump P1

Initiating
event
Design failure

Failure Mode
Rupture

Potential Effects of
failure
Loss of containment of
pathogenic material

Score

MTR

II

5 - 10
Failures

The pipe
from the
pump p1 to
the valve

Insoluble
/accumulation
of solids in the
pipe

Blockage of
pipe

Loss of wastewater to
treatment/system out of
service

I

5 - 10
Failures

Valve to
treatment

Insoluble
/accumulation
of solids in the
pipe

Blockage of
pipe

Loss of wastewater to
treatment/system out of
service

I

5 - 10
Failures

Reactor

discharge of
disinfectant
material to
front-end

Loss of biomass
activity

Loss of treatment
I

5 - 10
Failures

design failure
or damage

Leak

II

5 - 10
Failures

design failure
or damage

rupture

Loss of containment and
ground contamination
with pathogenic material
Loss of containment and
ground contamination
with pathogenic material

II

5 - 10
Failures

Pipe to
valve

Design failure

Rupture

II

5 - 10
Failures

Backwash
line

Design failure

I

5 - 10
Failures

Chlorination
tank

Tank damage
or failure

Rupture

I

5 - 10
Failures

Chlorination
tank

Failure of
treatment

Contaminated
water in the
treatment tank

I

5 - 10
Failures

Reactor

Reactor

Rupture

Loss of containment of
pathogenic material

loss of backwash program
leading to loss of
membrane
Loss of disinfection

Loss of disinfection

`
The NEWgenerator public perception risk assessment is as follows:
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Table 4.46: NEWgenerator Inherent Risks Matrix Public Perception
Risk Level

Public Perception

II

Community warning as a
result of the release of
material from technology and
local media coverage

I

No to minor impact on the
community e.g. one toilet or
shower not working but others
available with no discernable
impact on the community

Definite

Likely

Occasional

Unlikely

Remote

Rare

10, 11, 12

1,3,4,5,7,8,9,15

2,6,13,14

The table below shows that there are no high-level public perception risks associated with
the NEWgenerator. This is because even though the NEWgenerator system is a novel water
treatment system in a decentralized sanitation setting, the technology of anaerobic membrane
treatment for wastewater is well understood and has been around for a long time. Therefore,
failures within the NEWgenerator are unlikely to be solely associated with membrane technology
failure, thus reducing the probabilities of a public boycott of membrane technology in sanitation.
Table 4.47: NEWgenerator Maximum Tolerable Risk (MTR) Public Perception
Unique
identifier
1

2

3

4

Name
Plastic pipe
with a valve
overhead
water storage
tank
overhead
water storage
tank
overhead
water storage
tank

Initiating
event
Blockage in
Pipe

Failure
Mode
No flush
water

Damage/design
failure

Rupture

Blockage of
outlet

Overflow

Blockage of
outlet

Overflow

Potential Effects of
failure
No flush capacity/long
time for the cistern to
fill
Loss of flush
water/system out of
service
No clean water for flush

Score
I

MTR
5 - 10
Failures

I

5 - 10
Failures

I

5 - 10
Failures

I

5 - 10
Failures

Reduced flush capacity

237

Table 4.47: (Continued)
Unique
identifier
5

6
7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14
15

Name
Municipal top up
line/treated
water to up line
Pipe to Pump P1
The pipe from
the pump p1 to
the valve
Valve to
treatment

Reactor

Reactor

Reactor

Pipe to valve

Backwash line

Initiating
event
Blockage in
pipe

Design failure

Failure
Mode
No flush
water

Rupture

Potential Effects of
failure
No flush capacity after
storage capacity is
consumed if also no
recycling
Loss of containment of
pathogenic material

Score
I

MTR
5 - 10
Failures

I

5 - 10
Failures

Insoluble
/accumulation
of solids in the
pipe
Insoluble
/accumulation
of solids in the
pipe
discharge of
disinfectant
material to
front-end
design failure
or damage

Blockage of
pipe

Loss of wastewater to
treatment/system out of
service

I

5 - 10
Failures

Blockage of
pipe

Loss of wastewater to
treatment/system out of
service

I

5 - 10
Failures

Loss of
biomass
activity

Loss of treatment
I

5 - 10
Failures

Leak

II

5 - 10
Failures

design failure
or damage

rupture

Loss of containment and
ground contamination
with pathogenic material
Loss of containment and
ground contamination
with pathogenic material

II

5 - 10
Failures

Design failure

Rupture

II

5 - 10
Failures

I

5 - 10
Failures

I

5 - 10
Failures

I

5 - 10
Failures

Design failure

Rupture

Chlorination
tank

Tank damage
or failure

Rupture

Chlorination
tank

Failure of
treatment

Contaminated
water in the
treatment
tank

Loss of containment of
pathogenic material
loss of backwash
program leading to loss
of membrane
Loss of disinfection
Loss of disinfection

The tables below show that there are no high-level safety impacts for the NEWgenerator
for similar reasons as to why there are no high-level environmental risks issues. The reason is
that the NEWgenerator is contained within a containerized system called a CAB, so there is little
chance of pathogenic material being released into the environment and contaminating
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watercourse or food. Additionally, the interactions that front-end users have with the system is
mainly at the front-end user interface, which is limited in terms of contaminant and pathogenic
contact as long as basic hygiene is practiced, and similar to water cistern toilet systems found
anywhere. The use of familiar front-end interfaces removes the unfamiliarity factor for users,
which can lead to additional safety issues. The NEWgenerator safety risk assessment is as
follows:
Table 4.48: NEWgenerator Inherent Risks Matrix Safety
Risk Level

Safety

Definite

* 1 serious illness or multiple
minor illnesses locally due to
technology failure
*50% - 70% attributable burden
* 1minor illness locally due to
technology failure

III

Likely

Occasional

Unlikely

Remote

Rare

Occasional

Unlikely

Remote

Rare

10,11,

II

12

I

* First aid incidents

1,3,4,5,7,8,9,15

2,6,13,
14

Definite

Likely

Table 4.49: NEWgenerator Maximum Tolerable Risk (MTR) Safety
Unique
identifier
1

2

3

4

Initiating
event
Blockage in
Pipe

Failure Mode

overhead
water
storage tank

Damage/design
failure

Rupture

overhead
water
storage tank

Blockage of
outlet

Overflow

overhead
water
storage tank

Blockage of
outlet

Overflow

Name
Plastic pipe
with a valve

No flush water

Potential Effects of
failure
No flush capacity/long
time for the cistern to
fill
Loss of flush
water/system out of
service
No clean water for
flush

Score
I

MTR
5 - 10
Failures

I

5 - 10
Failures

I

5 - 10
Failures

I

5 - 10
Failures

Reduced flush capacity
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Table 4.49: (Continued)
Unique
identifier
5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14
15

Name
Municipal
top up
line/treated
water to up
line
Pipe to
Pump P1

The pipe
from the
pump p1 to
the valve
Valve to
treatment

Initiating
event
Blockage in
pipe

Failure Mode

Design failure

Rupture

No flush water

Potential Effects of
failure
No flush capacity after
storage capacity is
consumed if also no
recycling
Loss of containment
of pathogenic material

Score
I

MTR
5 - 10
Failures

I

5 - 10
Failures

Insoluble
/accumulation
of solids in the
pipe
Insoluble
/accumulation
of solids in the
pipe
discharge of
disinfectant
material to
front-end
design failure
or damage

Blockage of
pipe

Loss of wastewater to
treatment/system out
of service

I

5 - 10
Failures

Blockage of
pipe

Loss of wastewater to
treatment/system out
of service

I

5 - 10
Failures

Loss of biomass
activity

Loss of treatment
I

5 - 10
Failures

Leak

Loss of containment
and ground
contamination with
pathogenic material

III

35Failures

design failure
or damage

rupture

III

3-5
Failures

Pipe to
valve

Design failure

Rupture

II

5 - 10
Failures

Backwash
line

Design failure

I

5 - 10
Failures

Chlorination
tank

Tank damage
or failure

Rupture

I

5 - 10
Failures

Chlorination
tank

Failure of
treatment

Contaminated
water in the
treatment tank

I

5 - 10
Failures

Reactor

Reactor

Reactor

Rupture

Loss of containment
and ground
contamination with
pathogenic material
Loss of containment
of pathogenic material
loss of backwash
program leading to
loss of membrane
Loss of disinfection
Loss of disinfection

The NEWgenerator scores highly for technical knowledge risk. This is because the
system is advanced and requires a high level of expertise to keep it running, perform
maintenance, and to do repairs on the system. However, this can be mitigated by employing
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technical expertise as part of the long-term maintenance strategy for the system, and preferably
should be by a member of the local community (Wilderer, et al., 2000). Additionally, if there are
failures that require technical expertise, there is an equalization buffer volume between the frontend and the treatment section, which provides a buffer volume. This provides a period lag, which
allows the sanitation to engineer enough time to fix issues without impacting the front-end users.
However, of note is the fact that, before mitigation is considered the technical knowledge aspect
of any advanced system will score highly as a risk factor for ensuring long terms success of the
sanitation system.
The NEWgenerator technical knowledge risk assessment is as follows:
Table 4.50: NEWgenerator Inherent Risks Matrix Technical knowledge
Risk Level

V

Technical knowledge
Requires a high level of technical
expertise e.g. education to advanced
level (1 year) and multiple years’
experience in the field

IV

Requires moderate technical expertise
e.g. Basic education with (up to 1-year
training) and no experience in the field

Definite

Likely

7,8,9,15

6,10,11,14

1,2,3,4,5

12,13

Occasional

Unlikely

Remote

Rare

Table 4.51: NEWgenerator Maximum Tolerable Risk (MTR) Technical Expertise
Unique
identifier

1

2

3

Name
Plastic pipe
with a valve
overhead
water storage
tank
overhead
water storage
tank

Initiating
event
Blockage in
Pipe

Failure
Mode
No flush
water

Damage/design
failure

Rupture

Blockage of
outlet

Overflow

Potential Effects of
failure
No flush capacity/long
time for the cistern to
fill
Loss of flush
water/system out of
service
No clean water for
flush

Score

MTR

IV

1-2
Failures

IV

1-2
Failures

IV

1-2
Failures
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Table 4.51: (Continued)
Unique
identifier
4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14
15

Name
overhead
water
storage tank

Initiating
event
Blockage of
outlet

Failure Mode
Overflow

Potential Effects
of failure
Reduced flush
capacity

IV

MTR
1-2
Failures

IV

1-2
Failures

V

1-2
Failures

Municipal
top up
line/treated
water to up
line
Pipe to
Pump P1

Blockage in
pipe

No flush water

Design failure

Rupture

The pipe
from the
pump p1 to
the valve
Valve to
treatment

Insoluble
/accumulation
of solids in the
pipe
Insoluble
/accumulation
of solids in the
pipe
discharge of
disinfectant
material to
front-end

Blockage of
pipe

Loss of wastewater
to treatment/system
out of service

V

1-2
Failures

Blockage of
pipe

Loss of wastewater
to treatment/system
out of service

V

1-2
Failures

Loss of
biomass
activity

Loss of treatment
V

1-2
Failures

design failure
or damage

Leak

V

1-2
Failures

design failure
or damage

rupture

V

1-2
Failures

Pipe to
valve

Design failure

Rupture

Loss of
containment and
ground
contamination with
pathogenic material
Loss of
containment and
ground
contamination with
pathogenic material
Loss of
containment of
pathogenic material

IV

1-2
Failures

Backwash
line

Design failure

IV

1-2
Failures

Chlorination
tank

Tank damage
or failure

Rupture

V

1-2
Failures

Chlorination
tank

Failure of
treatment

Contaminated
water in the
treatment tank

V

1-2
Failures

Reactor

Reactor

Reactor

Rupture

No flush capacity
after storage
capacity is
consumed if also
no recycling
Loss of
containment of
pathogenic material

Score

loss of backwash
program leading to
loss of membrane
Loss of disinfection
Loss of disinfection
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1

Plastic
pipe with
a valve

Blockage in pipe

No
flush
water

2

overhead
water
storage
tank

Damage/design
failure

Ruptur
e

9

Reactor

discharge of
disinfectant
material to frontend

Loss
of
biomas
s
activit
y

Highest Impact

Stakeholder

RPN

Detection

Occurrence

Severity

Potential Effects of
failure

Failure Mode

Initiating event

Name

Unique identifier

Table 4.52: Top 3 Aspects for QRM

No flush
capacity/long time
for the cistern to
fill
Loss of flush
water/system out
of service

5

9

10

450

User/Co
mmunity

S

9

8

10

720

S

Loss of treatment

8

9

10

720

Sanitatio
n
Engineer
/
Technici
an/
Service
provider
Sanitatio
n
Engineer
/
Technici
an/
Service
provider

R

4.2.2.2 NEWgenerator Reliability Assessment
It is assumed that Electrochlorinator failure, Membrane failure, damage to the water
storage tank are the most critical risk failures to consider in the NEWgenerator. This is because
the failure of these components can impact the process very quickly if they fail, because of
criticality to pathogen removal, disinfection, and recycled water supply availability. Failure of
plastic pipes is deemed to be easily repairable with very little expertise, that they are accepted to
have acceptable maximum tolerable risks for the process.
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Figure 4.19: Simplified Process Flow Diagram for the NEWgenerator
Source: (Shyu, et al., 2020)
To assign mitigative measures, the design information of each node must be examined.
This will enable an understanding of how improvements can be made and where improvements
can be made. This is done by determining the expected probability of failure on demand based
on manufacturers' data and comparing this with recorded data where applicable. Examination of
the PFDs of the Electrochlorinator and the HDPE water storage tank allows this. For example, a
well-maintained high-density polyethylene (HDPE) tank is normally expected to have a design
life of many decades at low pressures and in non-hazardous service. Where failures occur early,
these are normally attributed to wrong usage or manufacturing defects (Mora-Rodríguez, et al.,
2014).
Electrochlorinators like the ones used in swimming pools have a design life of 3-7 years
on average and create Chlorine via the equation below:
2NaCl + 2H2O → electrolysis → 2NaOH + H2 + Cl2
They operate at high temperatures and in arduous duty. A heat generator such as the one
used in the NEWgenerator electrochlorinator will be expected to fail at least twice per year.
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Therefore, using the equation for probability of failure on demand at a rate of two failures
per year (i.e. MTBF of 0.5 year or 4380 hours) and assuming a proof test interval based on
produced water generation of twice per day, the probability of failure on demand for the
Electrochlorinator is:
Electrochlorinator PFD = (1/MTBF) x (12/2) = (1/4380) x (12/2)
= 0.00136
note that 1/MTBF = Failure rate
A proof test interval of twice per day = 12hrs on average.
This means the chance of failure is about 136 for every 100,000 attempts. A system with
this level of PFD is acceptable because the impact of failure will be limited to the system itself,
due to sampling and the presence of sanitation engineers who monitor the system, therefore
failures will be detected very quickly. This PFD also does not mean that the Electrochlorinator
will fail 136 times in 100,000 attempts per se but indicates that if better failure outcomes are
desired or if failure is not an option, then attempts should be made to add a backup chlorination
system. A system such as bleach dosing directly into the produced water tank when the
Electrochlorinator is offline would close the failure gap. Additionally, an indicator that alerts
sanitation engineers to the failure of the Electrochlorinator could be added. The NEWgenerator
has monitoring that provides this facility. This approach allows the benefits of using a common
chemical i.e. salt for disinfection. It removes the need for complex supply chains.
For the HDPE tank assuming an MTBF of 10 years maximum design life. The
probability of failure is assumed to be low, but even if failure did occur it is unlikely to lead to a
hazardous event because the tank content is water. So, for an adequately sized tank, it is assumed
that the proof test aligns with the pressure head in the tank, which is the same as the highest level
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in the tank. The highest level in the tank will occur twice per day in line with the two batched
produced water transfers into the tank from the NEWgenerator. The same calculation provides:
HDPE tank PFD = (1/MTBF) x (12/2) = (1/87600) x (12/2)
= 0.000068
Therefore, the chance of failure is about 68 for every 1,000,000 attempts. This is a very
good level of reliability for the tank.
Another aspect of failure in advanced decentralized non-sewered sanitation systems is
instrument failure, Instrument failure, particularly where instruments are in contact with dirty
liquid are more likely to occur than when the instruments are in clean service. The
Electrochlorinator would be classed as arduous service and the high probability of failure on
demand is as expected. Instrument failure is often caused by system logic failure, which is highly
dependent on human interactions with logic solvers. It is difficult to quantify how often this is
likely to occur, but human error tends to occur frequently during software development (Anu, et
al., 2016). For actual sensor failures, the use of more robust sensing equipment often reduces
probabilities of failure, so for example the use of a radar level sensing instrument in dirty service
will give better results, than a level sensor in direct contact with a liquid which might foul it.
However, a radar gauge is not reliable in foaming environments, whereas direct sensing
equipment would fare better. For the NEWgenerator Electrochlorinator, a back-up program
could be added to dose bleach into the effluent when the Electrochlorinator is offline. This will
ensure full disinfection coverage in the period when the system is unable to generate chlorine
and reduce the breakthrough of pathogens in the effluent.
The NEWgenerator process is connected in series. None of the components are spared.
Therefore failure requires repair and/or replacement. The success of the NEWgenerator system
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can be easily measured by tracking the generation of treated water and the log removal value of
pathogenic material at the effluent stage, which must meet the ISO 30500 requirements.
In the chart shown below, the grey trend shows the supply and demand flow rates of the
USF NEWgenerator between the 17th of October 2019 and the 9th of March 2020 (143 days).
Where the data point is “1” on the primary y-axis, it indicates a supply failure i.e. there was no
treated water made even though there was a demand from the front-end section of the
NEWgenerator. The orange chart overlaid over the grey chart indicates on the primary y-axis,
that there was a success in the production of treated water demand and/or the supply exceeded
the NEWgenerator demand.
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Figure 4.20: NEWgenerator Demand versus Supply
The above chart shows that the treated water production and the following chart shows
that the existence of a water storage tank as mitigation, makes the PFD zero. This mitigates 9 out
of the 15 top aspects identified as the highest risks of reliability failure for the NEWgenerator
system, which are tied to the loss of clean/flush water. The flow data chart does not account for
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the alternative water source, which is a municipal supply, but the qualitative analysis
subsequently has identified that this mitigation removes the risk of water loss completely. On a
user basis alone, the reliability is 100% due to the alternative water source. Demand for flush
water at any point is very likely to be higher than instantaneous recycled treated water
production, which is why when the data alone is observed without the water storage tank the
PFD is either very close to 1 or is 1. The chart of cumulative water production overlaid over
water demand is shown below. The chart shows that overall, more water is produced than is
needed for flushing, hence reliability is high.
Cummulative demand

Cummulative produced water volume
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Figure 4.21: Cumulative Demand and Produced Water Flows
The presence of the water storage tank and the ability to cumulatively store water and
have water supply available 100% of the time from a service perspective, means the system is
100% reliable. Thus, to the end-user wishing to flush the toilet, the NEWgenerator provides a
reliable source of clean water for sanitation. To the sanitation engineer the system is performing
as per design, so is again reliable.
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Thus, as indicated in the table below which covers unique aspects 2, 3 and 4 related to
clean water provision, the storage tank mitigates aspects related to NEWgenerator reliability
from a water production perspective, making the system highly reliable for recycled water
production for flushing.
Table 4.53: Table of Aspects Related to Water Storage Tank
2

overhead
water
storage
tank

Damage/de
sign failure

Rupture

Loss of
flush
water/syst
em out of
service

Rupture

9

8

10

720

Sanitation
Engineer /
Technician
/ Service
provider

S/R

3

overhead
water
storage
tank
overhead
water
storage
tank

Blockage
of outlet

Overflow

No clean
water for
flush

Overflo
w

5

9

10

450

User/Com
munity

S/R

Blockage
of outlet

Overflow

Reduced
flush
capacity

Overflo
w

5

9

10

450

User/Com
munity

S/R

4

4.2.2.3 NEWgenerator Availability Assessment
The availability of the NEWgenerator is assumed to be 100%. The NEWgenerator is a
class 3 system and has numerous front ends for the front-end user interface. This means that the
availability will be high as the users have multiple options for usage. Additionally, an adequately
sized equalization tank provides buffer storage which means that there is a constant flow of
wastewater for the NEWgenerator treatment system throughout the day.
Table 4.54: Agreed Maximum Tolerable Availability
Maximum Tolerable Risk per unit per annum
Availability

<0.5

0.5 – 0.9

>0.9

Maximum Tolerable Risk
level

Unacceptable

Acceptable but increased
monitoring
III-IV

acceptable

V - VI

I - II
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The availability can also be expressed in terms of downtime per specified period. For
downtimes, for 24 hours the different availabilities are listed below. Based on the information
below, it is assumed that the individual front-end interphases have availabilities > 99%.
The NEWgenerator has a zeolite ion exchange system for TN reduction. The zeolite bed
is regenerated 2X per year, requiring a maintenance downtime of 10 days in total. This equates to
a treatment system availability of 0.97.2 for the treatment section.
Availability = 1- (10/365) = 0.972 i.e. 97% availability
Cleaning is assumed to take 20 minutes per stall per day (1440 minutes in a day).
Availability of the front end is particularly crucial in keeping the NEWgenerator system useable
from a user perspective, meaning there should always be a toilet stall available, but if all are
occupied, then the maximum wait time for a clean one to be available ( if the unavailability is
partly or fully due to cleaning), is 20 minutes. The NEWgenerator treatment system itself has
relatively high availability and is unlikely to affect the front end. However, impacts that affect
the front end can easily drop the availability of the entire system below the acceptable range,
therefore affecting the front-end user stakeholder perspective of failure. Cleaning and any events
that take the front-end out of service should be staggered, to maintain front-end availability. If 20
minutes is allocated for cleaning daily that’s an availability of 98.6%, this in addition to the 2X
five-day period for the zeolite regeneration distributed over a year, is an average of 59.45
minutes downtime per day. However, in reality, downtime observed on a day to day basis by
front-end users will be zero on a normal day because toilet cleaning is staggered and the zeolite
regeneration period is a dedicated offline period, which happens in one 5-day stretch, meaning
the NEWgenerator will have 100% unavailability in that turnaround period. The equalization
storage tank between the front-end interface and the NEWgenerator provides for the buffer for
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the front end during the 5-day turnaround, by ensuring 100% front-end availability through
intermediate wastewater bulk storage.
Table 4.55: Availability Distribution
Availability

Average Downtime per day

Time unit

90.00%
95.00%

2.4
1.2

hours
hours

99.00%
99.50%
99.80%
99.90%
99.95%
99.99%

14.4
7.2
2.88
1.44
43.2
8.64

minutes
minutes
minutes
minutes
seconds
seconds

100.00%
100.00%
100.00%

864
86.4
8.64
NEWgenerator average downtime and availability per year
Component
Availability
Time
Zeolite downtime = (365-10)/365 days
97.2%
39.45
Cleaning downtime = (1440-20)/1440
98.6%
20
minutes

milliseconds
milliseconds
milliseconds
Time unit
minutes
minutes

Average daily availability of the NEWgenerator per day is (1440– 59.45)/1440 = 95.8%,
which is acceptable and means that 2 offline events per year are acceptable, thus it covers the
two turnaround periods for the zeolite beds, assuming cleaning doesn’t lead to full unavailability
of front-ends, in any scenario.
4.2.2.4 NEWgenerator Maintainability Assessment
The regeneration of the zeolite bed is a main maintenance requirement for the
NEWgenerator, occurring twice per year. The regeneration currently takes 5 days (between
zeolite regeneration with NaCl brine and rinse out of interstitial salt with freshwater), but
ongoing R&D for a new procedure aims to reduce it to 1 day. The GAC bed plays a critical
function in the post-membrane polishing of residual COD, color, TSS, and turbidity. Unlike
zeolite, GAC cannot be regenerated onsite and requires replacement. It has been determined
through field trials that 2X/yr GAC replacement is prudent. The maintenance assessment can be
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computed as follows using the Weibull method. The data based on criteria used to push the
NEWgenerator to stress conditions during the pilot testing stage and is not representative of
standard operation, but it illustrates how data might be used to improve the maintenance strategy
for a system under stress and therefore allow a predictive maintenance strategy to be proposed.
Mean time to repair (MTTR) is, therefore,
Total number of hours equipment was in repair
Number of repair events in that period

Equation 30

Table 4.56: Table of Maintenance Event Times
Events

Description

Repair number of days

Repair number of
hours

1

Granular activated carbon replacement

1

24

2

Zeolite regeneration

5

120

3

Granular activated carbon replacement

1

24

4

Zeolite Regeneration

5

120

Total

288
Repair events

4

MTTR = 288/4 = 72 hours
Repair rate = 1/72 hours = 0.0139
The time to failure looks at the time from when the failure occurs to the time the system
is put back in service. Therefore, we look at the time that the failure occurs from a startup. The
times to failure for GAC replacement and zeolite regeneration are shown in the following table.
The table also assumes that the GAC replacement occurs in the same turnaround window as the
zeolite regeneration, so there is an overlap of maintenance events.
Failure time, when plotted on Weibull probability paper (shown below) creates a fairly
linear plot. This indicates that the choice of the two-parameter Weibull distribution for modeling
the maintenance distribution is valid. If the points did not follow a straight line, a different
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lifetime distribution to analyze the data is required. However, since it is linear, the Weibull
approximation is used. A line of best fit is drawn through the points.
To calculate the shape and scale parameters a Weibull plot is created as follows:
Median Rank (MR) = i−0.3/n+0.4

Equation 34

Time to failure days

Number of hours

Rank

Median Rank/Theoretical
unreliability

Granular activated
carbon replacement

90

2160

1

0.16

7.68

1.19

0.17

Zeolite regeneration

94

2256

2

0.39

7.72

1.63

0.49

Granular activated
carbon replacement

270

4320

3

0.61

8.37

2.59

0.95

Zeolite Regeneration

274

4320

4

0.84

8.37

6.29

1.84

[ln(1/(1−MR)]

[(1/(1−MR)]

ln(t)

Description

Table 4.57: Theoretical Unreliability for Maintenance Determination
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Figure 4.22: Sample Blank Weibull Plot Paper
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Figure 4.23: Weibull plot for NEWgenerator Maintenance Events
Once the reliability information is arranged in a probability plot, then the β and η can be
estimated. With the chart estimates the maintainability function is determined. Determination
of β, or the Weibull slope, is relatively easy. It is a case of reading the slope of the line directly or
by calculating the gradient of the slope through a calculation of the slope or gradient of the line
of best fit i.e. delta y-axis /delta x-axis.
To obtain the slope via the Bernard method means, drawing a line to the line of best fit at
67% on the y-axis and to join the y-axis, and then draw another line parallel to the line of best fit,
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but perpendicular to the perpendicular line just drawn. Read the scale value of the X-axis, as the
slope.
The figure below shows how the slope which equals 11 is estimated on a Weibull plot,
meaning that the shape parameter of the NEWgenerator maintenance distribution is 11. So, β >1.
This means maintenance is justified when the cost is considered as part of maintenance.

Figure 4.24: Weibull Plot for NEWgenerator Shape Parameter Determination
Using the data from the chart it is possible to estimate the scale (η) parameter, this
indicates the average maintenance time that the current distribution has. Thus, maintenance
strategies can be implemented at those intervals if the current failure for the repair rate is
inadequate or not if the current strategy is adequate.
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The time to maintenance “t” can be estimated for each item. The GAC change out is a
replacement, so maintenance timing is assumed to be sufficient as long as it is in line with the
zeolite bed regeneration and timings overlap in turnaround periods. The GAC has to be changed,
so there is no repair function, so β is assumed to be < 1, so no further predictive maintenance
analysis is required.
The predictive maintenance aspect for zeolite regeneration is as follows.
Repair = e-(t/η) β
R = 1- (1/MTTR)
R = 1 - 0.0139 = 0.9861
If the NEWgenerator is to maintain a predictive maintenance strategy to remove the 5day long shutdown every 6 months and have β equals to or close to 1. Assuming a system repair
rate of 0.0139 and a time to failure of 182.5 days (4380 hours), so the formula above is rewritten
as such:
For current: 0.9861 = e-(4380/η) x 11 = 344,2041
For predictive at β equals to or close to 1, TAR: 0.9861 = e-(t/17,902) x 1= 250 hours
If η is 17902, while β is fixed at 1, the distribution has a normal distribution where failure
reduces over time and preventative maintenance aims to stay in this sweet spot, by performing
maintenance before the cliff edge, or the system will have sudden failures at a certain point of
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inflection where the system will face rapid failure. Here t is too low so preventative maintenance
is not justified.
To increase t, increase the η or reduce the reliability to justify the t interval of 250-hours.
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Figure 4.25: Optimum Level for Predictive Maintenance
Computing for t at η of 17902 and a β of 1 gives 250 hours which is predictive
maintenance required to give a β = 1. Thus, regeneration and GAC of the zeolite bed for
preventative maintenance is every 10 days. The chart above shows the difference failure
occurrences by a cumulative time, even with a decreasing failure rate for β of 1 and a β of 11. It
shows that a β of 11, has more failures by cumulative time. Failure is calculated by interpolating
the failure distribution between the reliability of 0 and 1 assuming constant failure rates. So, if
the reliability of 0.9861 gives 4 failures, all other failures can be estimated by saying (1 – R)/ [(10.9861) x 4]. Every 25hours is too excessive, because the bed will not be fully loaded after 10
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days, nor will the system be able to shut down every 10 days for 5 days to regenerate, but it
won’t need that long to regenerate after only 10-days. So, it may be that it only needs a
proportion of the time, for example, if 180 days of operation requires 5 days regeneration, it
follows that 10 days of operation may only need 0.3-days [(5 x 10/182.5)days] or 6.5 hours of
regeneration per 10 days. The determinant will be the cost of regeneration every 10 days versus
the cost of regenerating for 5 days every 6 months
A decision must be made regarding the cut-off point, so, the cost of predictive
regeneration needs to be compared with the cost for 6 monthly regeneration based on the number
of regenerations required per year. Assuming the cost of regeneration per day is USD 100, which
includes labor cost and cost of raw materials, the calculation is as follows:
Table 4.58: Maintenance Cost Comparisons
Type of
Maintenance
Predictive
maintenance
Predictive
maintenance

Time
interval
(days)

10
182.5

Cost per year
Cost per day x (365/maintenance interval days) x number of
turnaround days
= USD $100 x (365/10) x 0.3 = USD $3,650 (1 full day used
instead of 0.3 days as it is assumed that a full day will be required
when preparation and re-instatement are accounted for)
= USD $100 x (365/182.5) x 5 = USD $1000 (Preparation and reinstatement absorbed into 5-day period)

So, the strategy chosen for maintenance depends on the cost-benefit analysis of the
maintenance choice between predictive maintenance for the zeolite bed regeneration. The 6month interval process is chosen for maintenance analysis because it is most cost-effective
overall, but care must be taken to account for the cliff-edge failure rate increases as the system
nears its maintenance due time. This is achieved by regular sampling for increased residual
COD, color, TSS, and turbidity, where following the ISO standards described earlier and the
NSF/ANSI standards, guide sampling criteria.
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The system maintainability needs to be balanced with the availability from a treatment
system perspective, with the sanitation engineer as the primary stakeholder. The front-end is not
affected because of the equalization buffer tank, so from a front-end user perspective, the system
is highly maintainable. From the perspective of the sanitation engineer, a cost-benefit assessment
needs to be made based on the cost of predictive maintenance, between a minor regeneration
every 34-days, or a system turnaround every 6 months. The longer periods can be further
mitigated and identified by specifying that an increase in TN in the effluent, indicated by the
water quality parameters of the system, should be used as a trigger for earlier regeneration when
required. Either way, the choice will be based on the most cost-beneficial strategy which still
meets stakeholder requirements.
4.2.2.5 NEWgenerator Safety Assessment
The safety failure of a sanitation system is defined as the release of viruses, bacteria,
and/or pathogenic protozoa to the environment such that it can be directly or indirectly
transferred to humans and cause disease regardless of the actual source of release from the
system.
It is as follows:
LRV = Log 10(influent pathogen concentration/effluent pathogen concentration)
This is calculated for each technology and compared with the (ISO 30500, 2018) Requirement.
The NEWgenerator’s safety sampling data was assessed between the time of 12th of January
2019 and the 10th of March 2020 which indicates the last sampling date before the system was
shut down for COVID-19 reasons. The system was monitored remotely for parameters required
to maintain system hibernation status. The ISO 30500 are as follows:
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Table 4.59: Pathogen Parameters for NEWgenerator from Durban Field Trial
E. coli (CFU/mL)

6 (LRV)

Fecal Coliforms (CFU/mL)

6 (LRV)

Helminths (counts/L)

≤1

Protozoa

Not measured

Virus

Not measured

Loss of quality is dictated by ISO 30500 standard as a pathogenic release due to failure –
the loss of quality of effluent is assumed to be predicated on the failure of the membrane and/or
the chlorination system. Downstream recontamination by flies that enter open or improperly
sealed tanks, thereby bypassing a disinfection barrier, is also a possibility. Although not
anticipated if the system is properly maintained and functioning, the following maximum
pathogenic failure rates are assumed based on the assumptions stated for each worst-case
scenario:
1.

Bacteria – It is assumed that there is a worst-case 5% failure rate of E. coli in the
effluent. This means that if a hundred effluent samples are analyzed, 5 will be
assumed to have E. coli levels outside ISO 30500 requirements. The assumption is
because though E. Coli would not get through the pore size of the NEWgenerator
membrane, there is the potential for bacterial regrowth downstream of the membrane.
Although bacteria can be killed by chlorine relatively easily, if the Electrochlorinator
malfunctions, the secondary disinfection barrier is lost. Finally, if any of the tanks are
not properly sealed, flies can potentially reintroduce E. coli into the effluent tank
after initial treatment.

2.

Helminth – It is assumed that the worst-case prevalence of Helminth positive hits
will be in 1% of the samples analyzed. It is unlikely that Helminth eggs will get
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through the UF membrane pores (0.03 micron) into the effluent. However, as the
pore sizes are determined on the distribution of average pore sizes, there is a small
chance that any defects which create larger pore sizes, can lead to helminth
breakthrough incidents. This would be detected and rectified relatively quickly, in a
real-life scenario but, for the study, a failure incidence of 1% for Helminths in the
effluent is assumed. Also, again, flies can be a contributing factor for downstream recontamination of opened tanks.
3.

Protozoa – Due to the small size and tough nature of protozoa (such as Giardia and
Cryptosporidium oocysts) compared with the other microorganisms of interest in the
ISO 30500 standard aside from viruses, it is assumed that there will be a worst-case
3% failure occurrence of protozoa in the effluent. Incidents of protozoa will also
increase during periods of Electrochlorinator is out of service which means that:
(4.5 days x 2 x 24) + 52 hours, to account for salt refill = 268 hours.
A total of 268/8760 per year = 3% failure occurrence.

4.

Virus – As a worst-case scenario, viruses are assumed to be present in effluent 10%
of the time, due to the ubiquitous nature of viruses. While most of the viruses are
anticipated to be removed by the UF membrane, a small fraction might still
breakthrough because the 0.03-micron pore size is an average value. This means the
chlorination system plays a major role in virus removal. While viruses can be
removed by chlorination relatively easily, any malfunction of the Electrochlorinator
would result in possible virus survival. The table below shows the percentage of time
that the ISO 30500 were not met, based on the sampling data from the
NEWgenerator effluent.
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For the projected worst-case scenario, the table below shows the percentage of time
that the ISO 30500 will not be met.
Table 4.60: Microbial Safety Assessment Criteria
Pathogenic Parameter

ISO 30500

Unreliability

Bacteria (CFU/L of E. coli as surrogate)

100

5%

Protozoa (CFU/L of Clostridium spores as surrogate)

<1

3%

Helminths (number of viable Ascaris ova as surrogate/L)

<1

1%

Virus (PFU/L of MS2 Coliphage as a surrogate)

10

10%

To calculate the burden of disease, the disability-adjusted life years (DALY), is used as
“a single measure to quantify the burden of diseases, injuries and risk factors” (Christopher J. L.
Murray, 1996).
DALY = YLL + YLD

Equation 38

YLL is the years of life lost and YLD is the years lost due to disability.
The published data for DALY for 2004 diarrhoeal disease for South Africa was shown as
7.8 x 10-3, the data is provided in the appendix as Table B6. The values used for health impact in
this paper were calculated from the consequence for diarrheal diseases which are the most
prevalent from waterborne pathogens from unsanitary conditions. The numbers are based on the
WHO age-standardized DALYs per 100,000 and by cause, using member state publication from
DALY for diarrheal diseases.
For the local impact, the calculation is based on the impact on the local population which
is assumed to be about 1500 people. The worst-case scenario is assumed to be a situation where
there is no sanitation or recovered treated water, and the entire population is at risk from
diarrheal based diseases from lack of sanitation.
The attributable burden is calculated as follows:
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Attributable burden = IF x Estimated Population
where IF is the impact factor:
IF = ∑PiRri - ∑Pi'Rri
∑PiRri

Equation 40

•

Pi = Proportion of the population in the exposure category i

•

Pi’ = Proportion of the population in the exposure category i after an intervention or
other change.

•

RRi = Relative risk at exposure category i compared to the reference level.

The Pi’ impact population after the installation of the NEWgenerator on-site, is assumed
to be the highest number of the population likely to benefit from the installation of an advanced
decentralized sanitation system. This is evaluated from DALY numbers shown in the appendix,
for Africa, and is 4141 people affected per 100,000.
calculated from:
Population number death by Diarrhoeal disease = 42,235,590
Total population (both sexes) = 1,016,920 x000

DALY = 0.041410681
The preceding table shows the assumed numbers of times after the initial installation that
the NEWgenerator did not meet the ISO 30500 criteria.
Impact factor after the system reaches steady-state and meets ISO 30500 requirements is
calculated as shown below.
IF = Impact factor
Pi = Proportion of the population in exposure category i (assuming a community of 1500) =
0.04141 * 1500 = 62.11 (Rounded up to 63). This means that 63 people will probably get sick
and have a higher chance of death.
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1500 – 63 = 1437 Remaining people who can potentially get sick, but probability is lower i.e.
pathogenic exposure
Pi’ = Proportion of the population in exposure category i after an intervention or other change:
For bacteria death: (63 x 5%) = 3
For bacteria sickness: (1437 x 5%) = 72
For protozoa death: (63 x 3%) = 2
For protozoa sickness: (1437 x 3%) = 43
For helminths death: (63 x 1%) = 1
For helminths mild sickness: (1437 x 4%) = 14
For virus death: (63 x 10%) = 6
For virus mild sickness: (1437 x 10%) = 143
Table 4.61: Table of Calculated Affected Populations
Without NEWgenerator (DALY numbers)
With NEWgenerator at the pilot stage

E. Coli

Risk of Death
63
3

Risk of mild sickness
1437
72

Protozoa

2

43

Helminths

1

14

Virus

6

143

Total

12

272

(Average =3)

(Average =68)

RRi = Relative risk at exposure category i compared to the reference level.
This is the probability of failure of sanitation system versus a chosen reference scenario
e.g. a pit latrine that is likely to overflow or fail once in three years versus a situation where the
diarrhoeal disease occurs by other means, not sanitation failure.
RR can be determined as follows, by using the probability of dying or being disabled in a
life span from diarrheal disease equals DALY rate total diarrheal deaths.
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Furthermore, the risk of exposure to disease-causing material also needs to be estimated.
Contact risk (c) assuming most people are exposed on average due to being in the toilet 5
minutes per day = Exposure time in minutes / total number of minutes per day = 5 minutes /
1440 minutes in one day = 0.00347
Probability of Exposure (E) = Contact risk (c) x risk of technology failure (Reliability calculated
from the number of times ISO 30500 was not met out of total time) x DALY rate total diarrheal
deaths and illness = 0.0034 x [(95%+99%+97%+90%)/4] x 0.04141
= 0.0034 x 0.9525 x 0.04141 = 0.00013 = 1.3 x 10-4
where IF for death by diarrhoeal disease is:
(63 x 1.3 x 10-4) – (3 x 1.3 x 10-4))
(63 x 1.3 x 10-4)
Impact factor = 0.952 i.e. 95%
where IF for sickness by diarrhoeal disease is:
(1437 x 1.3 x 10-4) – (68 x 1.3 x 10-4)
(1437 x 1.3 x 10-4)
Impact factor = 0.9526 i.e. 95%
Attributable Burden means that the number of people less likely to be sick and die
compared to the original exposure population of 63 is now 0.81 x 63 = 60 out of 63, instead of 0
out of 63, and the number of people less likely to be sick compared to the original exposure
population of 1437 is now 0.95 x 1437 = 1365 out of 1437, instead of 0 from that group.
This means approximately 95% of the susceptible population will see a positive impact
from the installation of the NEWgenerator for E. coli, fecal coliforms, Protozoa, and helminths
as a minimum.
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The qualitative safety assessment shows that to maintain the safety reliability of the
NEWgenerator, it is important to contain and treat the highest pathogenic concentration and
reduce the risk of pathogenic transmission from the NEWgenerator effluent, compared with
baseline transmission levels in the environment. This process assumes that all incidents of
diarrhoeal disease are associated with direct contact with wastewater, however, the spread of
diarrhoeal disease generally requires a level of fecal-oral transmission which will be controlled,
in a sanitation improvement scenario such as this, by most users who use the facilities washing
their hands after toilet use. Additionally, the health significance of most pathogens is based on
persistence in water, resistance to disinfectant, and infectiousness.
To illustrate the efficacy of pathogenic material the table below illustrates the pathogenic
exposures.
The information in the table adapted from the UN Guidelines for drinking-water quality
(WHO, 2011) is used to assume the levels of unreliability associated with the failures in
pathogenic removal for the NEWgenerator.
Table 4.62: Table of Pathogenic Risk Exposures
Pathogenic
Parameter
E. coli
(CFU/mL)

Health
Significance
High

Persistence in Water

Resistance in Chlorine

Infectivity

Moderate

Low

High

Protozoa
(CFU/mL)
Helminths
(counts/L)
Virus (≠/mL)

High

Moderate to Long

High

High

High

Short to Moderate

Moderate

High

Moderate to
High

Long

Moderate

High

An expert decision can be made on whether a situation where 95% in the susceptible
population is good enough, bearing in mind this is in addition to the already protected majority
of the 1500 people already having improved sanitation.
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4.2.2.6 NEWgenerator Risk Reduction Factors (RRF)
When considering risk reduction in RAMS assessment of sanitation system failures, there
are two main options for assessing failure mode of operation. Systems either operate on-demand
or continuously. Demand functions only operate when needed to perform a safety or RAMS
function. When demand failures occur, they tend to impact RAMS very quickly, examples of
these are failure of the membrane backwash pump, which if it failed would impact the treatment
process very quickly by impacting operations of the treatment system. Demand failures normally
mean that the system affected needs to be fixed very quickly to reduce unavailability impact and
maintain reliability. A continuous mode function operates continuously as part of normal
operations and creates continuous mode failures e.g. A leak in the anaerobic membrane reactor
tank, failure of which though needs repair does not stop the sanitation system from working as
designed, and they may not impact reliability. Failure reduction for both services must be
accounted for in different ways. Failure of continuous functions usually occurs without creating a
RAMS failure, but demand mode failures affect RAMS, therefore we are concerned with
demand mode failures more so for RAMS than continuous mode failures. Continuous mode
failure occurs regularly and impacts RAMS however, they do not impact RAMS immediately, or
at least the stakeholder effect is secondary or compound. Therefore, the impact is normally felt
through lack of immediate intervention, Continuous mode failures cause less of an immediate
issue for RAMS levels when compared with demand mode failures, which can have
instantaneous impacts and are therefore higher priority.
Thus, for the list of 15 top risks identified the risk reduction factors can be calculated
from the reductions in probabilities of occurrence assessed for the unmitigated risks. Focusing on
the highest-ranking risks and maximum tolerable risks outcomes (shown in the table below)
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means the most cost-beneficial mitigative actions can be taken to achieve probability reductions.
The following risk assessment matrixes show the new QRM scenarios after the mitigations have
been put in place. Finally, a new FMEA is conducted to show the risk reduction achieved by
mitigating the original risk levels. Note that the risk levels remain the same because the
consequence of failure does not change, due to the technology remaining unchanged, but the
probability of occurrence is reduced, thus reducing the overall risk from failure.
To mitigate most risks, there is usually an overall activity that can be taken to mitigate most of
the risks, though this is not always the case. It is important to understand risk as continuous and
not discrete. Therefore, the mitigating act required to fix an identified pathogenic release safety
risk which is the highest risk identified would be an increase in technical expertise so that any
pathogenic releases can be quickly brought under control before escalation to the community for
example. In unique identifier cases, 10 and 11 shown in tables 4.66 and 4.67, the way to mitigate
a release of pathogenic material is to have the right level of expertise locally to reduce the impact
of any releases as well as the housing of the components in secondary containment to reduce the
probability of people coming into contact with pathogenic material. It means that focusing on
technical expertise, secondary containment, and affordability i.e. economics will reduce most of
the risks associated with the NEWgenerator, as long as the system treats the wastewater as per
design. Thus, risk can be addressed in a continuum, and a few effective mitigative measures can
be used to mitigate most of the risks identified. For example, measurement of free chlorine in the
treated water tank as a trigger for additional manual dosing in the operational procedures.
Technical knowledge involves having on-hand technical expertise which can rectify
issues very quickly, and therefore requires investment in local experts who can respond
immediately to issues as they occur.
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Overflow

Blockage of
outlet

Overflow

Blockage in
pipe

No flush
water

R

Design
failure

Rupture

S

Mitigations

Blockage of
outlet

RRF Range

S

Highest
Ranking
Aspect in
QRM

Rupture

Technical
Expertise

Damage/desi
gn failure

Safety

6

S

Public

5

No flush
water

Environment

4

Blockage in
Pipe

Economics

3

Highest
RAM impact

2

Failure Mode

1

Failure

Unique
identifier

Table 4.63: NEWgenerator Combined Table of Maximum Tolerable Risk (MTR)

II

I

I

I

IV

Technical
knowledge

Definite/Likely
RRF range =1 10

III

I

I

I

IV

Technical
knowledge

Definite/Unlikely
RRF range =100 1000

Ensure effective local technical
expertise to respond to blockages
within 24hours, so that issues are
unlikely to affect the front-end
Ensure effective local technical
expertise to respond fix immediate
issues by connecting to alternative
water source/ensuring treated water
recycle is functional during the
period to replace the damaged tank.

II

I

I

I

IV

Technical
knowledge

Definite/Likely
RRF range =1 10

II

I

I

I

IV

Technical
knowledge

Definite/Unlikely
RRF range =100 1000

II

I

I

I

IV

Technical
knowledge

Definite/Unlikely
RRF range =100 1000

Ensure effective local technical
expertise to respond to blockages
within 24hours, so that issues are
unlikely to affect the front-end

III

II

I

I

V

Technical
knowledge

Definite/Occasion
ally
RRF range =10 100

Ensure effective local technical
expertise to respond fix immediate
issues by stemming leak and
prevent the pathogenic release and
replacing damaged pipe before
issues affect the front-end

S

S

Ensure effective local technical
expertise to respond to blockages
within 24hours, so that issues are
unlikely to affect the front-end
Ensure effective local technical
expertise to respond to blockages
within 24hours, so that issues are
unlikely to affect the front-end
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Loss of
biomass
activity

R

Mitigations

discharge of
disinfectant
material to frontend

RRF Range

R

Highest Ranking
Aspect in QRM

Blockag
e of pipe

Technical
Expertise

Insoluble
/accumulation of
solids in the pipe

Safety

R

Public

Blockag
e of pipe

Environment

Insoluble
/accumulation of
solids in the pipe

Economics

9

Highest RAM
impact

8

Failure Mode

7

Failure

Unique identifier

Table 4.63: (Continued)

II

I

I

I

V

Technical
knowledge

Definite/Likely
RRF range =1 - 10

Ensure effective local technical
expertise to respond to blockages
within 24hours, so that issues are
unlikely to affect the front-end

II

I

I

I

V

Technical
knowledge

Definite/Likely
RRF range =1 - 10

Ensure effective local technical
expertise to respond to blockages
within 24hours, so that issues are
unlikely to affect the front-end

V

I

I

I

V

Economics (E)/
Technical
knowledge
(TK)

E: Definite/Definite
RRF range =none
TK: Definite/Unlikely
RRF range =100 1000

Ensure effective local
affordability, by setting up a
system of collective payment by
the local community and have the
local technical expertise
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Design
failure

Rupture

Mitigations

Rupture

RRF Range

Design
failure

Highest
Ranking
Aspect in
QRM

rupture

Technical
Expertise

design
failure or
damage

Safety

S

Public

Leak

Environment

13

design
failure or
damage

Economics

12

Highest RAM
impact

11

Failure Mode

10

Failure

Unique
identifier

Table 4.63: (Continued)

II

II

II

III

V

Technical
knowledge/
Safety

S:
Likely/Unlikely
RRF range =10 100
TK:
Definite/Unlikely
RRF range =100 1000

Ensure effective local technical expertise/ CAB
protection as secondary containment for any
leakages

V

II

II

III

V

Technical
knowledge/
Safety

S: Likely/Unlikely
RRF range =10 100
TK:
Definite/Unlikely
RRF range =100 1000

Ensure effective local technical expertise/ CAB
protection as secondary containment for any
leakages

II

II

II

II

IV

Technical
knowledge

Definite/Unlikely
RRF range =100 1000

Ensure effective local technical expertise to
respond to pipe rupture and replace damaged
pipe and valve, so that issues are unlikely to
affect the front-end

III

I

I

I

IV

Technical
knowledge

Definite/Unlikely
RRF range =100 1000

Ensure effective local technical expertise to
respond to pipe rupture and replace damaged
pipe and valve, so that issues are unlikely to
affect the front-end

S

S

R
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I

I

V

V

I

I

I

V

S

Mitigations

I

RRF Range

V

Economics/
Technical
knowledge

E: Definite/Definite
RRF range =none
TK: Definite/Unlikely
RRF range =100 - 1000

Ensure effective local affordability,
by setting up a system of collective
payment by the local community and
have the local technical expertise

Economics
(E)/ Technical
knowledge
(TK)

E: Definite/Definite
RRF range =none
TK: Definite/Unlikely
RRF range =100 - 1000

Ensure effective local affordability,
by setting up a system of collective
payment by the local community and
have the local technical expertise

Highest
Ranking
Aspect in
QRM

Contaminated water in
the treatment tank

Tech.

Failure
of
treatment

Safety

S

Public

Rupture

Env.

Tank
damage
or failure

Econ.

Highest RAM
impact

15

Failure Mode

14

Failure

Unique
identifier

Table 4.63: (Continued)

Table 4.64: NEWgenerator Mitigated Inherent Risks Matrix Economics
Risk Level

Economics

V

>USD $10 per person to USD $100 per person

IV
III

>USD $1 per person to USD $10 per person
>USD $0.1 per person to USD $1 per person

II

>USD $0.01 per person to USD $0.1 per person

I

<USD $0.01 per person

Definite

Likely

Occasional

15

9,

11,14

Unlikely

Remote

Rare

Unlikely

Remote

Rare

2,6
1, 3,4,5,7,8,

10, 12, 13

Definite

Likely

Occasional
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Table 4.65: NEWgenerator Mitigated Inherent Risks Matrix Safety

Risk Level
III
II
I

Likely

Occasional

Unlikely
10,11,

Remote

Rare

Occasional

Unlikely

Remote

Rare

12
2,6,13,14
Likely

Table 4.66: NEWgenerator Mitigated Inherent Risks Matrix Technical knowledge

Risk Level

Technical knowledge

V

Requires a high level of technical expertise e.g. education to advanced level (1
year) and multiple years’ experience in the field

IV

Requires moderate technical expertise e.g. Basic education with (up to 1-year
training) and no experience in the field

Definite

Likely

Occasional

Unlikely

6

7,8,9,15

1, 3

Definite

Likely

Remote

Rare

Remote

Rare

2,4,5,10,11,12,13,14,

Occasional

Unlikely
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Affordability means the creation of a process by which the local community can
contribute to the upkeep of the sanitation system fairly and sustainably, so that when the outside
influence is no longer on location the community can still afford to keep the technology
operational, by investing in the reliability, availability, and maintenance of the system. Thus,
creating a more cost-effective process for risk mitigation, and if some risks are of special
interest, they can be addressed specifically and mitigated due to the unique threat that they pose.
Then the RAMS assessment for the aspects is conducted to determine where the best
maintenance strategies and design strategies can be applied to ensure that the risks identified are
mitigated, so the probability of occurrence is reduced in the first instance.
The before and after mitigation RPN chart for the NEWgenerator showed that there are
some opportunities to improve the reliability and maintainability of the system, however many of
the improvements overlap. So, improving the reliability of a particular component tends to affect
more than that one component. It could influence other components, by improving their
operability as well, compromise it and can highlight opportunities to have further flexibilities
within the system. An example of this is the installation of an additional equalization tank. This
will increase buffer storage capacity, but it will also introduce more maintenance due to the
additional component, which is the tank, and at the same time, it will increase the flexibility of
the entire system in a crisis scenario, by providing more capacity for the system to be offline for
longer periods before needing intervention for repair. This is expected with an advanced
decentralized sanitation system with many interconnected components that work in harmony
with each other.
The results of the assessment are detailed in the following tables.
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1
Plastic
pipe with
valve

No flush
water

5

9

10

450

User/Community

S

S

Pipe with
low
flow/low
pressure
alarm

% Risk
reduction after
the measure

RPN after
mitigation

Detection

Occurrence

Severity

Improvements
measures

Highest RAMS

Stakeholder

RPN before
mitigation

Detection

Occurrence

Severity

Failure Mode

Name

Unique
Identifier

Table 4.67: NEWgenerator FMEA Post Improvement Measures

5

8

6

240

47%

9

8

6

432

40%

5

8

6

240

47%

5

8

6

240

47%

5

8

6

240

47%

2
overhead
water
storage
tank

Rupture

9

8

10

720

Sanitation
Engineer /
Technician/
Service provider

overhead
water
storage
tank

Overflow

5

9

10

450

User/Community

S

Overflow

5

9

10

450

User/Community

S

No flush
water

5

9

10

450

User/Community

R

3

4

5

overhead
water
storage
tank
Municipal
top up
line/treated
water to up
line

Alarm
level
transmitter
Pipe with
low
flow/low
pressure
alarm
Pipe with
low
flow/low
pressure
alarm
Pipe with
low
flow/low
pressure
alarm
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6

Pipe to
Pump P1

Rupture

9

8

7

% Risk
reduction after
the measure

RPN after
mitigation

Detection

Occurrence

Severity

Improvements
measures

Highest RAMS

Stakeholder

RPN before
mitigation

Detection

Occurrence

Severity

Failure Mode

Name

Unique
Identifier

Table 4.67: (Continued)

S

Pipe with
low
flow/low
pressure
alarm

5

8

7

280

44%

R

Pipe with
low
flow/low
pressure
alarm

5

8

7

280

48%

5

8

7

280

48%

3

9

5

135

81%

504

User/Community

540

Sanitation
Engineer /
Technician/
Service provider

540

Sanitation
Engineer /
Technician/
Service provider

R

720

Sanitation
Engineer /
Technician/
Service provider

R

7
Pipe
from
pump p1
to valve

Blockage
of pipe

6

9

10

8

Valve to
treatment

Blockage
of pipe

Reactor

Loss of
biomass
activity

6

9

10

9

8

9

10

Pipe with
low
flow/low
pressure
alarm
Biomass
loss
indication
(e.g. biogas
generation
reduction
trend) and
divert to
rework tank
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% Risk
reduction after
the measure

RPN after
mitigation

Detection

Occurrence

Severity

Improvements
measures

Highest RAMS

Stakeholder

RPN before
mitigation

Detection

Occurrence

Severity

Failure Mode

Name

Unique
Identifier

Table 4.67: (Continued)

10

Reactor

Leak

8

8

9

576

Sanitation
Engineer /
Technician/
Service
provider

448

Sanitation
Engineer /
Technician/
Service
provider

448

Sanitation
Engineer /
Technician/
Service
provider

S

480

Sanitation
Engineer /
Technician/
Service
provider

R

S

House reactor in
secondary
containment (e.g.
CAB)

3

8

9

216

63%

S

House reactor in
secondary
containment (e.g.
CAB)

3

8

9

216

52%

3

8

9

216

52%

3

8

9

216

55%

11

Reactor

rupture

8

8

7

12

Pipe to
valve

Rupture

8

8

7

13

Backwash
line

Rupture

6

8

10

Ensure pipes with
raw wastewater
are within
secondary
containment (e.g.
CAB)
Ensure pipes with
raw wastewater
are within
secondary
containment (e.g.
CAB)

278

14

Chlorination
tank

Rupture

6

8

9

432

Sanitation
Engineer /
Technician/
Service
provider

729

Sanitation
Engineer /
Technician/
Service
provider

Chlorination
tank

9

9

9

% Risk
reduction
after the
measure

RPN after
mitigation

Detection

Occurrence

Severity

S

Automatic
online
residual
chlorine
measurement
and alarm

6

8

4

192

56%

S

Automatic
online
residual
chlorine
measurement
and alarm

6

8

4

192

74%

15
Contaminated
water in
treatment
tank

Improvemen
ts measures

Highest
RAMS

Stakeholder

RPN before
mitigation

Detection

Occurrence

Severity

Failure
Mode

Name

Unique
Identifier

Table 4.67: (Continued)
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Figure 4.26: RPN of NEWgenerator Before and After RAMS Mitigations
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Figure 4.27: Spider chart of NEWgenerator Before and After Mitigation RPNs
Blue = before, Yellow = After, Green = Overlap because excluded in rationalization phase
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4.3 Adapting the RAMS Framework to communities: ISO 31800
ISO 31800, a standard for community-scale fecal sludge treatment units, is further
developed than ISO 30500 in its consideration for reliability, availability, maintainability,
and safety. However, it stops short of guiding exactly how these can be applied practically.
Thus, a simple adaptation of the RAMS framework can be used for the RAMS assessment of
community-based systems that serve 1,000 – 100,000 users as prescribed by the IOS 31800
standard. The RAMS process for phases 1 to 4 are essentially the same but adapted for
systems which will cater to more front-end users. If the sanitation systems are a combination
of multiple treatment systems arranged in parallel and/or in series, phase 4 “Mathematical
Method for RAMS assessment” which is the mathematical method for the RAMS assessment
will need to consider the impact of networked connections on the calculations for Reliability,
Availability, Maintainability, and Safety.
The process will need to describe subsystems as several functional blocks that are
interconnected, and according to the effect of failure within each block, the failure of the
overall system RAMS is determined. The easiest way to do this is to show the system as a
series of interconnected reliability blocks as shown below, depending on whether they are
connected in series or parallel, as follows:

Figure 4.28: Sanitation System in Series
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Figure 4.29: Sanitation System in Parallel

Figure 4.30: System with a Combination of Series and Parallel Connections
The first figure to follow shows a series diagram representing a system of two blocks
such that the failure of either block prevents the operation of the system. The next figure shows a
situation where both blocks must fail for the system to fail. This is known as a parallel, or
redundancy, case (Smith, 2017). The combination system shows a combination of series and
parallel, where there might be several permutations of failure required for the system to fail,
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giving more complexity but perhaps more reliability due to lack of a single point of failure, for
example, if Block B fails there are alternative paths via blocks C and E. It represents a system
that will only fail if block A fails because it is a point of common failure which affects all other
downstream blocks; or if all of, block B, block C, and E fail at the same time. The failure of B or
C or D or E on their own is insufficient to cause a system failure.
For systems in series the reliability failure rate is mathematically calculated as follows:
λ Block A + λ Block B + ……λn – (λ Block A λ Block B ……λn)

Equation 44

For systems in Parallel (where failures are truly independent of each other)
λ Block A x λ Block B x ……. λ n

Equation 45

For the Combination system shown above its

{λ Block A + {[(λ Block B + λ Block D) – (λ Block B x λ Block D)]x[λ Block C] x [λ Block E]}} - {λ Block A x {[(λ
Block B + λ Block D)

– (λ Block B x λ Block D)]x[λ Block C] x [λ Block E]}}

Equation 46

Depending on whether the subsystems are connected in series and/or in parallel the
overall failure rate for the entire subsystem or system is determined by using the computation of
failure rate calculation for series or in parallel, or a combination of both which is more
complicated as shown in equation 38. , Boundaries should be created around the smallest
neighboring systems, which are calculated in parallel or series depending on the configuration,
the boundaries are gradually widened to include neighboring subsystems where the connecting
relationships are used to compute the failure rates until the entire macro system is included in the
calculation. The failure rate is then used to determine the PFD for the entire system.
For the Availability frequency function, the failure rate (λ) in the equation of A = 1/(1+λτ) can be
estimated using the computations for a parallel, series system, or combination system. The
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calculation for overall unavailability can be obtained using the same criteria for calculating
unavailability for single systems as shown below:
Failure = Unavailability = downtime / (uptime + downtime) = td / T
The average unavailability of the system can be determined by finding the mean
unavailability as follows:
Unavailability of Block A + Unavailability f Block B + Unavailability of Block n
Number of Ns
Maintenance computations of the MTBF is simply replaced by the MTTR, and λ is
replaced by µ, and the same computations for a system in series, parallel, or in combination is
the same process.
Microbial Safety assessment is based on using DALYs to determine the impact factor for
the communal sanitation system is the same. The DALY numbers are used to estimate the impact
factor for each sanitation system. It is important to report the impact factor for each sanitation
system independently and not as an average of all systems which are in combination, parallel, or
in series so that systems which score very low impact factors do not get an inflated higher score
when averaging with systems which score very high for the same population.
4.4 Conclusion of Applications of RAMS in Sanitation
A look at the charts generated for the risk ranking for the two technologies assessed
shows that an advanced decentralized system such as the NEWgenerator has the lowest overall
risk when it comes to safely neutralizing pathogenic material which can lead to diarrhoeal
disease, which is unsurprising. The reliability of the system is enhanced by the ability of the
system to produce treated water as per the design to facilitate flushing, especially useful to have
in areas where clean water availability is an issue for sanitation achievement. However, there are
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residual risks that cannot be mitigated, and will remain as inherent risks (e.g. theft, vandalism,
software issues, etc) that have to be managed for advanced decentralized non-sewered sanitation
systems, hence the overlap in the before and after RPNs for the NEWgenerator. The reliability
of the pour-flush pit latrine on the other hand is very dependent on the number of users per
standard pit built, and available space over time. The ability to control the fill rate by providing
multiple pit options for the users, in turn highly influences the reliability of pit latrines. It also
requires the use of acceptable wipe materials and correct structural methods of erection to
prevent falls in and groundwater infiltration/contamination.
The reliability of the NEWgenerator is greatly enhanced by the presence of local
technical expertise. Meaning that issues with the system can be quickly diagnosed and fixed this
is the most important aspect for the NEWgenerator RAMS. This aspect is probably true of all
advanced sanitation systems. Thus, the primary stakeholder most affected by the highest-ranking
aspects of the NEWgenerator risk assessment is the sanitation engineer/technology provider.
Systems that are more technically require more technical expertise and the ability to respond to
technical issues quickly. Economics also plays an important role in the RAMS of the
NEWgenerator. The community must pay for future maintenance and upkeep of the system,
including paying for the local technological expertise to keep the system online once the
technology provider/outside influence providing the technology has left the community. This
approach ensures that the system has longevity and local users have a vested interest in the
success of the system. This is shown in the fact that the highest-ranking aspects have economics
and technology expertise as the most important risks to consider for mitigations of
NEWgenerator’s inherent risks, assuming the system runs as intended.
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In terms of availability, the availability of the NEWgenerator is high at > than 99%. This
is exceptional for an advanced system and is because availability impacts on the front-end are
vastly mitigated by having intermediate storage between the user interface and the treatment
section in the form of the equalization tank. This mitigation increases the front-end availability
of the system. Having the buffer storage allows impacts in the middle of the advanced sanitation
system to be separated from the user interface. Advanced decentralized systems that possess
none or small buffer volumes between the user interface and the treatment section such as the
Cranfield Nanomembrane toilet, would need to have perfect RAMS to negate the no buffer
effect. Perfect RAMS is impossible, so such systems will likely require high volume
maintenance visits to mitigate reliability failure occurrences.
Pit latrines by design can provide 100% availability if they are not full and have more
than one user interface. However, as illustrated in the RAMS assessment, the cost of
implementing good design and structural integrity of pit latrines which fit all the required safety
criteria to prevent fall in, foul smell and fly infestation, hygiene levels, etc., can mount up very
quickly for a community. In the case of the example community of 100 people, there was a
calculated rate for 18 pit latrines at 3.5m3 volumetric capacity to meet a 10year empty rate or
10pit latrines emptied on a 5-year cycle. The cost of emptying the pits more frequently will need
to be added into the recurring cost of pit maintenance, thus making this option more costly, to
begin with, but a ten-year cycle for 18pits is more costly overall. Additionally, the lack of
resource recovery means that there are no additional benefits from the system, apart from the
initial sanitation benefit.
Maintainability for the NEWgenerator has been calculated using past maintenance
events. The calculations show that the most important maintenance events are the regeneration of
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the zeolite beds which can be at a regular interval of 16days, to achieve the shape parameter (β)
equals to or around 1, which indicates a predictive maintenance program or the effluent can be
monitored and regeneration instigated based on effluent lab sample results. This approach
requires a set criterion predetermined to say at what levels the bed should be regenerated. This
approach may be better where access to fresh zeolite bed is harder and as costs benefit dictates,
plus if the water is of sufficient quality for flushing even when the parameter levels start to
reduce from ISO 30500 levels for human hygiene. A risk-based decision can be made on how
recycled water is treated and re-used based on the level of contact with humans. Risk-based
approaches are valid for maintenance and a choice should be made based on economics,
convenience, safety, and the technical expertise available, to change the bed.
The maintainability of the pit latrine is more simplistic than that of the NEWgenerator,
however, the cost of maintenance must be factored into the design stages of the pit latrine
installation. The maintenance of pit latrines would be generally lower than that of advanced
systems, however, the actual maintenance activities would most likely be higher because of the
increased need to keep pathogenic material contained within the pit thorough cleaning of the user
interface. The cleaning and hygiene would not require technical expertise to achieve.
The safety assessment of the NEWgenerator showed that the system will improve the sanitation
of 85% to 87% of the population from the starting baseline. The most important aspects for
ensuring the RAMS based safety of the NEWgenerator is ensuring that the contents of the
reactor do not leak to the community/environment or any drinkable watercourse. Also, the
quality of the effluent (if discharged) to the environment is high and without pathogenic material.
If the treated water is re-used and there is direct contact with community users during re-use, it is
of vital importance that the reliability of the treatment process is high enough so that there is no
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accidental leak of pathogenic material into the recycled water system. To further prevent
ingestion by the local population, handwashing must be promoted, and handwashing stations
provided, as is the case with the NEWgenerator. The NEWgenerator can meet all the
requirements for ISO 30500 (Category A) and was able to do so consistently after the initial
technology trial stages, this makes it an “appropriate technology” in terms of sanitation
provision. There were several times that the ISO 30500 requirement was not met in the early
development stages of the NEWgenerator pilot., but these were rectified based on learning from
failures. The parameters post-pilot phase is now consistently within the ISO 30500 requirements.
Incremental improvements and fine-tuning of the technology helped achieve the ISO 30500
requirements, so by redesigning and adding mitigations to the system, it was able to meet the
minimum safety requirements of the ISO standard. Now the system can achieve consistent safety
levels as per the RAMS framework methodology.
There are no LRV reductions associated with the pit latrine. Therefore, on the microbial
safety aspect, it is the least favorable sanitation option compared with the MURT. It does
however improve sanitation by fecal sludge containment and reduces fecal-oral transmission of
diarrhoeal disease as a result. It is an improvement in sanitation when compared with having no
alternative options.
The tables below illustrate side by side the RAMS outputs of the NEWgenerator and the
pour-flush pit latrine assessed with the RAMS framework methodology.
Green and a score of 3 indicates high RAMS scores, a score of 2 and color yellow
indicates medium, and a score of 1 and color red indicates a low RAMS score.

289

Safety

Maintainab
ility

VIP
Lat
rine

The availability of the
VIP latrine is high as
long as it is designed
to accommodate the
population it serves,
and /or is emptied on a
frequent enough basis
that pits are not
abandoned.
Abandoned pits will
require new structures
to be built to prevent
open defection and
increase in diarrhoeal
disease incidents, thus
adding unplanned
costs.

NE
Wg
en.

VIP
Lat
rine

NE
Wg
en.
Hig
h
fron
tend
avai
labil
ity
due
to
the
mult
iple
num
bers
of
cubi
cles.

VIP
Lat
rine

If the system is
designed to serve a
comparable
population as the
NEWgenerator, then
the initial capital
costs are
comparable.
Operational costs
are lower over the
lifetime of the
system because
costs are cleaning
costs not a
component and/or
machinery costs, as
will be the case with
the NEWgenerator.

NE
Wg
en.

E
c
o
n
o
m
i
c
s

The system
has a highreliability
requirement
and therefore
high capital,
and
maintenance
costs are
needed to
ensure that
reliable
components
are used in
the system,
to maintain
the levels of
RAMS.

VIP
Lat
rine

NE
Wg
en.

Reliability

Availability

Table 4.68: Comparison of NEWgenerator and Pour Flush VIP Latrines: Economics

The NEWgenerator has
high maintenance costs
due to the advanced
technology which is
inherent in the system.
The costs are also affected
by how easy the system is
to repair, difficult to
maintain components will
incur higher maintenance
costs either because of
technician labour costs or
the cost of replacement.
The NEWgenerator has
some components with
expended repair
/replacement times such
as the zeolite bed,
however, this can be
mitigated with
intermediate blackwater
storage. The cost of
intermediate storage
means that the overall
economics can be higher
depending on how big the
required tankage is.

Maintenance
cost is variable
and depends on
the requirement
of the user
community in
terms of the
level of cleaning
required but it
can vary from
low to
moderate, when
compared with
an advanced
system like the
NEWgenerator,
it is very low..

Higher safety
achievement for
relative cost due
to the inherent
design of the
NEWgenerator
system, because it
treats waste onsite, which
meaning no
collection and
transfer safety
costs, which is
determined by
human exposure
to pathogenic
material from
fecal waste.

The cost of
treatment
will be
comparable
to the cost of
onsite
treatment,
however,
there is also
emptying
and transfer
safety costs,
which may
be higher if
pathogenic
exposure
occurs in
transit.

290

VIP
Latrine

NEWg
en.

VIP
Latrine

Safety

NEWg
en.

Availability

The VIP Latrine
with adjustments
to the front-end
can reduce the
occurrence of
malodorous events
and fly infestation.
However,
contamination and
infiltration of
groundwater with
diarrhoeal causing
pathogens is an
inherent risk of
below-ground pits
and can only be
fully mitigated by
above-ground
storage systems at
additional cost.

The
ability for
users to
use
several
front-end
interfaces
reduces
the
occurrenc
e of open
defection
in the case
of the
NEWgene
rator.
Also,
cubicles
are secure
which
encourage
s more
usage.

VIP
Latrine

NEWg
en.

Reliability
VIP
Latrine

NEWg
en.
E
n
v
i
r
o
n
m
e
n
t

The
NEWgenerat
or has a
lower impact
on the
environment
in terms of
odor and
flies
infestation.
It also fares
better in the
prevention
of
contaminatio
n of
groundwater
and
discharges of
pathogenic
material
within the
community.

Maintainability

Table 4.69: Comparison of NEWgenerator and Pour Flush VIP Latrines: Environment

The ability
for users to
use several
front-end
interfaces –
several
pits,
reduces the
occurrence
of open
defection
in the case
of the
latrine.
Also,
structures
that are
made
secure will
encourage
more
usage.

The maintainability of
the NG is more
complicated however
if left unmanaged the
potential impacts on
the environment are
limited to the
immediate
environment of the
NG and any spills will
be detectible from
changes in pressure,
flows, and sample
results, thus reducing
the risk of long-term
undetected impact.
However, the
reputational damage if
an environmental
incident occurred due
to predictable failures
will be higher in the
novel engineered
system.

The
maintainability
of the pit
latrine is more
simplistic than
that of the
NEWgenerator
, however, a
lack of
maintenance
can have
potentially
more
environmental
effects in this
system than in
the
NEWgenerator
because of the
risk of
structural
failure and
drinking water
contamination.

The impact of
safety from the
NEWgenerator
is better
managed
because samples
are taken to
detect any
failures within
the system, also
the measurement
of flow and
other parameters
means that mass
balances can be
done to
determine if
there are any
missing volumes
which can be
investigated for
environmental
releases.

A well built and
maintained system will
be less prone to leak to
groundwater, however,
the risk of environmental
release leading to
pathogenic release is
much higher from the pit
latrine system
Additionally, during
emptying and transfer,
the risk of environmental
releases is higher if waste
is treated at alternative
locations wo where waste
is generated, because this
shifts the burden of
contamination to a
different community,
creating a secondary or
compound effect failure.
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Safety
VIP
Latrine

The
maintainability
perception of the
NEWgenerator is
highly dependent
on the presence
of local experts
who can respond
to and fix issues
quickly. Thus,
public perception
maintainability is
highly skewed by
response time.

The maintainability perception
of the pit latrine in terms of
public perception is highly
dependent on the community
spend, therefore if the
community sees the spending
as good value for money then
the system will have a good
image. This means that the
perception is in the hands of
the local community
themselves, unlike in the case
for the NEWgenerator where it
is in the hands of community
engagement of the technology
experts' perceived response to
issues.

NEWgen.

VIP
Latrine

The NEWgenerator
will have similar
public perception
availability risks as
the VIP latrine if
there are a similar
number of front-end
interfaces. Cleaning
patterns will impact
the perception of
accessibility in both
types of sanitation
options.

NEWgen.

Availability
VIP
Latrine

The public
perception of
the
NEWgenerat
or is more
likely to be
damaged
than that of a
pit latrine if
there are
recurring
reliability
issues from it
because it is
new
technology.

NEWgen.

VIP
Latrine

Reliabili70
NEWgen.
P
u
b
l
i
c
p
e
r
c
e
p
t
i
o
n

The pit latrine’s reliability is
highly dependent on build
quality, which is highly
impacted by the choice of
builder used by the community
themselves. However, it is an
established system and
unlikely to be impacted by
public perception by incidents
that occur in a particular
location. However, generally,
pit latrines do not have the best
public perception as a baseline,
due to issues with groundwater
contamination, fall in and
dumping, but reputational
damage will be non-existent
on a global scale due to outcry
from localized incidents.

Maintainability

Table 4.70: Comparison of NEWgenerator and Pour Flush VIP Latrines: Public Perception

The public perception of
the NEWgenerator is
more likely to be
damaged far more than
that of a pit latrine if
there is a major safety
incident from it because
it is new technology.
The pit latrine being
established technology
will suffer less image
damage even if things
were to go wrong.
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Table 4.71: Comparison of NEWgenerator and Pour Flush VIP Latrines: Microbial Safety

Safety

The
NEWgenerator is
inherently safer
from a
pathogenic
reduction
standpoint than a
pit latrine. Thus,
it can be said to
be more reliable
in terms of
reducing the
spread of
diarrhoeal
diseases in the
community
compared with a
VIP latrine.

The cleaning of the front-end so
that it is hygienic and sanitary,
and therefore available for abuse
is similar in both technologies.
The community and or
technology providers must
dedicate some effort to regular
daily cleaning of the front-end
facilities to encourage use,
without contact with fecal
matter. However the
NEWgenerator has handwash
facilities as standard, a pit latrine
may or may not have ablution
facilities, which can impact the
ability to maintain hygienic
conditions and provide safety for
users of the front-end facilities in
a pit latrine system. Lack of
water can also affect the regular
cleaning of the stalls. So the
inherent design of the
NEWgenerator with clean water
facilities means that for a VIP
Latrine to have similar levels of
safety availability, it would need
reliable clean water provision
such as an accessible tap(s) close
to the facilities.

The maintenance aspect of
the NEWgenerator to
ensure that it continues to
provide a safe method of
reduction of entropy in
wastewater is more
involved than that of the pit
latrine, therefore the
NEWgenerator requires
more maintenance time.
However, simple systems
that are easy to diagnose
and maintain have been
chosen for the system
meaning that if there is
local expertise maintenance
of the system should be
assured, leading to high
maintainability.

If the community has a
robust system of
emptying, removal,
transportation, and
treatment of pit latrine
sludge then it will require
regular emptying every 210years dependent on the
number of pits. With a
sound sanitation value
chain, the levels of safety
provided by the pit latrine
can be higher than
standard, however, this
will add costs of
maintenance to the
system and increase the
operational maintenance
costs.

The NG meets the
IOS30500 requirements for
the safety of decentralized
sanitation systems, and if
there are additional
measures in place such as
additional sodium
hypochlorite dosing to
meet the 0.5mg/l residual
Chlorine ISO 30500
requirements, there will be
even higher levels of safety
during the disinfection
system offline times.
Additionally, the
Electrochlorinator could be
spared, however, this
creates further complexities
and costs which are not
necessarily beneficial in
the longer term.

VIP
Latrine

VIP
Latrine

NEWge
n.

Safety

NEWge
n.

VIP
Latrine

Maintainability

NEWge
n.

Availability

VIP
Latrine

NEWge
n.

Reliability

There is no
LRV associated
with the pit
latrine.
Therefore, on
the microbial
safety front, it is
the least
favourable
sanitation
option and does
not meet any of
the ISO 30500
criteria for
decentralized
sanitation
systems.
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Table 4.72: Comparison of NEWgenerator and Pour Flush VIP Latrines: Technical Knowledge
Reliability

NEWgenerator

T
e
c
h
n
i
c
a
l
k
n
o
w
l
e
d
g
e

Availability
NEWgenerator
VIP Latrine

Maintainability

VIP Latrine

In all cases the levels of technical
expertise required to maintain the
reliability of the NEWgenerator is
higher than that of the pit latrine
system, however, this creates a more
reliable system locally managed by
the community themselves, and
providing better sanitation overall.

Safety

NEWgenenator
In all cases, the levels of technical expertise required
to maintain the availability and maintainability of the
NG is higher than that of the pit latrine system. For
the pit latrine, it is essentially the cleanliness of the
front-end interface, whereas for the NEWgenerator it
is ensuring the entire treatment system and
particularly in the intermediate water storage,
membranes, and zeolite bed systems are reliable and
working, so that downstream issues do not
immediately impact the user interface and that any
downtime associated with the system is limited. This
can be achieved by planning maintenance for a
.specific week in the year when all work will be
carried out, however, there has to be enough
equalization storage capacity to store all waste
without impacting the front end during the is
turnaround(TAR) period, to maintain high availability
of the system Additionally, the length of time taken
for TAR, is highly dependent on how easily items can
be repaired and brought back into service i.e. high
maintainability because the more difficult that process
id the longer the offline time. Having the right levels
of expertise on hand will influence the length of time
taken for repairs because there would be no need to
wait around for the right expertise to be available,
work can begin as scheduled. Easy access to
consumables like salt, simple spare parts, and
supplies, are also critical actors in the maintainability
of the NEWgenerator, which is not the case with the
VIP latrine.

VIP Latrine

In all cases, the levels of microbial safety provided by
the NEWgenerator are higher than that of the VIP
latrine, and as such there are many more complex
parts required for operation. Failure of components
can lead to a breakthrough in pathogenic material, in
the effluent which can cause diarrhoeal diseases
causing illness and death. The presence of local
experts who can quickly diagnose issues and repair
problems is therefore crucially part of the
NEWgenerator’s mode of normal operation because
this ensures the safety levels of the system, The
expectation is that to maintain the correct levels of
pathogenic destruction the NEWgenerator, service
providers will need to employ local experts who can
monitor the system, take influent and effluent samples
for lab analysis to assure pathogenic destruction. The
local experts will also need to be able to interpret
results to diagnose problems. This requires a high
level of study perhaps up to associate degree level s in
the sciences.
There is no level of technical expertise required for
the VIP latrine, however, it is prudent to use skilled
workmen for the construction of the latrine and train
the users in the benefits of basic hygiene as standard.
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Table 4.73: 100 People Function and Service Definitions for Case Study
Multiple User –
100 people

NEWgenerator

VIP Latrine

Front-end

Middle

Back-end

Back-end

User Interface (1)

Transfer – Primary
Treatment (2)

Waste Treatment
(3a) and Resource
Recovery (3b)

Recovered
Resource Delivery
(4)

Cost and safety Reliable. Technical
knowledge requirement poses the
highest risk if issues arise elsewhere
within the system.
Reliable – energy saving and no
water. Costly when compared to an
advanced system which will offer
treatment option as well as waste
separation from humans.

Reliable when
compared with
centralized systems Shorter runs
Generally, not
applicable – but can
have a very short run of
pour-flush user
interface

Reliable - Wellknown technology
membrane-based
Technology
Unreliable – Due to
service being only
provided outside of
the scope

Reliable shorter runs

Unreliable – Due to
service being only
provided outside of
the scope

Assumed overall
reliability to be
predicted by the
framework
High RAMS

Low RAMS

All the above favor the NEWgenerator as the far better sanitation option for the scenarios assessed as shown below.
Table 4.74 Comparison Table for Pit Latrine and NEWgenerator
Reliability
Sludge removal

Pit Latrine
Medium
Low

Technical expertise

Not required

Microbial safety
Safety e.g. falling in, Drowning,
structure
Vandalism
Environment
Public perception
Cost of installation
Availability
Maintenance

Low
Low
High
Low
Low
High
High
Medium

Score
2
1
3

1
1
3
1
1
3
3
2

NEWgenerator
High
High
High (locally
available
expertise)
High
High
Medium
High
High
Medium
High
Medium

Score
3
3
3

3
3
2
3
3
2
3
2
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Figure 4.31: Venn Diagram for the Comparisons of Pit Latrine RAMS and NEWgenerator RAMS
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Pit Latrine

NEWgenerator

Reliability
Maintenance

3

Sludge removal

2
Availability

Technical expertise

1
0

Cost of installation

Public perception
Environment

Microbial safety
Safety e.g. falling in,
Drowning, structure
Vandalism

Figure 4.32: Comparison of Pit Latrine RAMS and NEWgenerator scores

Figure 4.33: University Of South Florida NEWgenerator Treatment System
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Chapter 5. Inferences and Conclusions
In the process of developing a reliability, availability, maintainability, and safety
(RAMS) framework assessment model for decentralized wastewater treatment systems, there
was a level of subjective analysis in the semi-quantitative and qualitative models, due to lack of
data and information on decentralized sanitation systems. Some assumptions need to be made,
which were sometimes based on limited data. The development of the ISO 30500 2018
framework created a baseline for safety in sanitation and was used as the starting point for the
development of what a good sanitation system looks like. This allowed a framework to be built
which looks at failure as a loss of function or service which leads to unwanted RAMS impacts.
The case studies used simple data sets to determine these qualitative assessment factors and
rely heavily on expertise and sanitation knowledge in determining the main risk factors
associated with different decentralized sanitation technologies. The concept of expert knowledge
as the basis of risk assessments is well established in the industrial sector, be it manufacturing,
aerospace, and heavy machinery industry. So, the framework method borrows accepted
methodologies from these industries with a well-established history of risk rationalization to
determine which risks, need to be treated in decentralized sanitation technologies, to advance
decentralized non-sewered sanitation. The methods used here are by no means exhaustive,
however, they are based on logical assumptions that data from a system together with some
expertise-based assumptions can be used to predict, with a high degree of certainty how a system
will perform over a while. There is a drawback where there is no data available for failure rates
and repair times because in those cases the methodology cannot be used to estimate the RAMS
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of the system and will rely solely on expertise. The methodology is dependent on having reliable
data from the technology, or in the case for pit latrines where the data is readily available
generally and logical assumptions can be made from available data.
The research questions and answers are as follows:


Can we create a model that allows the RAMS behaviours of sanitation systems to be
assessed? Yes



Can we create a consistent, practical, and reproducible framework that covers all
decentralized non sewered sanitation systems as single or multiple users re-invent the
toilet systems? Yes



Can we create a flexible method that can be used for volume or flow-based sanitation
system assessments in off-grid sanitation solutions? Yes.

Therefore, If RAMS can be accurately modelled for decentralized non sewered sanitation
systems using stakeholder information and failure data as the source of initial quantification;
then the success of decentralized non sewered sanitation systems can be guided by comparing the
RAMS derived failure information of different sanitation systems. The RAMS framework for
assessing sanitation technologies can be a single framework that guides the development
trajectory of new sanitation technologies as needed, therefore helping to achieve the United
Nations goal for global sanitation provision.
All in all, the RAMS framework methodology defines failure and uses that as a starting
point to quantify the RAMS risks associated with decentralized sanitation, which is a logical
approach to meet the united nations sustainable development goals for sanitation. The risks are
prioritized and mitigations applied in line with predetermined risk reduction factors, until the
system either meets a balance of RAMS requirements or not, The process can be repeated over
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and over until the risk is sufficiently mitigated, or a new approach could be taken, for example, a
different type of sanitation system. The flow chart below shows the basic flow concept for the
RAMS framework methodology.
The methodology uses established concepts for RAMS calculations, so the validity of the
methodology is in the inherent nature of applying a step by step method, which uses established
calculation methods for RAMS analysis. The approach is novel to sanitation, and the creation of
a new risk matrix allows experts to compare risks, however, the process is based on established
definitions of consequences from experience and literature). There are no right or wrong answers
rather whether sanitation focuses on fit for purpose
In the future, the methodology should be used to assess the RAMS status of a SURT,
where the data is available. It should also be used to determine whether the degree of
decentralization has an optimum point, by assessing hybrid scenarios in sanitation. The
networkability aspects where several independent systems are connected can be explored to see
at which optimum point the system behaves more like a centralized system with all the
advantages and disadvantages thereof. This can help highlight the point at which economies of
scale can be maximized, but infrastructure costs minimized for a decentralized non-sewered
sanitation system.
Other risk factors such as distance from users, footprint, aesthetics, etc can also be
assessed. These criteria can impact the front-end users' definition of failure and success,
therefore studies that explore what these impacts have on the meaning of a successful sanitation
campaign can shed insight into the directions that the global clean sanitation for all needs to take.
For example, do all users want a flushable toilet in their homes, due to distance to facilities, and
if so, how is that impacted by the footprint of the system and the affordability. Also, aesthetics
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can be a crucial factor in the installation of SURTS because users want a system that looks
presentable in their homes, and how far is that aspect influence the definitions of failure and / or
success. All these and more social science questions which impact the cultural perceptions of
what successful sanitation is will need to be explored to understand the soft values which
determine success in addition to the machine reliability.
Stress test scenarios also need to be assessed for the sanitation systems, by comparing
how each system responds to the addition of stress-inducing factors. Once this has been factored
in, then the framework methodology is used to determine the outcomes. Stress scenarios such as
overload with disinfectant, high ambient temperature, low ambient temperature, flooding, etc are
good examples of some common scenarios that can be expected. These scenarios can be tested to
see which systems are most robust overall under these conditions.
Additionally, the research did not consider disgust and perceptions of human excrement
and/or how people perceive using products (water, nutrients) recovered from feces, etc. There is
a growing literature on this, showing that these considerations do impact the uptake of sanitation
technologies particularly in resource recovery (Libby, et al., 2020; Hawkins, 2006). Therefore,
future iterations of the RAMS methodology do need to include the sampled expectations of
stakeholders in the definition of failure, to feed Phase 1 of the methodology. This will create a
more robust assessment s of the failure of sanitation systems with the voice of the front-end user
as the main driver. Other factors not considered which are outside of RAMS but do affect the
RAMS outcomes and may influence the outcome of RAMS assessments are
•

Cost – OpEx

•

Design of user interface

•

Cultural sensitivities
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These aspects will benefit from being assessed in further detail and will further improve the
robustness of the RAMS Framework Methodology, which is also applied systematically.
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Figure 5.1: Flowchart Showing the RAMS Framework Methodology Process

303

References
1.

Aarset, M. V., 1987. How to Identify a Bathtub Hazard Rate. IEEE Transactions on
Reliability, 36(1), pp. 106 - 108.

2.

Abbas Jorsaraei, Mahdi Gougola, Jules B. Van Lier 2014. A cost-effective method for
decentralized sewage treatment. Process Safety and Environmental Protection, Volume 9,
pp. 815 - 821

3.

Abegglen Christian Konrad, 2008. Membrane Bioreactor Technology for Decentralized
Wastewater Treatment and Reuse, Zurich: Swiss Federal Technical Institute of
Technology.

4.

Abellán, J., 2017. Water supply and sanitation services in modern Europe: developments
in the 19th-20th centuries. Salamanca, Research gate.

5.

Almalki, S. J. & Nadarajah, S., 2014. Modifications of the Weibull distribution: A
review. Reliability Engineering & System Safety, Volume 124, pp. 32 - 55.

6.

Amoah, I. D., Reddy, P., Seidu, R. & Stenström, T. A., 2018. Concentration of soiltransmitted helminth eggs in sludge from South Africa and Senegal: A probabilistic
estimation of infection risks associated with agricultural application. Journal of
Environmental Management, pp. 1020-1027.

7.

Antosz Katarzyna, Ratnayake R.M. Chandima., 2019. Spare parts’ criticality assessment
and prioritization for enhancing. Journal of Manufacturing Systems, Volume 50, pp. 212
- 225

304

8.

ANSI. Eco-San Toilet Eco-San. n.d. 17 April 2020.
<https://sanitation.ansi.org/EcoSanToilet>.

9.

Archer, Diane. 2012. Aan Mankong participatory slum upgrading in Bangkok, Thailand:
Community perceptions of outcomes and security of tenure. Habitat International,
Volume 36, pp.178-184.

10.

Anu, V., Walia, G., Bradshaw, G., & Alqudah, M., 2019. Developing and Evaluating
Learning Materials to Introduce Human Error Concepts in Software Engineering Courses:
Results from Industry and Academia. IEEE Frontiers in Education Conference (FIE),
Covington, KY, USA, pp. 1-9.

11.

Azarkhail, M., Modares, M., 2012. The Evolution and History of Reliability Engineering:
Rise of Mechanistic Reliability Modelling. International Journal of Performability
Engineering, Volume 8, pp. 35-47.

12.

Back, J. O. et al., 2018. Risk assessment to groundwater of pit latrine rural sanitation
policy in developing country settings. Science of The Total Environment, Vol 613, pp.
592-610.

13.

Bair, Robert. USF’s NEWgenerator Aims to Solve World’s Sanitation Woes. n.d. 17
April 2020. <https://floridainsider.com/education/university-of-south-florida-sanitationgenerator/>.

14.

Bassan, M. et al., 2015. Success and failure assessment methodology for wastewater and
fecal sludge treatment projects in low-income countries. Journal of Environmental
Planning and Management, pp. 1690-1710.

305

15.

Bastirai, Majuru; Marc, Suhrcke; R, Hunter Paul, 2018. Reliability of water supplies in
low- and middle-income countries: A structured review of definitions and assessment
criteria. Journal of Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene for development, pp. 1-23.

16.

BBC, 2018. South Africa to eradicate pit latrine toilets in schools. [Online] Available at:
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-45183593 [Accessed 18 October 2020].

17.

Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation., 2018., [Online] Available at:
https://www.gatesfoundation.org/ [Accessed 11 November 2018].

18.

Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation., Sanitation Value Chain, 2010. Sanitation Value
Chain. [Online] available
https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/7/74/Sanitation_Value_Chain.jpg
[Accessed 18 June 2020].

19.

Bonnardela, Nathalie, D. & John, 2020. Brainstorming variants to favor creative design.
Applied Ergonomics, Volume 83, Issue: 102987.

20.

Brands, E., 2014. Prospects and challenges for sustainable sanitation in developed
nations: a critical review. Environmental Reviews, Volume, 22, pp. 346 - 363.

21.

Butala; Neel M. et al., 2010. Improved health outcomes in urban slums through
infrastructure upgrading. Social Science & Medicine, Volume 71, pp. 935 - 940

22.

Cao, et al. 2018. A literature review on selective maintenance for multi-unit systems.
Shijiazhuang, China. Wiley.

23.

Capodaglio, A. G., 2017. Integrated, Decentralized Wastewater Management for
Resource Recovery in Rural and Peri-Urban Areas. Resources, Volume 6, pp. 22.

306

24.

Carlos, J. A. C. et al., 2013. Levels of Norovirus and E. coli in Untreated, Biologically
Treated, and UV-Disinfected Sewage Effluent Discharged to a Shellfish Water. Journal
of Water Resource and Protection, pp. 978-982.

25.

Carter, S. D. & Deans, D. M., 2011. Reliability engineering as a practical application to
improving system performance — From concept to system retirement. [Online]Available
at: http://yadda.icm.edu.pl/yadda/element/bwmeta1.element.ieee-000005754497
[Accessed 21 7 2018].

26.

Chaoua, Sana; Boussaa, Samia; Khadra, Ahmed; Boumezzough, Ali; 2018. Efficiency of
two sewage treatment systems (activated sludge and natural lagoons) for helminth egg
removal in Morocco. Journal of Infection and Public Health, pp. 197-202.

27.

Chemweno, P., Pintelon, L., Muchiri, P. N. & Horenbeek, A. V., 2018. Risk assessment
methodologies in maintenance decision making: A review. Reliability Engineering and
System Safety, pp. 64-77.

28.

Christopher J. L. Murray, A. D. L., 1996. Global Burden of Disease. Harvard University
Press.

29.

Clemen; R. T., Winkler; RL., 1999. Combining Probability Distributions from Experts in
Risk Analysis. Risks Analysis, Volume 19, pp. 187 - 203.

30.

Coppola, A., 1984. Reliability Engineering of Electronic Equipment A Historical
Perspective. IEEE Transactions on Reliability, 33(1).

31.

Costanza, et al. 2014. An Overarching Goal for the UN Sustainable Development Goals.
Solutions 5.4 (13-16).

32.

Cranfield University. Nanomembrane toilet. n.d. 17 April 2020.
<http://www.nanomembranetoilet.org/>.

307

33.

Crittenden, J. C. et al., 2005. Water Quality Management Strategies. In: Water Treatment
Principles and Design. New Jersey: John Wiley and Sons, pp. 165 - 224.

34.

Davies, H. G., Bowman, C. & Lub, S. P., 2017. Cholera − management and prevention.
Journal of Infection, pp. 566-573.

35.

Daudey, L, 2018. The cost of urban sanitation solutions: a literature review. Journal of
Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene for Development, Volume 8, pp. 176-195.

36.

Dillon, et al. “Improving the Use of Risk Matrices at NASA.” IEEE (2018): 1-11.

37.

Dongiovanni and Lesmantas, 2016. Modified Weibull model: A Bayes study using
MCMC approach based on progressive censoring data. Fusion Engineering and Design, 1
November, pp. 613-617.

38.

Dr. Liji Thomas, M., 2019. News Medical Life Sciences. [Online] Available at:
https://www.news-medical.net/health/Urine-Composition-Whats-Normal.aspx [Accessed
02 07 2020].

39.

Eaton & K, 2017. Mind-Mapping Tools That Make Brainstorming Beautiful. The New
York Times, p. 8.

40.

EAWAG. Blue Diversion Autarky. n.d. 17 April 2020.
<https://www.eawag.ch/fileadmin/Domain1/Forschung/Menschen/Abwasser/autarky/Aut
arky_booklet.pdf>.

41.

Eawag/Sandec. “Sanitation Systems & Technologies.” Swiss Federal Institute of Aquatic
Science and Technology (Eawag) 2008.

42.

Eggimann, Sven, Bernhard Truffer, and Max Maurer. “The cost of hybrid wastewater
systems: A systematic framework for specifying minimum cost-connection rates.” Water
Research (2016): Volume 103, pp. 472-484.

308

43.

Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc. Feces. 8 January 2015. 11 November 2018.
<https://www.britannica.com/science/feces>. [Accessed 11 November 2018].

44.

Environmental Protection Agency, 2012. Microbial Risk Assessment Guideline., USDA.

45.

EPA, US. Septic Systems Overview. 2018. 11 November 2018.
<https://www.epa.gov/septic/septic-systems-overview>. [Accessed 11 November 2018].

46.

Eti; M.C., Ogaji; S.O.T., Probert; S.D., 2007. Integrating reliability, availability,
maintainability, and supportability with risk analysis for improved operation of the Afam
thermal power-station. Applied Energy, Volume 84, pp. 202-221.

47.

Etnier, et al., 2005. Decentralized Wastewater Treatment System Reliability Analysis,
Eco Eng. Newsletter.

48.

European Commission, 2015. European Guidelines for Cost-Effectiveness Assessments
of Health Technologies, Brussels: European Commission.

49.

Faruqe Hussain, Thomas Clasen, Shahinoor Akter, Victoria Bawel, Stephen P. Luby, Elli
Leontsini, Leanne Unicomb, Milan Kanti Barua, Brittany Thomas and Peter J. Winch,
2017. Advantages and limitations for users of double pit pour-flush latrines: a qualitative
study in rural Bangladesh. BMC Public Health, Volume 17, pp. 515.

50.

Freitas, Vania. Assembly of European Regions. 19 May 2020. <https://aer.eu/sustainabledevelopment-goals-engaging-regions/>.

51.

G. Libralato, A.V. Ghirardini, F. Avezzù, 2012. To centralize or to decentralize: an
overview of the most recent trends in wastewater treatment management. Journal of
Environmental Management, pp. Volume 91, pp. 61 - 68.

309

52.

Gaulke, et al. “Evaluation Criteria for Implementation of a Sustainable Sanitation and
Wastewater Treatment System at Jiuzhaigou National Park, Sichuan Province, China,
2009. Environmental Management Volume 45, pp. 93-104.

53.

George Quezada, Andrea Walton, Ashok Sharma, 2016. Risks and tensions in water
industry innovation: understanding the adoption of decentralized water systems from a
socio-technical transition perspective. Journal of Cleaner Production, Volume 113,
pp.263 - 273.

54.

Ghodrati, et al. 2013. Machine availability improvement is crucial for achieving an
optimal and economical production process. Since the failure rate as a component of
system/machine.” International Journal of Reliability, Quality, and Safety Engineering.
pp. 1-16

55.

Gibney, K., Sinclair, M., O'Toole, J. & Leder, K., 2013. Using disability-adjusted life
years to set health-based targets: A novel use of an established burden of disease metric.
Journal of Public Health Policy, Volume 34 pp. 439-446.

56.

Gikas, P. & Tchobanoglous, G., 2009. The role of satellite and decentralized strategies in
water resources management. Journal of Environmental Management, pp. 144-152.

57.

Giné-Garriga, R., Jiménez-Fernández de Palencia, A. & Pérez-Foguet, A., 2015.
Improved monitoring framework for local planning in the water, sanitation, and hygiene
sector: From data to decision-making. Science of the Total Environment, pp. 204-214.

58.

Gobble, Willaim M, C. & Harry, 2005. Safety Instrumented Systems Verification:
Practical Probabilistic Calculations. North Carolina: The Instrumented, Systems, and
Automation Society.

310

59.

Graham, J. & Polizzotto, M., 2013. Pit latrines and their impacts on groundwater quality:
A systematic review. Environmental Health Perspectives, pp. 521-530.

60.

Grant, E., Rouch, D., Deighton, M. & Smith, S., 2012. Pathogen risks in land-applied
biosolids. Evaluating risks of biosolids produced by conventional treatment. Water
Journal of the Australian Water Association, pp. 72-78.

61.

Gros, et al. “Pharmaceuticals in source-separated sanitation systems: Faecal sludge and
blackwater treatment, 2020. Science of Total Environment, Volume 703, pp. 135530

62.

Hagen; M. Bernard, A., Grube; E, 2016. ‘Do It All Wrong! Using Reverse-Brainstorming
to Generate Ideas, Improve Discussions, and Move Students to Action. Management
Teaching Review, Volume 1, pp. 85.

63.

HBM Prenscia Inc., Characteristics of the Weibull Distribution. [Online] Available at:
https://www.weibull.com/hotwire/issue14/relbasics14.htm [Accessed 03 07 2020].

64.

Hannah G. Davies, Conor Bowman, Stephen P. Luby. “Cholera − management and
prevention.” Journal of Infection (2017), Volume 74, pp. 566 - 573.

65.

Hawkins, G., 2006. The Ethics of Waste – How We Relate to Rubbish. In: Shit. Oxford;
Rowman and Littlefield, pp. 45 - 70

66.

He, Y., Gu, C., Chen, Z. & Han, X., 2017. Integrated predictive maintenance strategy for
manufacturing systems by combining quality control and mission reliability analysis.
International Journal of Production Research, pp. 5841-5862.

67.

Hueso, A. & Bell, B., 2013. An untold story of policy failure: The total sanitation
campaign in India. Water Policy, pp. 1001 - 1017.

68.

Hussain, F. et al., 2017. Advantages and limitations for users of double pit pour-flush
latrines: a qualitative study in rural Bangladesh. BMC Public Health, pp. 17-515.

311

69.

HTClean Sanitation, ANSI. Helbling with Gates Foundation. n.d. 17 April 2020.
<https://sanitation.ansi.org/HTClean>.

70.

IDRC, 2016. Addressing the Sanitation Challenge in Poor Urban Areas (East Africa).
[Online] Available at: https://www.idrc.ca/en/project/addressing-sanitation-challengepoor-urban-areas-east-africa [Accessed 4 07 2020].

71.

Ikonen, T. J. et al., 2020. Large-scale selective maintenance optimization using bathtubshaped failure rates. Computers & Chemical Engineering, Volume 139.

72.

Inhabitant. The Sabine Schober toilet (2015). <https://inhabitat.com/8-toilet-designs-thatcould-save-millions-of-lives-around-the-world/sabine-schober-toilet/>. [Accessed 17 08
2020].

73.

Isaksen, S., 1998. A review of brainstorming research: six critical issues for enquiry.
Creative Research Group, pp. 302.

74.

ISO 24518. Activities relating to drinking water and wastewater services — Crisis
management of water utilities. 2015. 30 10 2018.
<https://www.iso.org/obp/ui/#iso:std:iso:24518:ed-1:v1:en>. [Accessed 30 10 2018].

75.

ISO 24521. Activities relating to drinking water and wastewater services — Guidelines
for the management of basic on-site domestic wastewater services. 2016. 30 10 2018.
<https://www.iso.org/obp/ui/#iso:std:iso:24521:ed-1:v1:en>. [Accessed 30 10 2018].

76.

ISO 30500. Non-sewered sanitation systems — Prefabricated integrated treatment units
— General safety and performance requirements for design and testing. Draft
International Standard (2018): ISO/PC 305. Available at:
https://www.iso.org/files/live/sites/isoorg/files/news/News_archive/2017/11/Ref2245/IS
O%2030500_Briefing_Note.PDF. [Accessed 10 June 2020].

312

77.

ISO 31800 Faecal sludge treatment units - Energy independent, prefabricated,
community-scale, resource recovery units - Safety and performance requirements. Draft
International Standard (2020): ISO/PC 318. Available at:
https://sanitation.ansi.org/standard/ISOPC318. [Accessed 31 October 2020].

78.

Jan O. Back, Michael O. Rivetta, Laura B. Hinzac, Nyree Mackaya, Gift J. Wanangwad,
Owen L. Phirid, Chrispine Emmanuel, Songolae Mavuto, A.S. Thomas, Steve
Kumwendag, Muthi Nhlemah, Alexandra V.M. Millera, Robert M. Kalina, 2018. Risk
assessment to groundwater of pit latrine rural sanitation policy in developing country
settings, Science of The Total Environment, Volume 613 pp. 592-610.

79.

Jofre, J., Lucena, F., Blanch, A. R. & Muniesa, M., 2016. Coliphages as Model
Organisms in the Characterization and Management of Water Resources. Water, Volume
199, pp. 8.

80.

Jorsaraei, A., Gougola, M. & Lier, J. B. V., 2014. A cost-effective method for
decentralized sewage treatment. Process Safety and Environmental Protection, pp. 815821.

81.

Junga, Y. T., Narayanan, N. & Cheng, Y.L., 2018. Cost comparison of centralized and
decentralized wastewater management systems using optimization model. Journal of
Environmental Management, pp. 90-97.

82.

Jun-Li Shi, Ya-Jun Wang, Hai-Hua Jin, Shuang-Jiao Fan, Qin-Yi Ma, and Mao-Jun Zhou
2016. A Modified Method for Risk Evaluation in Failure Mode and Effects Analysis.
Journal of Applied Science and Engineering, pp. 177-186.

313

83.

Jürgensen, J. H., Nordstrom, L. & Hilber, P., 2016. A review and discussion of failure
rate heterogeneity in power system reliability assessment. Beijing China, IEEE.

84.

K R Shailesh, 2018. An example of estimating the Weibull scale (eta) and shape (beta)
parameters from sample failure data. Mangalore, Manipal Institute of Technology,
Manipal Academy of Higher Education.

85.

Kirkcaldy; K J, Chauhan; D, 2012. Functional Safety in the Process Industry.

86.

Kohler, L. E., Silverstein, J. & Rajagopalan, B., 2016. Predicting Life Cycle Failures of
On-Site Wastewater Treatment Systems Using Generalized Additive Models.
Environmental Engineering Science, Volume 33, pp. 112 - 125

87.

Konrad, C. A., 2008. Membrane Bioreactor Technology for Decentralized Wastewater
Treatment and Reuse, Zurich: Swiss Federal Technical Institute of Technology.

88.

Kujawa-Roeleveld, K. & Zeema, G., 2006. Anaerobic Treatment in Decentralized and
Source-Separation-Based Sanitation Concepts. Reviews in Environmental Science and
Bio/Technology, pp. 115-139.

89.

Langridge, R., Christian-Smith, J. & Lohse, K. A., 2006. Access and resilience:
Analyzing the construction of social resilience to the threat of water scarcity. Ecology and
Society. Ecology and Society, p. 11(2): 18. [online] URL:
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol11/iss2/art1.

90.

Larsen et al., 2015. Blue Diversion: a new approach to sanitation in informal settlements.
Journal of Water, Sanitation and Hygiene for Development, Volume 5, pp.64–71.

91.

Libralato, G., Ghirardini, A. & Avezzù, F., 2012. To centralize or to decentralize: an
overview of the most recent trends in wastewater treatment management. Journal of
Environmental Management, Volume 91, pp. 61 - 68.

314

92.

Lijó, L. et al., 2017. Decentralized schemes for integrated management of wastewater and
domestic organic waste: the case of a small community. Journal of Environment and
Management, pp. 732-740.

93.

Libby, J. A., Wells, C. E. & Mihelcic, J. R., 2020. Moving up the sanitation ladder while
considering function; An assessment of indigenous communities, pit latrine users, and
their perceptions of resource recovery sanitation technology in Panama. Environmental
Science and Technology

94.

Loowatt. Waterless toilet company. n.d. 17 April 2020. <https://www.loowatt.com/>.

95.

Malik, O. A., Hsu, A., Johnson, L. A. & de Sherbinin, A., April 2015. A global indicator
of wastewater treatment to inform the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).
Environmental Science & Policy, pp. 172-185.

96.

Mara, D., 2003. Water, sanitation, and hygiene for the health of developing nations.
Public Health, pp. 452-456.

97.

Marias, Ntema Lochner, and John, 2013. The upgrading of an informal settlement in
South Africa: Two decades onwards,” Habitat International. Volume 39, pp. 85-95.

98.

Massoud, May A., Tarhini, Akram., Nastra, Joumana A. 2009. Decentralized approaches
to wastewater treatment and management: Applicability in developing countries. Journal
of Environmental Management Volume 90, pp. 652-659

99.

Maurer, et al., 2006. Treatment processes for source-separated urine. Water Research
Volume 40, pp. 3151-3166.

100.

McDermott, R. E., Mikulak, R. J. & Beauregard, M. R., 2009. The Basics of FMEA. New
York: Taylor and Francis Group.

315

101.

McGinnis, S. M., 2017. A Systematic Review: Costing and Financing of Water,
Sanitation, and Hygiene (WASH) in Schools. International Journal of Environmental
Research and Public Health, pp. 442.

102.

Meeks, J. V., 2012. Willingness-to-pay for maintenance and improvements to existing
sanitation infrastructure: Assessing community-led total sanitation in mopti, Mali,
Tampa: University of South Florida.

103.

Meehan, K., Jepson, W., Harris, L. M., & Amber Wutich., 2020 Exposing the Myths of
Household Water Insecurity in the Global North: A Critical Review. Wires Water, 7(6),
pp. 1486

104.

Mercer, Davey E. and D. Azzini, A.L. Eusebi, R. Tierney, L. Williams, Y. Jiang, A.
Parker, A. Kolios, S. Tyrrel, E. Cartmell, M. Pidou, E.J. McAdam, C.J., 2019. Hybrid
membrane distillation reverse electrodialysis configuration for water and energy recovery
from human urine: An opportunity for off-grid decentralized sanitation. Journal of
Membrane Science, Volume 584, pp. 343-352.

105.

Mihelcic, J. R. et al., 2009. Latrines. In: Field Guide to Environmental Engineering for
Development Workers. Florida: American Society of Civil Engineers Press, pp. 381 408.

106.

Mihelcic, J. R. & Orner, K. D., 2018. A review of sanitation technologies to achieve
multiple sustainable development goals that promote resource recovery. Environmental
Science Water Research & Technology, pp. 16 - 32.

107.

Moe, Rheingans Christine l. and Richard D., 2006. Global challenges in water, sanitation,
and health.” Journal of Water and Health Volume 4, pp. 41-57.

316

108.

Molinos-Senante, María, H.S., Francesca, S.G. & Ramón, 2010. Economic feasibility
study for wastewater treatment: A cost-benefit analysis. Science of the Total
Environment, pp. 4396–4402.

109.

Mora-Rodriguez, J., Delgado-Galván, X., Ramos, M. H., & López-Jiménez A., 2014. An
overview of leaks and intrusion for different pipe materials and failures. Urban Water
Journal, Volume 11, pp. 1-10.

110.

Mudholkar, G. S., Asubonteng, K. O. & Hutson, A. D., 2009. Transformation of the
bathtub failure rate data in reliability for using Weibull-model analysis. Statistical
Methodology, Volume 6, pp. 622 - 633

111.

Murphy, H. M., McBean, E. A. & Farahbaksh, K., 2009. Appropriate technology – A
comprehensive approach for water and sanitation in the developing world. Technology in
Society, pp. 158-167.

112.

Murray, C. J. L. & Lopez, A. D., 1996. Global Burden of Disease. Harvard University
Press.

113.

Nakagiri, A. et al., 2015. Performance of pit latrines in urban poor areas: A case of
Kampala, Uganda. Habitat International, pp. Volume 49, pp. 529-537.

114.

NEW 24, 2020. Nearly 4,000 pit latrines in South Africa’s Schools. [Online] Available
at: https://www.new24/southafrica/news/nearly-4000-pit-latrines-in-south-africasschools-20200802 [Accessed 18 October 2020]

115.

O'Connor, Patrick D. T.; Kleyner, Andre., 2011. Introduction to Reliability Engineering.
[Online] Available at:
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/9781119961260.ch1/summary [Accessed 21 7
2018].

317

116.

Oliveira, Sílvia C., V. S. & Marco, 2008. Reliability analysis of wastewater treatment
plants. Water Research, Volume 42, pp. 1182 - 1194.

117.

Opher, T. & Friedler, E., 2016. Comparative LCA of decentralized wastewater treatment
alternatives for non-potable urban reuse. Journal of Environmental Management, pp. 467476.

118.

Orymowska, J. & Sobkowicz, P., 2017. Hazard identification methods. Scientific Journal
of Silesian University of Technology. Series Transport. Volume 95, pp. 145-158.

119.

Otterphol, R. “Options for alternative types of sewerage and treatment systems directed to
improvement of the overall performance.” Water Science Technology 45.3 (2002): 149158.

120.

Otterpohl, et al., 2003. Innovative technologies for decentralized wastewater management
in urban and peri-urban areas. Water Science and Technology Volume 48, pp. 23-32.

121.

Pedroni, N., Zio, E., Pasanisi, A. & Couplet, M., 2017. A Critical Discussion and
Practical Recommendations on Some Issues Relevant to the Non probabilistic Treatment
of Uncertainty in Engineering Risk Assessment. Risk Analysis, Volume 37, No. 7.

122.

Quezada, G., Walton, A. & Sharma, A., 2016. Risks and tensions in water industry
innovation: understanding the adoption of decentralized water systems from a sociotechnical transition perspective. Journal of Cleaner Production, Volume 113, pp. 263 273.

123.

Radford, J. et al., 2018. Fecal Sludge Simulants to Aid the Development of Desludging
Technologies, Cambridge: Mott MacDonald Ltd.

318

124.

Ricard Giné-Garriga, et al., 2013. Water–sanitation–hygiene mapping: An improved
approach for data collection at the local level. Science of The Total Environment, pp.
700-711.

125.

Rinne, H., 2008. The Weibull Distribution: A Handbook. Florida: CRC Press.

126.

Robin E. McDermott, et al., 2009. The Basics of FMEA. New York: Taylor and Francis
Group.

127.

Roefs, et al., 2017. Centralized, decentralized, or hybrid sanitation systems? Economic
evaluation under urban development uncertainty and phased expansion. Water Research,
Volume 109, pp. 274-286.

128.

Rudy & Lisa Jo, 2020. 19 Top Brainstorming Techniques to Generate Ideas for Every
Situation. [Online] Available at: https://business.tutsplus.com/articles/top-brainstormingtechniques--cms-27181 [Accessed 25 June 2020].

129.

Rustler, F., B. & T., 2012. Mind mapping for dummies. John Wiley & Sons (For
dummies).

130.

Saleh; J.H., Marias; K. 2006. Highlights from the early (and pre-) history of reliability
engineering. Reliability Engineering & System Safety, Volume 91, pp. 249-256.

131.

Sambit. Trade Market Research. 20 October 2018. 21 October 2018.
<https://trademarketresearch.com/178511/global-water-and-wastewater-treatmenttechnologies-market-growth-by-2018-2023-manufacturers-trends-challenges-marketshare/>. [Accessed 21 October 2018].

132.

Samotech, 2016. How Much Does a Wastewater Treatment System Cost? (Pricing,
Factors, Etc.). [Online] Available at: https://www.samcotech.com/cost-wastewatertreatment-system/

319

133.

Sano, D., Haas, C. & Rose, J., 2019. A QMRA Framework for Sanitation Treatment
Decisions. Water Pathogens, Volume 3.

134.

Särkilahti, et al. 2017. Replacing centralized waste and sanitation infrastructure with local
treatment and nutrient recycling: Expert opinions in the context of urban planning.
Technological Forecasting and Social Change Volume 118, pp.195-204.

135.

Science Direct, 2020. Weibull Distribution. [Online] Available at:
https://www.sciencedirect.com/topics/materials-science/weibull-distribution [Accessed
03 July 2020].

136.

Shakeri, H. & Nazif, S., 2018. Development of an algorithm for risk-based management
of wastewater reuse alternatives. Tehran: University of Tehran.

137.

Sharma, A., Burn, S., Gardner, T. & Gregory, A., 2008. Role of decentralized systems in
the transition of urban water systems. Water Science and Technology: Water Supply,
Volume 10, pp.577 - 583.

138.

Shi, J. L.et al., 2016. A Modified Method for Risk Evaluation in Failure Mode and
Effects Analysis. Journal of Applied Science and Engineering, pp. 177-186.

139.

Deitz, S. & Meehan, K., 2019. Plumbing Poverty: Mapping Hot Spots of Racial and
Geographic Inequality in the U.S. Household Water Insecurity. Annals of the American
Association of Geographers, 109(4), pp. 1092 - 1109

140.

Shyu, H-Y & Yeh, D. 2020. The NEWgenerator Decentralized Wastewater Treatment
System for Non-Sewered Sanitation – Engineering Field Test in eThekwini Municipality,
South Africa. Submitted to J. Environ. Management.

320

141.

Sitzenfrei, R., and W. Rauch, 2014. Investigating Transitions of Centralized Water
Infrastructure to Decentralized Solutions – An Integrated Approach. Procedia
Engineering Volume 70, pp. 1549-1557.

142.

Smith, D. D. J., 2011. Reliability, Maintainability, and Risk. Oxford: ButterworthHeinemann.

143.

Smith, D. J., 2017. Chapter 8 - Methods of Modelling, In: Reliability, Maintainability,
and Risk (Ninth Edition). Butterworth-Heinemann, pp. 105-136.

144.

Smoot, J., 2017. A Closer Look at MTBF, Reliability, and Life Expectancy. [Online]
Available at: https://www.cui.com/blog/mtbf-reliability-and-life-expectancy [Accessed
01 October 2017].

145.

Soliman, A. A., Abd-Ellah, A. H., Abou-Elheggag, N. A. & Essam, A. A., 2014.
Modified Weibull model: A Bayes study using MCMC approach based on progressive
censoring data. Reliability Engineering and System Safety, pp. 48-57.

146.

STeP Sanitation Technology Platform. The Empower Sanitation System. 17 April 2020.
<https://techdirectory.stepsforsanitation.org/systems/15/>.

147.

Stevens, D. P. et al., 2017. Helminth log reduction values for recycling water from
sewage for the protection of human and stock health. Water Research, pp. 201-511.

148.

Strande, L., Ronteltap, M. & Brdjanovic, D., 2014. Fecal Sludge Management: Systems
Approach for Implementation and Operation. IWA London.

149.

Suriyachan, C., Nitivattananon, V. & Amin, A. N., 2012. Potential of decentralized
wastewater management for urban development: Case of Bangkok. Habitat International,
pp. 85-92.

321

150.

Taheriyoun, M. M. S., 2015. Reliability Analysis of a Wastewater Treatment Plant using
Fault Tree Analysis and Monte Carlo Simulation. Environmental Monitoring Assessment,
pp. 187:4186.

151.

Tatjana, Schellenberg, et al., 2020. Wastewater Discharge Standards in the Evolving
Context of Urban Sustainability–The Case of India. Frontiers in Environmental Science
Volume 8, pp. 30.

152.

Tantsyur; V., Grimes; I., Mitchel; J., 2010. Risk-Based Source Data Verification
Approaches: Pros and Cons. her Innov Regul Sci, Volume 44, pp. 745–756.

153.

Tchobanoglous, G. & Burton, L. F., 1991.Selection of Treatment Process Flow Diagrams
IN: B.J Clark & J. M. Morriss, eds. Wastewater Engineering Treatment, Disposal, and
Reuse Metcalf & Eddy, Inc. S.L: McGraw -Hill, pp. 130-140.

154.

Thacker, S. B. et al., 2006. Measuring the Public’s Health, Atlanta: Centre for Disease
Prevention.

155.

Thibodeau, Charles, et al., 2014. Comparison of black water source-separation and
conventional sanitation systems using life cycle assessment. Journal of Cleaner
Production Volume 6, pp. 45-57.

156.

Tilley, E. et al., 2018. Compendium of Sanitation Systems and Technologies. Swiss
Federal Institute of Aquatic Science and Technology (Eawag).

157.

Ulrich, L., Klinger, M., Luthi, C. & Reymond, P., 2018. How to Sustainably Scale-Up
Small Scale Sanitation in India. Strategic Environmental Sanitation Planning, pp. 13-15.

158.

UN, 2017. Sustainable Development Goals. [Online] Available at:
https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/UNGuidelines-for-Use-of-SDG-logo-and-17-icons-December-2017.pdf

322

159.

United Nations, 2008. Tackling a global crisis: International Year of Sanitation, UNWater.

160.

UNEP. “Environmentally Sound Technologies for Wastewater and Stormwater
Management.” Book, An International Source. International Environmental Technology
Centre: London, UK; Osaka, Japan, 200. Osaka, Japan: IWA Publishing, 2002.

161.

UNFPA, UN. State of the world population. Unleashing the potential of urban growth,
2007.

162.

United Nations Settlements Program. UN-HABITAT annual report, 2008.

163.

US Environmental Protection Agency, 2017. Centralized Waste Treatment Effluent
Guidelines. [Online] Available at: https://www.epa.gov/eg/centralized-waste-treatmenteffluent-guidelines#whatis

164.

Vliet, v., Bas J. M., S., Gert, O. & Peter, 2011. Sanitation under challenge: contributions
from the social sciences. Water Policy, Volume 13, pp. 797 - 809.

165.

Wan, et al., 2017. Three-loop Monte Carlo simulation approach to Multi-State Physics
Modelling for system reliability assessment. Reliability Engineering and System Safety,
Volume 167, pp. 276–289.

166.

Wang, Shen, 2014. Values of decentralized systems that avoid investments in idle
capacity within the wastewater sector: A theoretical justification. Journal of
Environmental Management, Volume 136, pp. 68-75.

167.

WASHCOST, 2012. WASHCost Infosheet 1 - Providing a basic level of water and
sanitation services that last: cost benchmarks. [Online] Available at:
https://www.ircwash.org/sites/default/files/IRC-2012-Cost.pdf

323

168.

Water Research Australia, 2014. Fact Sheet: Log Removal Values in Wastewater
Treatment. Water Research Australia, April, pp. 1-2.

169.

Weibull.com, 2002. Characteristics of the Weibull Distribution. [Online] Available at:
http://ll.com/hotwire/issue14/relbasics14.htm [Accessed 03 07 2020].

170.

Weride magazine. DIY Sawdust compost outhouse. n.d. 17 April 2020.
<https://www.bing.com/images/search?view=detailV2&ccid=iJD29Y9m&id=EDB47B21
0FB0BFC53BDC64B7A3F0135F5DD1E119&thid=OIP.iJD29Y9miWwr5RToTj9JtAHa
E7&mediaurl=https%3a%2f%2fweride-magazine.com%2fwpcontent%2fuploads%2f2017%2f04%2f4.jpg&exph=1333&expw=2000&q=simp>.

171.

WHO, 2013. Methods and data sources for the global burden of disease estimates 20002011., Geneva: Department of Health Statistics and Information Systems WHO.

172.

WHO, 2017. Sanitation - Context. [Online] Available at:
https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/sanitation#1 [Accessed 24 10 2018].

173.

WHO, 2018. Guidelines on Health., World Health Organization.

174.

WHO, 2018. Life expectancy and healthy life expectancy, the World Health
Organization.

175.

WHO, 2018. Quantitative Microbial Risk Assessment: Application for Water Safety
Management. [Online] Available at:
http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/246195/9789241565370eng.pdf;jsessionid=F6F9171EE5D8C3E377FCA378BFC8A474?sequence=1 [Accessed
2018].

324

176.

WHO, 2019. Metrics: Disability-Adjusted Life Year (DALY). [Online] Available at:
https://www.who.int/healthinfo/global_burden_disease/metrics_daly/en/ [Accessed 31
January 2019].

177.

WHO. Methods and data sources for global burden of disease estimates 2000-2011.
Geneva: Department of Health Statistics and Information Systems WHO, 2013.

178.

WHO. Global Health Estimates 2016: Disease burden by Cause, Age, Sex, by Country,
and by Region 2000-2016. Geneva, 2018.

179.

WHO, 2011. Guidelines for drinking-water quality, Water Sanitation, and Health

180.

Wilderer, P. A. & Schreff, D., 2000. Decentralized and centralized wastewater
management: a challenge for technology developers. Water Science and Technology,
Volume 41, pp. 1-8

181.

Yadava G. S. 2008, An overview of reliability, availability, maintainability, and
supportability (RAMS) engineering. International Journal of Quality & Reliability
Management, Volume 25, pp. 330 - 344.

182.

Zaharia, C., 2017. Decentralized wastewater treatment systems: Efﬁciency and its
estimated impact against onsite natural water pollution status. A Romanian case study.
Process Safety and Environmental Protection, Volume 108, pp. 74 - 88

183.

Zakikhani Kimiya, Nasir Fuzhan, Zayed Tarek., 2020. Availability-based reliabilitycentered maintenance planning for gas. International Journal of Pressure Vessels and
Piping, pp. 183

184.

Zavala, M. A. L., Funamizu, N. & Takakuwa, T., 2002. Characterization of feces for
describing aerobic degradation of feces. Journal of Environmental Systems and
Engineering, pp. 99-105.

325

Appendix A Copyright Permissions
The Permission for the use of the Sanitation value chain (BMGF Sanitation Value Chain,
2010) image to illustrate traditional decentralized sanitation technology scopes at several points
in the explanation of the traditional sanitation option.
-

Free to use under the creative commons license for free cultural works pictured below

-

Changes were done to snip the sanitation value chain into the different sections needed to
illustrate the front-end, middle, and back-end of a sanitation subsystem
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The Permission for the use of images of the NEWgenerator by the Department of Civil and
Environmental Engineering, Dr. Daniel Yeh’s research lab images of the NEWgenerator to
illustrate an “Advanced Decentralized Non-Sewered Sanitation System”.
-

Permission was given as part of Dr. Yeh’s research group to use data, pictures, and
diagrams related to the NEWgenerator for analysis of advanced decentralized sanitation
systems.
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Appendix B Supplemental Tables
Table B1: Risk assessment Results Table Header Legend Interpreter
Subsystem
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Item
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Name
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Boundary
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Initiating event

IE

Impact

Im

Category
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Function/Service Failure
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Normal operational issue with no further impact (Y/N)
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Impact on RAMS (Y/N)
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Primary Stakeholder
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Highest impact Ranking 4
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Impact Ranking 3
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Lowest impact Ranking 1

IR1

Effect
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E
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Consequence
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Sc
Co
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St
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Table B2: Top Aspects from NEWgenerator Phase 1 and Phase 2 Assessments
I
N
Plastic pipe
with a valve

IE
Blockage in Pipe

F

2

overhead
water storage
tank

Damage/design
failure

Rupture

3

overhead
water storage
tank
overhead
water storage
tank
Municipal top
up line/treated
water to up
line

Blockage of outlet

6

7

1

4

5
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Impact
S

FS/F
No flush
capacity/long time
for the cistern to fill
Loss of flush
water/system out of
service

Severity
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Occurrence
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RPN
450
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User/Community

9

8

10

720

Sanitation Engineer
/ Technician/
Service provider
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Overflow

No clean water for
flush

5

9
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User/Community
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Blockage of outlet

Overflow

Reduced flush
capacity

5
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User/Community
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Blockage in pipe

No flush water

No flush capacity
after storage capacity
is consumed if also
no recycling

5

9

10
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User/Community

R

Pipe to Pump
P1

Design failure

Rupture

9

8

7
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User/Community

S

The pipe from
the pump p1
to the valve
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/accumulation of
solids in the pipe

Blockage of pipe

Loss of containment
of pathogenic
material
Loss of wastewater
to treatment/system
out of service
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Sanitation Engineer
/ Technician/
Service provider

R

No flush water
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Table B2: (Continued)
I
IE
Insoluble
/accumulation of
solids in the pipe

F

8

N
Valve to
treatment

9

Reactor
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Reactor

discharge of
disinfectant
material to frontend
design failure or
damage

11

Reactor
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treatment/system out of
service

Severity
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Loss of biomass
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design failure or
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rupture
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loss of backwash program
leading to loss of
membrane
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Chlorination
tank

Tank damage or
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Chlorination
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Failure of
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Contaminated
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Engineer /
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Engineer /
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Service provider
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Service provider
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Impact
R

R

S

S

S
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Table B3: FMEA for NEWgenerator
Failure Mode

Municipal top up line/treated water to up line No flush water

Potential Effects of
failure
Initiating event Severity
No flush capacity after
storage capacity is
consumed if also no
recycling
Blockage in pipe 3

Equalization tank level LS2

Incorrect reading

Incorrect level reading foaming

4

10

7

280

Pipe to Pump P1

Blockage of pipe

Loss of wastewater to Insoluble
treatment/system out of /accumulation of
service
solids in the pipe 4

10

7

280

Pipe to Pump P1

Rupture

Loss of containment of
pathogenic material
Design failure

7

8

6

336

Pressure transmitter P1

Leak

Incorrect pressure
reading

Damaged
pipe/incorrect
design

3

8

7

168

Pressure transmitter P1

Incorrect reading

Incorrect pressure
reading

8

7

168

Pump P1

Blockage

Incorrect
calibration
3
Insoluble
Loss of wastewater to /accumulation of
treatment/system out of solids in pump
service
suction
5

10

7

350

No power

Loss of wastewater to
treatment/system out of
service
Power failure

6

10

7

420

Not working

Loss of wastewater to
treatment/system out of mechanical
service
failure

5

9

10

450

Name

Pump P1

Pump P1

Occurrence

Detection

RPN

10

6

180
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Table B3: (Continued)
Failure Mode
Name

Potential Effects of failure

The pipe from the pump p1 to
the valve
Blockage of pipe

Initiating event Severity
Insoluble
Loss of wastewater to treatment/system out /accumulation of
of service
solids in the pipe 3

The pipe from the pump p1 to
the valve
Rupture

Loss of wastewater to treatment/system out
of service
Design failure

The pipe from the pump p1 to
the valve
Rupture

5

Valve to treatment

Blockage of pipe

Reactor

Loss of biomass
activity

Loss of wastewater to treatment/system out Overpressure
of service
from pump
5
Insoluble
Loss of wastewater to treatment/system out /accumulation of
of service
solids in the pipe 3
discharge of
disinfectant
material to frontLoss of treatment
end
8

Reactor

Leak

Loss of containment and ground
contamination with pathogenic material

design failure or
damage
5

Reactor

rupture

Loss of containment and ground
contamination with pathogenic material

Reactor Level transmitter LS5 Incorrect reading

Incorrect level reading

design failure or
damage
5
Transmitter
broken
2

Membrane

Overflow

No flow out of treatment section

Blockage of
membrane outlet 4

Pipe to valve

Rupture

Loss of containment of pathogenic material Design failure

5

Occurrence

Detection

RPN

8

9

216

8

7

280

8

7

280

8

9

216

7

3

168

8

7

280

8

7

280

10

7

140

8

6

192

8

7

280
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Table B3: (Continued)
Failure Mode
Name

Potential Effects of failure

Initiating event

Occurrence

Detection

RPN

Incorrect pressure reading

Damaged pipe/incorrect
design
5

Flow transmitter FS1

Leak
Incorrect
reading

8

7

280

8

7

168

Incorrect pressure reading

Incorrect calibration
3
Damaged pipe/incorrect
design
5

Pressure transmitter P3

Leak

8

7

280

Membrane pump

No power

No flow out of treatment section

Power failure

7

9

6

378

Membrane pump

Not working No flow out of treatment section

mechanical failure

6

9

10

540

Membrane pump

No suction

No flow out of treatment section

mechanical failure

6

9

10

540

Backwash line

Rupture

loss of backwash program leading to loss of
membrane

Design failure

6

8

7

336

Backwash line

Rupture

6

8

7

336

Flow transmitter FS1

Incorrect flow reading

Severity

Backwash valve

loss of backwash program leading to loss of
membrane
loss of backwash program leading to loss of
reduced flow membrane

Overpressure from
pump
Design failure/solid
accumulation

5

8

6

240

Backwash valve

Blockage of
valve

loss of backwash program leading to loss of
membrane

Insoluble /accumulation
of solids in the pipe
6

7

6

252

Backwash pressure
transmitter P2

Incorrect
reading

Incorrect pressure reading

Incorrect calibration

10

7

210

Flow transmitter FS2

Leak

Incorrect pressure reading

Damaged pipe/incorrect
design
5

8

7

280

3
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Table B3: (Continued)
Name

Failure
Mode

Potential Effects of failure

Initiating event

Severity

Occurrence

Detection

RPN

Incorrect pressure reading

Incorrect calibration

3

8

7

168

Incorrect pressure reading

Damaged pipe/incorrect design 3

8

7

168

Incorrect pressure reading

Incorrect calibration

6

8

7

336

Flow transmitter FS2

Incorrect
reading

Backwash pressure
transmitter P4
Backwash pressure
transmitter P4

Leak
Incorrect
reading

Backwash pump P3

Blockage

loss of backwash program leading to loss
of membrane

Insoluble /accumulation of solids
in pump suction
5

8

6

240

Backwash pump P3

No power

loss of backwash program leading to loss
of membrane

Power failure

7

7

10

490

Backwash pump P3

loss of backwash program leading to loss
Not working of membrane

mechanical failure

7

7

10

490

Backwash pump P3

No suction

loss of backwash program leading to loss
of membrane

mechanical failure

7

7

7

343

Permeate Pump P4

No power

Loss of treated water forward flow

Power failure

4

7

10

280

Permeate Pump P4

Not working Loss of treated water forward flow

mechanical failure

5

7

10

350

Permeate Pump P4

No suction

Loss of treated water forward flow

mechanical failure

3

7

7

147

Pipe to chlorination

Rupture

Loss of flow to chlorination / loss of
disinfection

Design failure

6

8

7

336

Zeolite bed

Rupture

Loss of treated water forward flow

Design failure

6

8

7

336

Chlorination unit

Leak

Loss of flow to chlorination / loss of
disinfection

Design failure

6

8

7

336
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Table B3: (Continued)

Failure Mode
Name

Potential Effects of failure

Initiating event

Severity

Occurrence

Detection

RPN

Design failure
6
Non return valve failure/high discharge
pressure
7

8

7

336

7

6

294

Power failure

7

7

6

294

Chlorination unit

Leak

Chlorination pump

backflow

Chlorination pump

No power

Chlorination pump

Not working

Loss of flow to chlorination /
loss of disinfection
Loss of flow to chlorination /
loss of disinfection
Loss of flow to chlorination /
loss of disinfection
Loss of flow to chlorination /
loss of disinfection

mechanical failure

8

8

7

448

Chlorination pump

No suction

Loss of flow to
chlorination/loss of disinfection mechanical failure

7

8

7

392

Chlorination tank

Rupture

Loss of disinfection

Tank damage or failure

7

8

7

392

Chlorination tank

Contaminated water in
the treatment tank

Loss of disinfection

Failure of treatment

7

8

6

336

Chlorination tank

Overflow

Loss of disinfection forward
flow

Blockage of outlet

5

8

7

280

Level switch LS3
Level switch LS3
ORP 1
ORP 2

Leak
Incorrect reading
Leak
Incorrect reading

Damaged pipe/incorrect design
Incorrect calibration
Damaged pipe/incorrect design
Incorrect calibration

3
3
3
3

8
8
8
8

7
7
7
7

168
168
168
168

Powered valve PV1
Powered valve PV2

Blockage
Failure closed

Accumulation of solids in valve
Design failure/age

3
4

9
9

7
7

189
252

Incorrect pressure reading
Incorrect pressure reading
Incorrect pressure reading
Incorrect pressure reading
Loss of treated water
generation
Loss of flush water
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Table B3: (Continued)
Failure
Mode
Name

Potential Effects of failure

Initiating event

Severity

Occurrence

Detection

RPN

Powered valve PV3

Failure open Loss of disinfection

Design failure/age

2

9

10

180

Permeate storage tank

Overflow

Loss of flush water

Blockage of outlet

2

8

7

112

Exit pump 6

No power

Reduced flush water and use of municipal as a
top-up
Power failure

1

9

7

63

Exit pump 6

Not
working

Reduced flush water and use of municipal as a
top-up
mechanical failure

1

8

6

48

Exit pump 6

Reduced flush water and use of municipal as a
No suction top-up
No water in permeate tank

1

9

7

63

Sc

Rs

St

2

2

Users/Community

0.5

Partially Unmitigated

Gradual

2

Sc

Co

Sc

Me

Sc

E

1

Primary

S

User/Community

Function

IR4

PS

IOR

FS/F

C

Y

People / Behavioural

Im
Fly
infestation/malodours
smell/diarrheal disease

F

IE
Lack of proper use of
facilities/lack of
cleaning

Pit latrine
enclosure

Unsanitary/fecal matter
in the housing

A- Front
-end/User
interface:
Squat
pan/Hole
in the
ground

N

I

Table B4: Phase 1 and Phase 2 VIP Latrine
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A- Frontend/User
interface:
Squat
pan/Hole in
the ground
Pit latrine
enclosure

A- Frontend/User
interface:
Squat
pan/Hole in
the ground
Pit latrine
enclosure
S
1

2

3

0.5

1

St

Sc

Co

Sc

Me

Sc

E

IR4

PS

IOR

FS/F

C

Im

IE

F

Rs

Users/Community

0

Sc

Users/Community

Fully Mitigated

Sudden
3

System/Technology
Providers

1

Partially Unmitigated

S

Gradual

1

Unmitigated

Y

Primary

User/Community

Function

Equipment

Death/injury

Missing cover

S

Sudden

Y

Primary

User/Community

Function

Equipment

Diarrhoeal disease due to flies
transferring the fecal matter to
food and water

Lack of cover / ineffective design
for airflow

Y

Primary

User/Community

Function

Equipment

Death/injury if
someone is in the
structure at the time of
the collapse

Lack of proper design

Fall into pit

Pit latrine
enclosure

Malodorous smells

A- Frontend/User
interface:
Squat
pan/Hole in
ground

Structural failure

N

I

Table B4: (Continued)

2
0

2
2

1
3
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Pit latrine
enclosure

D2 –
Fresh /
Treated
water
storage:
Ablution
water
Pit latrine
enclosure

B2 Equalizati
on and
pretreatment
storage:
Pit
Pit
Y
S
1

3

3

3

Rs

Sc

Co

Sc

Me

Sc

E

IR4

PS

IOR

FS/F

C

Im

IE

F

Sc

0.5

St

0.5

System/Technology
Providers

0.5

Users/Community

1

Users/Community

Unmitigated

3

System/Technolog
y Providers

1

Partially
Unmitigated

1

Partially
Unmitigated

Sudden

1

Partially
Unmitigated

S

Sudden

S

Sudden

Primary

User/Community

Function

People /
Behavioural

Diarrhoeal disease
due to flies
transferring the
fecal matter to food
and water

Vandalism

S

Sudden

Y

Primary

User/Community

Function

Equipment

Facilities not used

Lack of proper
design of structure/
door

Y

Primary

User/Community

Function

Equipment

Diarrhoeal disease
due to lack of
hygiene

Lack of ablution
water facilities local
to pit

Y

Primary

User/Community

Function

Equipment

Death/injury

Design
failure/ground
water damage

Missing pit cover

A- Front
-end/User
interface:
Squat
pan/Hole
in the
ground

No privacy

Pit latrine
enclosure

Lack of
flush/ablution water

A- Front
-end/User
interface:
Squat
pan/Hole
in the
ground

Pit collapse

N

I

Table B4: (Continued)

1
3

2
3

2
3

1
1
.
5
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C - Treatment and
entropy reduction:
Offsite treatment/pit
sealing
User/Community
S

N Sanitation Engineer /
Technician/ Service
provider
S

1

2

2

2

3

Rs

Sc

Co

Sc

Me

Sc

E

IR4

PS

IOR

FS/F

C

Im

IE

F

N

Sc

1

St

0.5

System/Technology
Providers

0.5

Users/Community

Partially
Unmitigated

0.5

System/Technology
Providers

Partially
Unmitigated

2

System/Technology
Providers

Y

1

Partially
Unmitigated

S

1

Unmitigated

User/Community

Gradual

Y

Gradual

Primary

Function

Equipment

Diarrhoeal disease

Inappropriate
design

S

Gradual

Primary

Service

Equipment

Fly
infestation/malodou
rs smells/diarrheal
disease

Lack of emptying

User/Community

Sudden

Primary

Function

Equipment

Pit full before time

Inappropriate design

Y

Secondary

Function

Material Release

Pit

Diarrhoeal disease

B2 - Equalization and
pre-treatment storage:
Pit

Insecure transportation
measures

Pit

Groundwater
contamination

B2 - Equalization and
pre-treatment storage:
Pit

Full /overflow

Pit

Groundwater
infiltration

B2 - Equalization and
pre-treatment storage:
Pit

Discharge of pathogenic
material

Transport

I

Table B4: (Continued)

1
1

2
2

1
1

1
6
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CTreatment
and entropy
reduction:
Offsite
treatment/pit
sealing
N

S

S

Sc

Me

Sc

E

IR4

PS

IOR

FS/F

C

Im

IE

F

N

3
Partially
Unmitigated
0.5
System/Technology
Providers
1
3

3
Unmitigated
1
External
Community
3
2
7

3
Unmitigated
1
System/Technology
Providers
1
6

Co

Rs

2

Sc

3

St

Sudden

2

Sc

Sudden

Secondary

Sanitation Engineer /
Technician/ Service
provider

Function

Equipment

Diarrhoeal disease

Insufficient inoculation
of pathogenic material

Discharge of pathogenic
material

S

Sudden

N

Compound

Local government

Service

People / Behavioural

Diarrhoeal disease

Lack of or disregard
of sanitation
knowledge
/implications

Dumping

Treatment

N

Secondary

Sanitation Engineer /
Technician/ Service provider

Function

Equipment

Diarrhoeal disease

Insufficient inoculation of
pathogenic material

Ineffective treatment

CTreatment
and entropy
reduction:
Offsite
treatment/pit
sealing

Treatment

CTreatment
and entropy
reduction:
Offsite
treatment/pit
sealing

Treatment

I

Table B4: (Continued)
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Cx - Safe
discharge: Land
spreading
N

Secondary

Secondary

E

IR4

S
u
d
d
e
n
3

2
S
u
d
d
e
n
3

2
S
u
d
d
e
n
3

St

Sc
Rs

0.5

System/Technology
Providers

0.5

System/Technology
Providers

0.5

System/Technology
Providers

0.5

System/Technology
Providers

Sc

Co

2

Partially
Unmitigated

3

Partially
Unmitigated

S
u
d
d
e
n

Partially Unmitigated

2

Partially Unmitigated

Sc

S

Me

S

Sc

Secondary

PS

IOR

FS/F

C

Im

IE

Sanitation Engineer
/ Technician/
Service provider

Function

People /
Behavioural

Diarrhoeal disease

Insufficient
inoculation of
pathogenic material

F

N

S

Secondary

N

S

Sanitation Engineer /
Technician/ Service
provider

Function

Equipment

Diarrhoeal disease

Insufficient
inoculation of
pathogenic material

N

Sanitation Engineer /
Technician/ Service
provider

Service

People / Behavioural

Waste of resources

Lack of outlet

Inappropriate
discharge of
pathogenic material

Treatment

N

Sanitation Engineer /
Technician/ Service
provider

Function

Equipment

Diarrhoeal disease

Insufficient
inoculation of
pathogenic material

D1- Compost
generation

Ineffective treatment

Treatment

D1- Compost
generation

Compost not re-used

Treatment

D1- Compost
generation

Discharge of
pathogenic material

Land spreading

I

Table B4: (Continued)

1
3

1
3

1
3

1
3
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Table B5: FMEA VIP Latrine
Name

Initiating event

Failure Mode

Potential Causes of failure

Pit
latrine
enclosur
e

Lack of proper use
of facilities/lack of
cleaning

Unsanitary/feca
l matter in the
housing

Pit
latrine
enclosur
e
Pit
latrine
enclosur
e
Pit
latrine
enclosur
e
Pit
latrine
enclosur
e
Pit
latrine
enclosur
e
Pit
latrine
enclosur
e
Pit

Missing cover

Pit
Pit

Lack of basic hygiene training

Severit
y
9

Occurrenc
e
10

Detectio
n
8

RP
N
720

Fall into pit

Inadequate latrine design

10

10

8

800

Lack of cover /
ineffective design
for airflow

Malodorous
smells

Inadequate latrine design

3

10

8

240

Lack of proper
design

Structural
failure

Inadequate latrine design

10

10

8

800

Vandalism

Missing pit
cover

Lack of education on the importance of pit covers in reducing the risks of
fall in

3

10

8

240

Lack of proper
design of
structure/ door

No privacy

Inadequate latrine design

3

9

8

216

Lack of ablution
water facilities
local to pit

Lack of
flush/ablution
water

Inadequate latrine design

3

10

8

240

Design
failure/groundwate
r damage
Inappropriate
design

Pit collapse

Inadequate latrine design

9

10

8

720

Groundwater
contamination

Inadequate latrine design

9

10

10

900

Lack of emptying

Full/overflow

Inadequate maintenance

8

10

7

560
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Table B5: (Continued)
Name

Initiating event

Failure Mode

Potential Causes of failure

Severity

Occurrence

Detection

RPN

Pit

Inappropriate design

Inadequate latrine design

9

10

10

900

Transport

Insecure transportation
measures

Inadequate maintenance

9

10

8

720

Treatment

Insufficient inoculation of
pathogenic material

inadequate treatment design

9

10

8

720

Treatment

Lack of or disregard of
sanitation knowledge and
implications
Insufficient inoculation of
pathogenic material
Insufficient inoculation of
pathogenic material

Groundwater
infiltration
Discharge of
pathogenic
material
Discharge of
pathogenic
material
Dumping

Lack of basic hygiene training

9

10

10

900

Ineffective
treatment
Inappropriate
discharge of
pathogenic
material

inadequate treatment design

9

10

8

720

inadequate treatment design

9

10

8

720

Treatment
Treatment

Treatment

Insufficient inoculation of
pathogenic material

Ineffective
treatment

inadequate treatment design

9

10

8

720

Treatment

Lack of outlet

inadequate treatment design

9

10

8

720

Land spreading

Insufficient inoculation of
pathogenic material

inadequate treatment design

9

10

8

720

Pit latrine
enclosure

Lack of proper use of
facilities/lack of cleaning

Lack of basic hygiene training

9

10

8

720

Pit latrine
enclosure

Missing cover

Compost not reused
Discharge of
pathogenic
material
Unsanitary/fecal
matter in the
housing
Fall into pit

Inadequate latrine design

10

10

8

800
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Table B5: (Continued)
Name

Initiating event

Failure
Mode

Potential Causes of failure

Severit
y

Occurrenc
e

Detectio
n

RP
N

Pit latrine
enclosure

Lack of cover /
ineffective design
for airflow
Lack of proper
design
Vandalism

Malodorous
smells

Inadequate latrine design

3

10

8

240

Structural
failure
Missing pit
cover
No privacy

Inadequate latrine design

10

10

8

800

Lack of education on the importance of pit covers in reducing the risks of fall
in
Inadequate latrine design

3

10

8

240

3

9

8

216

Lack of
flush/ablutio
n water
Pit collapse

Inadequate latrine design

3

10

8

240

Inadequate latrine design

9

10

8

720

Groundwater
contaminatio
n
Full/overflow
Groundwater
infiltration
Discharge of
pathogenic
material
Discharge of
pathogenic
material

Inadequate latrine design

9

10

10

900

Inadequate maintenance
Inadequate latrine design

8
9

10
10

7
10

560
900

Inadequate maintenance

9

10

8

720

inadequate treatment design

9

10

8

720

Pit latrine
enclosure
Pit latrine
enclosure
Pit latrine
enclosure
Pit latrine
enclosure
Pit

Pit

Pit
Pit
Transport

Treatmen
t

Lack of proper
design of
structure/ door
Lack of ablution
water facilities
local to pit
Design
failure/groundwate
r damage
Inappropriate
design
Lack of emptying
Inappropriate
design
Insecure
transportation
measures
Insufficient
inoculation of
pathogenic
material
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Table B6: DALY Numbers for Communicable Diseases 2016
Sex

Both sexes

Age group

Total (all ages)

Population (thousands)

Code
0

40

A.

Infectious and parasitic diseases
1.

Tuberculosis

2.

STDs excluding HIV

50
60
70
80
85
90
100
110
120
130
140

1,019,920

508,849

511,071

598,615,381

315,473,038

283,142,343

365,720,240

189,440,016

176,280,224

184,522,492

98,046,220

86,476,272

18,393,291

11,553,713

6,839,578

6,374,371

2,848,814

3,525,557

5,377,469

2,410,849

2,966,620

299,129

134,619

164,509

371,951

227,627

144,324

51,634

0

51,634

44,086

14,804

29,282

230,102

60,914

169,188

43,424,910

22,618,030

20,806,881

42,235,590

22,700,023

19,535,567

6,543,425

3,422,943

3,120,481

564,184
89,405

228,984
45,435

335,200
43,970

Communicable, maternal, perinatal and nutritional conditions

10

30

Female

Cause of death
All Causes
I.

20

Male

a.

Syphilis

b.

Chlamydia

c.

Gonorrhoea

d.

Trichomoniasis

e.

Genital herpes

f.

Other STDs

3.

HIV/AIDS

4.

Diarrhoeal diseases

5.

Childhood-cluster diseases
a.

Whooping cough

b.

Diphtheria
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Table B6: (Continued)
Both sexes

Male

Female

4,033,171

1,935,332

2,097,839

1,856,665

1,213,192

643,473

13,253,296

7,076,574

6,176,722

927,909

505,376

422,534

1,774,083

903,920

870,163

69,226

41,267

27,959

1,259,450

637,293

622,157

38,037

18,536

19,501

407,369

206,824

200,545

41,539,255

20,969,064

20,570,191

34,679,773

17,175,375

17,504,398

203,436

99,036

104,400

0

0

0

2,203,772

1,095,711

1,108,061

172,564

94,116

78,448

667,483

566,344

101,140

961,821

518,411

443,410

1,073,502

530,676

542,826

Total (all ages)
150
160
170
180
185

Encephalitis

8.

Hepatitis

205

240
250
260
270
280
285

Tetanus

7.

200

230

d.
Meningitis

190

220

Measles

6.

186

210

c.

9.

a.

Acute hepatitis A

b.

Acute hepatitis B

c.

Acute hepatitis C

d.

Acute hepatitis E

Parasitic and vector diseases
a.

Malaria

b.

African Trypanosomiasis

c.

Chagas disease

d.

Schistosomiasis

e.

Leishmaniasis

f.

lymphatic filariasis

g.

Onchocerciasis

h.

Cysticercosis
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Table B6: (Continued)
Both sexes

Male

Female

36,646

17,188

19,458

102,224

44,356

57,868

40,217

16,641

23,576

656,589

452,664

203,925

741,227

358,546

382,682

1,148,255

521,553

626,701

564,288

252,943

311,345

89,280

44,304

44,977

494,686

224,306

270,379

0

0

0

75,760

34,452

41,308

8,832,348

4,891,759

3,940,589

Total (all ages)
295
300
310
315
320
330

10.

340
350
360
362
365
370

i.

Echinococcosis

j.

Dengue

k.

Trachoma

l.

Yellow fever

m.

Rabies

Intestinal nematode infections
a.

Ascariasis

b.

Trichuriasis

c.

Hookworm disease

d.

Food-bourne trematodes

11.

Leprosy

12.

Other infectious diseases

*Number used highlighted in red within the table
(Source: Metrics: Disability-Adjusted Life Years (DALY) https://www.who.int/healthinfo/global_burden_disease/metrics_daly/en/
Global Health Estimates 2016: DALYs by age, sex, and cause
Region:

African Region 2016
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